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Abstract  
 
This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the PETI Committee, aims to update the 
2016 study “Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of 
humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants”. It takes stock of and examines the latest 
developments that have taken place since 2016, specifically the legislative and policy 
changes, along with various forms and cases of criminalisation of humanitarian actors, 
migrants’ family members and basic service providers. The study uses the notion of 
‘policing humanitarianism’ to describe not only cases of formal prosecution and sentencing 
in criminal justice procedures, but also wider dynamics of suspicion, intimidation, 
harassment and disciplining in five selected Member States – Belgium, France, Greece, 
Hungary and Italy. Policing humanitarianism negatively affects EU citizens’ rights – such as 
the freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and freedom of conscience. When civil society 
is effectively (self-)silenced and its accountability role undermined, policies to combat 
migrant smuggling may be overused and give rise to serious breaches of the EU’s founding 
values, notably the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. Moreover, policing 
humanitarianism negatively affects wider societal trust and diverts the limited resources of 
law enforcement from investigating more serious crimes. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
Overview 
This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional 
Affairs at the request of the European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions, serves to update the 2016 study “Fit 
for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants”.1 
The initial study undertook a legal and socio-political assessment of the EU’s tools aimed combatting migrant 
smuggling. It mapped the so-called EU Facilitators’ Package comprising the EU’s Facilitation Directive2 and 
Framework Decision.3 The initial study assessed EU legislation against the international legal framework and 
explored the direct and indirect effects of these laws and/or policies on civil society organisations, local 
authorities and ship-owners in 17 EU Member States. The initial study concluded that the EU Facilitators’ Package 
is not fit for purpose and thus legislative change is needed to bring the EU legislation and policies in line with 
international, regional and EU criminal justice and fundamental rights standards. In 2017, the European 
Commission undertook a regulatory fitness and performance (REFIT) assessment of the EU Facilitators’ Package, 
but despite the evidence in preceding studies, it refrained from changing the EU’s anti-smuggling laws and 
transforming old ‘third-pillar’ legislation into new Lisbon Treaty instruments.4 
This 2019 update study regards such REFIT findings as a problem and attributes some responsibility to the 
vagueness of the EU Facilitators’ Package. This study provides even more evidence of wide-spread criminalisation 
of civil society actors that have saved the lives of refugees and other migrants in the Central Mediterranean and 
Aegean Seas, and who have provided basic services and assistance upon their arrival – in the hotspots in Greece 
and Italy and in places of transit and residence in Belgium, Hungary and France. It takes stock of and evaluates 
the developments across the EU that have taken place since 2016 up until November 2018.  
The study compiles a selection of practical cases where civil society actors have experienced various forms of 
interference when providing humanitarian assistance and enabling access to rights (see Section 3). These 
dynamics can be better understood not only through the lens of ‘criminalisation’ on the grounds of migrant 
smuggling, but also more widely through the notion of “policing humanitarianism”.5 The notion of policing 
covers the four different, but interlinked forms (modalities) of interference with civil society’s free space ranging 
from suspicion, intimidation and harassment to disciplining and actual criminal justice measures, such as 
misguided prosecutions. The media monitoring exercise captured 92 entries/articles indicating the institutional 
nature of policing and its escalation in 10 EU Member States and at the EU level (see Annex1). 
The so-called European humanitarian refugee crisis started in 2015. In the beginning it was characterised by an 
unprecedented number of irregular arrivals to the EU who were driven by conflict and instability in the Middle 
East (in countries including Syria as well as Libya and Afghanistan) and other regions (e.g. West Africa and North 
Africa), coupled with a lack of adequate reception infrastructure in European host states. Local citizens, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and volunteers from all across European Union were first responders to the 
                                                                    
1 S. Carrera, E. Guild, A. Aliverti, J. Allsopp, M. Manieri and M. Levoy (2016), “Fit for Purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the 
Criminalization of Humanitarian Assistance to Irregular Migrants”, Study for the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee, 
Brussels. 
2 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ 
L 328, 5 December 2002.   
3 Council of the European Union (2002) Council framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal 
framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, 2002/946/JHA, OJ L 328, 5 December 2002. 
4 European Commission (2017), REFIT evaluation of the EU legal framework against facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence: The Facilitators Package (Directive 2002/90/EC and Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA, Staff Working Document, SWD 
(2017) 117 final, Brussels, 22 March. 
5 S. Carrera, V. Mitsilegas, J. Allsopp and L. Vosyliute (forthcoming), “Policing Humanitarianism: EU Policies Against Human 
Smuggling and their Impact on Civil Society”, Hart Publishing (https://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/policing-
humanitarianism-9781509923014/).  
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‘crisis’ in Greece, Italy and elsewhere.6 In 2015, the State of the Union address by President of the European 
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, called for more solidarity as a noble mission that EU Member States need to 
undertake together: “But when, generations from now, people read about this moment in Europe’s history books, 
let it read that we stood together in demonstrating compassion and opened our homes to those in need of our 
protection.”7 However, later public moods shifted towards more restrictive approaches on migration and in turn 
– on humanitarian assistance.  
The study finds that preventing civil society actors from fulfilling their humanitarian and human rights missions 
is likely to have assorted negative consequences affecting a range of actors, including citizens and society as a 
whole. These not only include well-documented negative impacts on the lives and human dignity of asylum 
seekers and immigrants, but also on the rights and freedoms of EU citizens as well as democratic rule of law 
principles at the EU and national levels. Quite paradoxically, removing access to basic service provision and 
assistance from irregular migrants in the name of ‘combatting human smuggling’ leads to more insecurity for all 
actors and individuals involved, and even increased opportunities for various criminal groups in the EU and in 
third countries.8  
The detrimental effects of criminalising solidarity towards migrants and refugees are well documented by 
academia and by international and regional human rights bodies.9 This study takes a new approach – the policing 
of civil society actors and citizens. This approach suggests that citizens’ rights and freedom of assembly are put into 
question when acts of compassion and solidarity are criminalised. The infringements on activities of civil society 
actors, some of which are ensuring the accountability of state policies on migration in light of human rights and 
humanitarian grounds, often have broader ramifications for the EU’s fundamental values, chiefly the rule of law, 
democracy and fundamental rights enshrined in the Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In particular, on the possibility for EU citizens to promote, enjoy and defend 
fundamental rights within the EU Member States. 
The current study shows that this worrying increase in policing of civil society actors has not happened in a legal 
and political vacuum. First, the EU Facilitators’ Package has itself created legal uncertainty over what is (not) a 
crime of migrant smuggling.10 The UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants provides clearer answers. The 
Protocol considers ‘migrant smuggling’ as a crime when committed for financial or other material benefit 
purposes.11 Despite the concerns expressed since the presentation of and negotiations on the EU Facilitators’ 
Package in 2002 by members of the European Parliament and public, the EU opted for the creation of new 
criminal concepts – ‘facilitation of entry and transit’ and ‘facilitation of residence and stay’.  
The new notion of ‘facilitation of entry and transit’ does not require proof of financial benefit or other material 
benefit to be considered a crime. Thus, in the EU Member States it is possible to prosecute for actions that do not 
                                                                    
6 S. Carrera, J. Allsopp, & L. Vosyliūtė (2018), “Policing the mobility society: the effects of EU anti-migrant smuggling policies 
on humanitarianism”. International Journal of Migration and Border Studies, 4(3), pp. 236-276. 
7 President of the European Commission (2015) State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity. Press Release, 
European Commission. 9 September (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en.htm). 
8 S. Carrera and E. Guild (eds) (2016), Irregular Migration, trafficking and smuggling of human beings: Policy Dilemmas in the EU, 
CEPS, Brussels; V. Mitsilegas, & Y. S. Holiday (2018), “The criminalisation of irregular migrants”. In E. Guild, & T. Basaran (eds) 
(2019), “Global Labour and the Migrant Premium the Cost of working abroad”, London: Routledge; X. Zhang, G. Sanchez, L. 
Achilli (2018) “Crimes of Solidarity in Mobility: Alternative Views on Migrant Smuggling”, The Annals, 676 (1), 21 February, pp. 
6-15. 
9 See for example UN Special Procedures (2018), Joint communication of Special Procedures ahead of the informal summit of 
EU heads of state or government in Salzburg, OL OTH 64/2018, on 19-20 September 2018; UN Human Rights Office (2017), “In 
search of dignity: Report on the human rights of migrants at Europe’s borders”, United Nations, Geneva; Council of Europe 
Venice Commission Legal Experts (2018), “Hungary: “Stop Soros” Provision on Illegal Migration Should Be Repealed as It 
Seriously Impairs Legitimate NGO Work”, Strasbourg, 22 June (https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-rule-of-law/-
/hungary-stop-soros-provision-on-illegal-migration-should-be-repealed-as-it-seriously-impairs-legitimate-ngo-work-say-
venice-commission-legal-experts). 
10 S. Carrera, et al. (2016), op. cit. 
11 United Nations General Assembly (2000), Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Resolution 55/25, 15 November (URL). 
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have clear criminal intent, namely, an aim to generate profit from migrant smuggling, in contradiction with Article 
6 of the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants. Only four out of 28 EU Member States are in line with UN 
standards. So, only in Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal do criminal proceedings require a proof of 
migrant smugglers obtaining financial or other material benefit for their actions.12 Interestingly, in these 
countries, media monitoring has not captured interferences with civil society free space, which is an indication 
that a good definition of ‘what is a crime?’ could by default prevent misguided prosecutions, when humanitarian 
actors are acting without profit motives. 
The ‘facilitation of residence’ does require financial or other material benefit. However, it does not exempt bona-
fide service providers, such as, for instance, land-lords, hotels and AirBnB providers, that charge smuggled 
migrants the same amount as any other clients, without any ‘unjust enrichment’ motive. This means that 
companies or organisations whose business model is providing the service and not profiting from the vulnerable 
situation of migrants are at risk of being criminalised.   
However, even if the EU Facilitation Directive requires the profit motive to establish the crime for the ‘facilitation 
of residence and stay’, this is not the case in 13 out of 28 EU Member States, namely, in Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.13 When  
facilitation of residence and stay without a profit factor is sufficient to establish a crime or offence, non-profit civil 
society actors, including citizen movements, as well as family members and friends are at risk of criminalisation.14 
It is illustrated in Chapter 4 and Annex 1 that indeed these have been the developments in Belgium, France, 
Greece, and the United Kingdom.  
In addition, the Facilitation Directive (Article1:2) suggests that each Member States can choose whether to 
criminalise civil society acting for humanitarian purposes for the facilitation of entry without profit motives, which 
is legally, politically and morally wrong. The relevant paragraph reads as follows:15  
Any Member State may decide not to impose sanctions with regard to the behaviour defined in 
paragraph 1(a) by applying its national law and practice for cases where the aim of the behaviour is to 
provide humanitarian assistance to the person concerned. 
Therefore, the Facilitation Directive stands at odds with the EU’s founding values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, 
the EU’s Fundamental Rights Charter, and its commitment to secure and protect humanitarian actors outside the 
EU – as noted in the Article 214 TEU and as has been widely agreed in the European High Level Consensus on 
Humanitarian Aid.16 
In addition, the Facilitation Directive does not cover humanitarian assistance in situations of residence and stay 
(in paragraph 1(b)). In countries, where such exemptions are declared, they are drafted overly narrow, as only 
covering situations of life and death that are already covered by international maritime law. In other countries, 
this leads to a discussion on what is genuine humanitarian assistance.  Some forms of explicit exemption were 
found in Belgium, Greece, Spain, Finland, Italy, Malta and the United Kingdom.17 Nevertheless, formal 
prosecutions occurred in countries where humanitarian exemptions were declared. The subsequent analysis in 
Section 3 and Annex 1 indicates that formal prosecutions of humanitarian actors were launched in Belgium, 
Greece, Italy, Malta and the United Kingdom.  
                                                                    
12 FRA (2014), “Criminalisation of Migrants in an Irregular Situation and of Persons engaging with them”, Vienna, March 
13 FRA (2014), “Criminalisation of Migrants in an Irregular Situation and of Persons engaging with them”, Vienna, March. 
14 S. Carrera, et al. (2016), op. cit. 
15 EU Facilitation Directive 2002/90, Article 1 para.2, emphasis added.  
16 Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the 
Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission (2008), The European Consensus on Humanitarian aid, 
(2008/C 25/01), 30.1.2018. (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/consensus_en.pdf) 
17 European Parliament Committee on Petitions (2017), Notice to Members - Subject: Petition No 1247/2016 by Paula Schmid 
Porras (Spanish) on behalf of NGO Professional Emergency Aid (PROEM-AID) concerning the criminalisation of persons 
engaging with migrants in an irregular situation and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance at sea, 31.7.2017.  
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Concerns have been raised, for example by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), that the legal definition of 
the facilitation of irregular migration is over broad and also fails to exempt important humanitarian actors who 
are acting on charitable intent.18 The UNODC Legislative Guide also confirms that the purpose of having an 
international legal framework to prosecute migrant smuggling should take into account the rights of others, in 
particular the right to seek asylum: “the Protocol should not require States to criminalize or take other action 
against groups that smuggle migrants for charitable or altruistic reasons”.19 
Despite the abovementioned non-compliances with the EU Facilitators’ Package, there were no infringement 
procedures started. The European Commission seems to have experienced reluctance on the part of EU Member 
States to report about the implementation of the Framework Decision for years after it was passed. For example, 
in 2006, five Member States were not providing the relevant information to the Commission and from four, the 
information that could not be used for the in-depth assessment.20 At that time, the Commission has been 
questioning the impact of the Facilitators’ Package and, in line with the judgment of the European Court of Justice 
in case C-176/0, putting forward the idea of a new EU instrument, bringing the Framework Decision and Directive 
into one legal act that  “aims at a higher level of harmonisation” in defining crimes and sanctions.21 After 2010, 
with the Treaty of Lisbon entering into force, and in particular, after its Protocol 36 on ‘Transitional Provisions’ 
(Title VII, Article 10) of the Lisbon Treaty, came to an end in December 2014, the Commission had new possibilities 
to inject ‘more EU’ within the former ‘third pillar’ legislation, meaning that new legislation in criminal  matters 
would move beyond ‘minimum approximation’ towards ‘more harmonisation’.22   
The uncertainty, compounded with the lack of compliance emerging from current EU and its Member States 
policies and laws, has been reflected in recent and ongoing concerns of European citizens and policy-makers. In 
October 2016, Paula Schmid Porras presented Petition 1247/2016 to the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Petitions (PETI) regarding the charges against the three Spanish lifeguards volunteering for PROEM-Aid on Lesvos 
island, Greece on the grounds of migrant smuggling.23 In November 2018, the PETI Committee heard the 
Petitioner, who was calling for obligatory exemption of humanitarian assistance from criminalisation in the EU’s 
Facilitation Directive as, despite the acquittal of her clients in May 2018, new misguided prosecutions against 
volunteers had been initiated by Greek authorities. 24  
The cases of criminalisation of solidarity has mobilised citizens at the European and national levels. The European 
Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) called “We are a welcoming Europe – let us help!” (#WelcomingEurope) reflects increasing 
concerns among citizens and volunteers offering assistance to immigrants and asylum seekers in the EU. The ECI 
is supported by more than 170 organisations.  The petition aims to gather a million signatures.  It calls upon the 
                                                                    
18 FRA (2014), “Criminalisation of Migrants in an Irregular Situation and of Persons engaging with them”, Vienna, March.  
19 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2004), Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto, UN Sales No. E.05.V.2. 
20 European Commission (2006) Report from the Commission based on Article 9 of the Council Framework Decision of 28 
November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence, COM/2006/770 final, Brussels, 6.12.2006. (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52006DC0770).  
21 Ibid. 
22 S. Carrera, N. Hernanz and J. Parkin (2013) "The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the European Parliament Assessing progress, shortcomings 
and challenges for democratic accountability in the area of freedom, security and justice", CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in 
Europe, No. 58, CEPS, September. (https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/LSE%20No%2058%20Lisbonisation%20of%20EP.pdf).  
23 European Parliament (2017), Petition No 1247/2016 by Paula Schmid Porras (Spanish) on behalf of NGO Professional 
Emergency Aid (PROEM-AID) concerning the criminalisation of persons engaging with migrants in an irregular situation and 
the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance at sea, Committee on Petitions, Brussels, 31.7. 2017. 
24 European Parliament, Committee on Petitions (2018) Recording of the Committee meeting on 21 November, 2018, from 
15:41 to 18:33, The European Parliament’s Multimedia Centre. (www.europarl.europa.eu, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-
live/en/committees/video?event=20181121-1430-COMMITTEE-PETI).   
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European Commission to decriminalise humanitarian assistance across the EU and to support EU citizens who 
want to offer safety to people seeking international protection.25  
The European Civic Forum has also initiated the knowledge-sharing online tool called ‘Civic Space Watch’ that 
provides a possibility for putting “together alerts from civil society, existing analyses and institutional resources” 
about the infringements on civil society free space.26  
In addition to civil society, regional and international bodies started to raise their concerns regarding the situation 
of human rights defenders across the EU. For example, Dunja Mijatovic, the Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights highlighted “worrying retrogression in the protection of human rights defenders and their ability 
to work in a growing number of European countries”.27 She called on governments to “value human rights 
defenders for their engagement and contributions towards the peaceful and just functioning of society”.28 Also, 
the World Organisation Against Torture started to follow the situation of judicial harassment of humanitarian and 
human rights organisations in EU Member States within the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of 
Human Rights Defenders in the EU.29 
Second, the political climate and policy salience of migration has changed. Prior to 2015, attempts to criminalise 
acts of solidarity could be remedied partly by traditional criminal justice ‘checks and balances’ – for example, 
prosecutors might drop a humanitarian facilitation case on the basis of a public interest test, as foreseen in the 
professional codes for prosecutors.30 Yet, since the European humanitarian refugee crisis of 2015, the so-called 
fight against migrant smuggling became a key political priority for the European Agenda on Migration31 and the 
European Security Agenda.32 Anti-smuggling measures were also artificially framed as migration management 
tools to reduce irregular immigration at the times of ‘crisis’. As a consequence, actors with different mandates 
were deployed to combat migrant smuggling – from border guards, including Frontex officers, gathering 
intelligence at the hot-spots,33 to military actors, such as EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia destroying boats 
used for smuggling in the Mediterranean and even NATO ships – providing situational awareness.34  Some of 
these actors portrayed the humanitarian assistance provided by civil society actors as  non-cooperative, 
suspicious, if not overall counterproductive to the underlying goal of ‘stemming the flows’.35 
Thirdly, the fight against migrant smuggling has been used to disguise the deficits of the European solidarity at 
times of ‘crisis’ when unilateral and self-interested decisions have prevailed. Some politicians demonstrated “the 
crisis of leadership that has set states against each other, and citizens against newcomers, in a race to the populist 
bottom”.36 In some of the countries this “race to the bottom” entailed violating the very founding principles of 
the EU, such as fundamental rights and rule of law.37 Some of them have passed the burden of responsibility over 
                                                                    
25 For more information refer to http://www.weareawelcomingeurope.eu/. 
26 For more information refer to https://civicspacewatch.eu/about-the-watch/  
27 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights (2018) “States’ Duty to Protect Human Rights Defenders”, Council of 
Europe,  Strasbourg 6 December, (https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/view/-
/asset_publisher/ugj3i6qSEkhZ/content/states-duty-to-protect-human-rights-defenders).  
28 Ibid. 
29 World Organisation Against Torture, “Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders” 
(http://www.omct.org/human-rights-defenders/observatory/).   
30 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op. cit. 
31 European Commission (2015a), “A European Agenda on Migration”, Communication, COM(2015) 240 final, Brussels, 13 May. 
32 European Commission (2015b), “The European Agenda on Security”, Communication, COM(2015) 185 final, Strasbourg, 28 
April. 
33 See for example: Frontex (2017), Annual Risk Analysis (for 2016), 15 February.  
34 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op. cit. 
35 Forensic Oceanography (2017), Report “Blaming Rescuers” by C. Heller and L. Pezzani, was produced as part of the Forensic 
Architecture agency at Goldsmiths (University of London) (https://blamingtherescuers.org/).  
36 E. Ambrosi (2017), “The unbearable lightness of leadership”, Opinion, EUobserver, Brussels, 18 October 
(https://euobserver.com/opinion/139507).  
37 See for example: P. Wintour (2017), “Italian minister defends methods that led to 87% drop in migrants from Libya”, The 
Guardian, 7 September. 
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the ‘emergency’ to other  EU Member States, third countries and to humanitarian actors, in particular those saving 
lives at sea.38   
This study finds that when the argument of ‘the fight against migrant smuggling’ is used not for the purpose of 
bringing criminal groups to justice, it risks becoming politicised. The fight against migrant smuggling in recent 
years has been reframed as a broader security and migration management issue, that has justified interferences 
with civil society free space for the purpose of preventing and stemming flows of asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants. The study provides evidence on ‘misguided prosecutions’ of humanitarian actors, service providers and 
smuggled migrants, that served to discourage migration. In such situations, traditional criminal justice checks 
and balances are critically diminished by overriding political influences.39 Therefore, the study proposes shifting 
the burden of proof from civil society organisations whether their actions constitute ‘genuine humanitarian 
assistance’,  to a question for national governments and EU agencies  – of what are the objectives of ‘a genuine 
fight against migrant smuggling’ that needs to be supported from the EU budget.  
Therefore, the legal vagueness of the EU Facilitators’ Package regarding what is (not) a crime, when combined 
with the political salience of migration issue, the lack of an EU-level holistic approach and long-term solutions on 
migration and asylum policies, has led to an increase in the EU’s political and operational support and funding 
for anti-smuggling activities. This has resulted in the policing of citizens and civil society in the receiving societies, 
specifically in search and rescue (SAR) at sea as well as along land borders and transit zones. This has negative 
consequences for social trust.  
SAR in the Mediterranean Sea 
While some Member States were overwhelmed, unable and/or unwilling to conduct effective SAR activities, civil 
society actors were there to fill ‘the protection gap’ at sea (see Annex 4). The code of conduct imposed by Italy on 
civil society SAR activities, coupled with the creation of related offences, has effectively led to the withdrawal of 
civil society missions in the Central Mediterranean where they have largely been replaced by the Libyan coast 
guard.40  
The net of suspicion was cast ever wider as these changes evolved. In Italy, Carmelo Zuccaro, the prosecutor in 
Catania, spread unfounded accusations that NGOs conducting SAR were ‘colluding with smugglers’ in Italian 
media.41 Even though the subsequent hearing in the Italian senate showed that the prosecutor had no evidence 
to support his claims,42 several politicians took up the accusations, labelling SAR NGOs as “migrant taxis” and 
exploiting them for populist purposes of political mobilisation of electorates.43 Subsequently, a binding code of 
conduct was adopted in Italy as a disciplining measure solely targeting NGOs conducting SAR in the Central 
Mediterranean. This was seen by civil society, academia and human rights bodies as a major attack on SAR NGOs 
and their independence. It institutionalised suspicion and introduced an exceptional application of international 
maritime law so that it applied only to civil society and not to merchant or government ships.44  
                                                                    
38 Forensic Oceanography (2017), Report “Blaming Rescuers” by C. Heller and L. Pezzani, was produced as part of the Forensic 
Architecture agency at Goldsmiths (University of London) (https://blamingtherescuers.org/).  
39 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op. cit. 
40 P. Cuttitta (2018a), “Pushing Migrants Back to Libya, Persecuting Rescue NGOs: The End of the Humanitarian Turn (Part I)”, 
Border Criminologies Blog, 18 April (https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-
criminologies/blog/2018/04/pushing-migrants). P. Cuttitta (2018b), “Pushing Migrants Back to Libya, Persecuting Rescue 
NGOs: The End of the Humanitarian Turn (Part II)”, Border Criminologies Blog, 19 April (https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-
subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/04/pushing-0). 
41 DW (2017), “Italy Prosecutor Claims NGOs Working with Human Smugglers”, News, 24 April (http://www.dw.com/en/italy-
prosecutor-claims-ngos-working-with-human-smugglers/a-38554753).  
42 The Malta Independent (2017), “Italian Prosecutor: No NGOs-Migrant Smuggler Links Emerge”, 3 May 
(http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2017-05-03/local-news/Italian-prosecutor-no-NGOs-migrant-smuggler-links-
emerge-6736173786).  
43 Adnkronos (2017), “Sink NGO “migrant Taxis” in Med Says Salvini”, 27 April (https://www.adnkronos.com/aki-
en/security/2017/04/27/sink-ngo-migrant-taxis-med-says-salvini_B7Zq5H1MwzMZ4NiAtuYJjK.html).  
44 Sea Watch (2017) ““Nonsensical”, “Dishonest”, “Illegal”: the ‘Code of Conduct’”, Interview with  
Dr. Violeta Moreno-Lax, 24 July (https://sea-watch.org/en/nonsensical-dishonest-illegal-the-code-of-conduct/). 
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The Italian binding code of conduct stirred legal uncertainty and imposed a major restriction on SAR NGOs – not 
granting automatic permission to disembark rescued persons to the closest port of safety. In response, some 
major NGOs, such as MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), Save the Children, Sea-Eye and MOAS (Migrant Offshore 
Aid Station), have suspended their operations, while others, like Jugend Rettet and Proactiva Open Arms were 
prosecuted and their vessels seized. Similarly, in the Aegean, SAR NGOs Team Humanity and Proem-AID 
(Professional Emergency Aid) were prosecuted by Greek authorities, although they were eventually acquitted.45 
A further misguided prosecution in Greece accused ten volunteers of migrant smuggling. The Greek authorities 
resorted to detention of two volunteers – Sarah Mardini and Sean Binder – who were held in a high security prison 
pending their trial.46 
In the Central Mediterranean, at the time of reporting, the only remaining big NGO ship is Aquarius, which is run 
by SOS Mediterranée and MSF. Aquarius has become a symbol of the lack of a common EU policy on migration 
and asylum in the Mediterranean, and the lack of solidarity among EU Member States and towards asylum seekers 
and people at risk at sea, as it continues to navigate a number of unresolved political controversies, from closed 
ports to refusals to grant a state flag to the vessel.47 In addition, in Italy, the government of Salvini also attacked 
national coast guard authorities performing SAR,48 Salvini, also demanded changes in EU operations, such as 
Operation Sophia, so that they would no longer disembark rescued people.49 These developments have led to a 
drop in the absolute numbers of sea crossings; however, the mortality rate in the Mediterranean has increased.50 
Through its (in)action, funding and political or operational cooperation, the EU bears responsibility for the 
violations of human rights of refugees and other migrants (see Figure 4. Mortality rate per thousand sea crossings 
in the Mediterranean, January 2014 – March, 2018).51  
Land borders and transit zones 
At land borders and transit zones,52 the policing of humanitarianism takes different shapes. In Hungary, the 
government spread various accusations against leading human rights organisations for being potential ‘migrant 
smugglers’.53 Soon after, certain civil society organisations were prohibited from entering border transit zones 
and this eventually led to changes in the Hungarian Criminal Code that enabled the criminalisation of any 
organisation working with migrants for activities such as “preparing or distributing informational materials” or 
“initiating asylum requests for migrants”.54 The fight against migrant smuggling has in this way been used as a 
justification by the Hungarian government to start judicial and fiscal harassment of humanitarian and human 
                                                                    
45 A. Safdar (2016), “NGOs decry charges against volunteers in Greece”, Al Jazeera, 16 January 
(http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/ngos-decry-arrests-volunteer-lifeguards-greece-160116193522648.html); Team 
Humanity (2018), “Danish Lifeguard fighting a battle of injustice”, Crowdfunding Campaign 
(https://startsomegood.com/danish-lifeguard-fighting-a-battle-of-injustice). 
46 Smith, H. (2018) “Arrest of Syrian ‘hero Swimmer’ Puts Lesbos Refugees Back in Spotlight”, The Guardian, 6 September. 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/06/arrest-of-syrian-hero-swimmer-lesbos-refugees-sara-mardini). 
47 Carrera and Lannoo (2018), op. cit. 
48 L’Obs (2018) “Migrants du Diciotti : pourquoi Matteo Salvini est poursuivi par la justice italienne.”  26 August 
(https://www.nouvelobs.com/monde/migrants/20180826.OBS1328/migrants-du-diciotti-pourquoi-matteo-salvini-est-
poursuivi-par-la-justice-italienne.html).  
49 Euractiv (2018) “Italy to Push EU for Reform of ‘Operation Sophia.’” Euractiv.Com, 30 August 
(https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/italy-to-push-eu-for-reform-of-operation-sophia/).  
50 L. Vosyliūtė (2018), “Is saving lives still a priority for the EU?”, Reconnecting Europe Blog, 19 April 
(http://www.picum.org/Documents/Publi/2018/Main-Findings-of-the-Report-2018.pdf). 
51 S. Carrera, El Qadim, N., Fullerton, M., Garcés-Mascareñas, B., Kneebone, S. Y., López Sala, A., Chun Luk, N., Vosyliūtė, L (2018), 
“Offshoring Asylum and Migration in Australia, Spain, Tunisia and the US: Lessons learned and feasibility for the EU”, CEPS 
Research Reports, Brussels, September 2018. 
52 De Vries, Carrera and Guild (2016). 
53 S. Walker (2018), “Hungary to Criminalise Migrant Helpers with ‘Stop Soros’ Legislation.” The Guardian, 29 May. 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/29/hungary-criminalises-migrant-helpers-stop-george-soros-legislation) 
54 Council of Europe Venice Commission Legal Experts (2018), “Hungary: “Stop Soros” Provision on Illegal Migration Should Be 
Repealed as It Seriously Impairs Legitimate NGO Work, Say Venice Commission Legal Experts”, op. cit. 
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rights civil society organisations and to reduce their capacity to uphold fundamental rights and the rule of law in 
the country.55  
This has been recognised by a recent Joint Opinion issued by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission and 
OSCE’s ODIHR (Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe, Office of Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights). It deals with Hungary “On the Provisions of the So-Called ‘Stop Soros’ Draft Legislative Package, 
which Directly Affect NGOs”.56 It concluded that the Hungarian legislation constitutes an unlawful interference 
with the freedom of association, and in some cases, expression. The Joint Opinion also highlighted that a legal 
provision in domestic law concerning the criminalisation of facilitation of irregular migration may pursue a 
legitimate aim, yet it “must not be used as a pretext to control NGOs or to restrict their ability to carry out their 
legitimate work nor as a means to hinder persons from applying for asylum”.  
In other Member States, such as Belgium and France, civil society actors and, in particular, individual volunteers 
acting in solidarity with refugees and migrants were also seen with suspicion and prosecuted for hosting them. 
Some politicians in these governments have also attempted changes in their legislation. For example, in Belgium, 
the minister of justice, secretary of state for asylum, migration and administrative simplification as well as the 
deputy prime minister proposed a law allowing the police to enter private households to search for migrants with 
expulsion orders without the proper house search order issued by an independent judge. The proposed law was 
widely criticised by the judiciary, civil society and academia, as well as by local authorities, for opening a new 
avenue to intimidate and criminalise citizens who were acting in solidarity with refugees and immigrants.57  
The compilation of practical cases in Annex 1 of this study shows that such civil society actors face a range of 
challenges: they are often looked upon with suspicion; they are harassed and intimidated by local authorities and 
police (see, for example, the ample testimonies by volunteers being teargassed in Italy and Greece); they are 
disciplined for unrelated offences with the aim of stopping their humanitarian activities (such as food hygiene 
norms imposed to stop the distribution of food to persons in an irregular situation in France); or they are brought 
to prosecution in criminal courts for activities that have otherwise been praised, with various nominations and 
prizes.58  
A key finding of this research is that even when such cases result in eventual acquittals, the damage has already 
been done – society in general is encouraged to view humanitarians as criminal suspects and individuals and 
groups are discouraged from providing assistance to vulnerable asylum seekers and migrants. The policing of 
civil society actors negatively affects fundamental rights of EU citizens, the freedom of assembly, freedom of 
speech and opinion, all of which lay at the foundations of national constitutional systems and EU primary law. 
Civil society, and the human right of freedom of association enabling its very existence, constitutes a central piece 
in the wider democratic rule of law puzzle. When civil society is dismantled and effectively silenced or side-lined, 
this constitutes a major threat to the EU’s founding values – democratic rule of law with fundamental rights – laying 
at the basis of mutual-trust cooperation.  
Still, refugees and other migrants pay the highest price – their lives are simply not saved at sea or their human 
dignity is negated at the border and transit zones. They are left to starve and even die from preventable diseases, 
left without shelter or without sleeping bags, without legal advice and possibilities to submit legitimate claims 
for international protection.59 Such policies increase the destitution of migrants and their exclusion from basic 
socioeconomic services and rights. This in itself qualifies as inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to all 
                                                                    
55 M. Szuleka (2018), “First Victims or Last Guardians? The Consequences of Rule of Law Backsliding for NGOs: Case Studies of 
Hungary and Poland”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 2018-06, CEPS, Brussels, 24 April 
(https://www.ceps.eu/publications/first-victims-or-last-guardians-consequences-rule-law-backsliding-ngos-case-studies). 
56 Council of Europe Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR (2018), Joint Opinion on the Provisions of the So-Called ‘Stop Soros’ 
Draft Legislative Package which Directly Affect NGOs, CDL-AD(2018)013, Strasbourg, 25 June. 
57 L’Echo, “Le projet de loi sur les visites domiciliaires mis au frigo”, 21 August (https://www.lecho.be/economie-
politique/belgique/federal/le-projet-de-loi-sur-les-visites-domiciliaires-mis-au-frigo/10041620.html) 
58 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op. cit. 
59 L. Fekete, F. Weber and A. Edmond-Pettitt (2017), Humanitarianism: the unacceptable face of solidarity, Institute of Race 
Relations, London; J. Allsopp (2017), “Solidarity, smuggling and the European Refugee Crisis: Civil society and its Discontents”, 
Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, 3/17. 
Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants: 2018 update 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 17 
relevant legally binding international, regional and EU human rights instruments. Consensus on this is emerging 
among civil society actors and EU citizens at a national level and across the international and regional bodies that 
are responsible for the monitoring and implementation of human rights standards.60  
The United Nations is also becoming increasingly concerned about these developments. A Joint Communication 
of Special Procedures issued on September 2018 by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(including five UN special rapporteurs) addressed to the presidents of the European Commission, the European 
Council and the European Parliament “ahead of the informal summit of EU heads of state or government in 
Salzburg on 19–20 September 2018” raised similar issues about the impacts of irregular immigration policies on 
civil society actors. The Joint Communication underlined that “[t]he EU and its Member States must ensure that 
acts of solidarity with migrants by civil society organisations and human rights defenders, including during search 
and rescue operations and border crossing, are not criminalised”.61  
In addition, some of the activities of EU justice and home affairs agencies involved in addressing migrant 
smuggling are based on widespread, yet robust evidence lacking assumptions about this phenomenon. There is 
a paradox in the narrative found in the key reports about the highly organised, hierarchical, transnational criminal 
groups of migrant smugglers.62 On the one hand, the migrant smugglers that are violent and driven by greed and 
involved in other criminal activities (such as human trafficking, arms trafficking and terrorism), but on the other 
hand, the local community members or people providing services via peer-to-peer platforms (such as BlaBlaCar 
or AirBnB) can ‘inadvertently’ become migrant smugglers. 
Moreover, beyond the statistics of prosecutions on migrant smuggling, qualitative analysis shows that in many 
cases those affected are family members, friends who acted out of compassion or asylum seekers who had no 
other legal alternative to access the EU, but to come under forged documents and become criminalised. Women 
and children who get involved in migrant smuggling are in a particularly vulnerable and precarious situation, for 
example, migrant children collaborating with smugglers for a discount on their journey are prosecuted as migrant 
smugglers and depending on the national legislation – lose their right to seek asylum. Therefore, the prosecutions 
in these cases raise concerns of secondary victimisation rather than dismantle ‘organised criminal groups’.  
Finally, measures taken in cooperation with countries of origin and destination indicate that the fight against 
migrant smuggling leads to greater and strengthened involvement of more professional criminals. This happens 
when anti-smuggling measures are promoted by the EU or its Member States in third countries for migration 
management concerns, disregarding the general rule of law situation, corruption and potential impacts on the 
human rights of citizens and migrants attempting to transit their respective third countries. Anecdotal evidence 
illustrates that sometimes EU Member States may even use slush-funds to bribe foreign militias and high-ranking 
migrant smugglers for short-term political goals.63   
Conclusions and recommendations 
The European Commission’s REFIT assessment of the EU Facilitators’ Package was a missed opportunity to bring 
EU legislation in line with international standards of the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants and the 
increased EU competence in criminal law, laid down in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty and the EU Better Regulation 
                                                                    
60 See for example UN Special Procedures (2018) Joint communication of Special Procedures ahead of the informal summit of 
EU heads of state or government, OL OTH 64/2018, op. cit.; UN Human Rights Office (2017) “In search of dignity: Report on the 
human rights of migrants at Europe’s borders”, op. cit.; Council of Europe Venice Commission Legal Experts (2018), “Hungary: 
“Stop Soros” Provision on Illegal Migration Should Be Repealed as It Seriously Impairs Legitimate NGO Work, Say Venice 
Commission Legal Experts”, op. cit. 
61 UN Special Procedures (2018) Joint communication of Special Procedures ahead of the informal summit of EU heads of state 
or government, OL OTH 64/2018, op. cit.  
62See for example: Europol (2017), “European Union serious and organized crime threat assessment: Crime in the age of 
technology” (SOCTA 2017), Europol, The Hague; Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre (2017), “First Year Activity 
Report: Jan 2016 – Jan 2017”, Europol, The Hague; Frontex, Risk Analysis Unit, Africa-Frontex 2016 Intelligence Community 
Joint Report, Warsaw, April 2017. 
63 P. Wintour (2017) “Italian minister defends methods that led to 87% drop in migrants from Libya”, The Guardian, 7 
September. 2017. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/07/italian-minister-migrants-libya-marco-minniti).  
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guidelines. The UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants and accompanying guidelines provide a clear 
definition and standard of reference of what should be criminalised and what should be exempted. As it stands, 
the EU’s legislation encourages Member States to depart from a main definition through a derogatory clause of 
Article 6(4) of the UN Protocol against Migrant Smuggling, stating that “[n]othing in this Protocol shall prevent a 
State Party from taking measures against a person whose conduct constitutes an offence under its domestic law”. 
However, a wide margin of appreciation makes futile the very purpose of the UN Protocol. 
If the Facilitators’ Package is a criminal justice tool, it needs to bring about more legal certainty across the EU on 
what is criminal and what is to be exempted from criminalisation. As it currently stands it is a ‘bad law’ and should 
be properly ‘Lisbonised’ into a sole EU legal act. Therefore, the conclusions reached in the 2016 study are 
confirmed - the current EU legislation is still ‘not fit for purpose’, and it needs to be changed and clarified. In 
addition, the operational activities of the EU and national agencies involved in the fight against migrant 
smuggling need to be carefully assessed in light of their impacts on the fundamental rights of smuggled migrants, 
their family members and friends as well as civil society actors providing humanitarian assistance. The civic 
society free space of humanitarian and human rights organisations needs to be vigilantly protected.  
The situation in Hungary and Italy illustrates the approach based on closing land and/or sea borders and fighting 
smuggling at all costs. Such approaches lead to violations of the states’ sovereign duty to save lives and safeguard 
human dignity, as well as repression of watch-dog civil society. Hence, in the long-term, such approaches pose a 
risk to EU founding values.  EU justice and home affairs agencies are located in front-line EU Member States to 
support them in securing external EU borders and fighting cross-border crime. EU funding is also channelled for 
this purpose.  In this way, the EU also becomes responsible for Member State actions. 
Recommendation 1: What should be investigated and prosecuted?  
● The EU’s Facilitators’ Package should be changed, ‘Lisbonised’ and brought in line with the UN Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants. The definition of a base crime should therefore insist on financial and 
other material benefit and in particular, on unjust enrichment requirements for the facilitation of entry 
and transit, and for stay and residence.  
● The EU Handbook on Investigating and Prosecuting Migrant Smuggling could further define what kinds 
of crimes the EU needs to focus on and the limits set by criminal justice checks and balances. 
● In this area, the priority should be given to EU police and judicial cooperation tools that are compatible 
with the EU criminal justice standards laid down in the European Investigation Order. 
Recommendation 2: What should not be criminalised?  
● In the EU Facilitation Directive, Article 1:2 should be changed so as to prohibit the criminalisation of 
humanitarian assistance, and to prevent the misguided prosecutions of various humanitarian actors, 
human rights defenders and basic service providers.  
● The definition of ‘humanitarian assistance’ should encompass different forms of solidarity with refugees 
and other migrants, starting from SAR activities and ending with the peaceful disobedience actions of 
human rights defenders. In this context, the EU should draw inspiration from several documents. Firstly, 
in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, ‘humanitarian assistance’ should protect any basic 
service provision that upholds the human dignity of refugees and other migrants and/or that enables 
access to fundamental rights, including the right to asylum, access to justice and legal aid, and others. 
Secondly, the definition agreed in the European High-Level Consensus on Humanitarian Aid64 and also 
the principles and safeguards for the Union humanitarian aid operations foreseen within Article 214 TEU 
should be applicable inside the EU. Finally, the UN Declaration on human rights defenders,65 should 
                                                                    
64 Council of the European Union and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the 
Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission (2008), European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, Joint 
Statement, 2008/C 25/01. OJ C 25, 30 January, pp. 1–12 
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uphold the rights of watch-dog civil society that monitor and uphold the rights of migrants, including 
the various forms of peaceful civil disobedience.  
● The EU, its Member States and local authorities should be encouraged to fund initiatives and projects 
implementing the principle of ‘firewalls’. The ‘firewalls’ call for strict separations between immigration 
enforcement, public services and civil society mandates. For example, immigration authorities should 
not have access to information regarding the migration status of people in need of humanitarian 
assistance and solidarity. Public services and civil society should not be obliged to report or share 
information on the migration status of their users and clients. The EU Handbook on Investigating and 
Prosecuting Migrant Smuggling should include information and training on ‘firewalling’ when it comes to 
cases of human smuggling. 
 
Recommendation 3: How it should be monitored?  
● The upcoming European Parliament could set up a new parliamentary inquiry to gather evidence and 
hear the testimonies of civil society actors and EU citizens who have been victims of misguided 
prosecutions and to investigate whether the cases were politicised.  
● Civil society, through the newly proposed EU values fund, could be supported to collect evidence 
showing non-compliance with the EU’s legal framework and submit it to the European Commission, so 
as to enable it to start infringement procedures against a Member State or EU institution/agency.  
● Civil society could also be supported by establishing and expanding an EU strategic litigation fund. This 
could be used to protect civil society actors, migrants and refugees, their family members and friends as 
well as bona fide service providers from unjust criminalisation.  
● The study also proposes to set up an independent observatory to monitor the policing of civil society 
actors across the EU. This could be composed of representatives from academia. Such an independent 
body could conduct qualitative country analysis, media monitoring and contain a possibility for civil 
society to submit individual and collective complaints and testimonies about interference with their 
mandates by the national or EU agencies.  
 
Recommendation 4: How should the status quo be assessed?  
● The European Ombudsperson should assess the fundamental rights impacts on migrants and EU citizens 
of the EU’s anti-smuggling operations in the EU and third countries, and in particular activities led by the 
EU justice and home affairs agencies, namely Frontex and Europol, as well as the EU’s External Action 
Service (Operation Sophia). 
● The European Court of Auditors should assess the EU support and funding to EU Member States as well 
as to third countries, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, taking into account the impacts on the 
fundamental rights of migrants and EU citizens, societal changes in the countries of origin, transit and 
residence, and changes in the ‘migrant smuggling business model’.  
● The European Parliament’s Budgets and Budgetary Control Committees could also undergo thorough 
assessment prior to approving the budgets for EU justice and home affairs agencies’ operations and 
missions that are supporting Member States or third countries in addressing migrant smuggling.  
 
Recommendation 5: What should be the alternatives to migrant smuggling?  
● EU justice and home affairs agencies are not adequately addressing the underlying reasons why 
migrants choose to use smugglers’ services. More safe and legal alternatives to come to the EU have 
been proposed by the European Parliament in its Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the 
Mediterranean. It has also highlighted the need for a holistic EU approach to migration.66 This study 
reiterates the importance of humanitarian visas to expand legal migration channels, and the need to 
                                                                    
66 European Parliament (2016), Resolution on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to 
migration (2015/2095(INI), P8_TA(2016)0102, Strasbourg, 12 April. 
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monitor and end discriminatory visa rejections for Blue Card applicants as well as for seasonal workers, 
students and researchers. In addition, there is a need to increase the possibilities for third-country 
workers (regardless of their first admission category), refugees and persons with humanitarian 
protection status to reunify with family members.67  
● The European Parliament has suggested an EU search and rescue mission. The CEPS Taskforce Report on 
a European Border and Coast Guard earlier reflected that the national coast guards are well trained and 
equipped to conduct such a mission.68 The main question to be resolved is political – how to share the 
responsibility among all the EU Member States over the rescued persons and who should do it?  
                                                                    
67 C. Conti (2018), “Impossibility for Family Reunification”, ReSOMA Discussion Brief, July.  
68 S. Carrera, S. Blockmans, J.P. Cassarino, D. Gros, E. Guild, & E. Letta (2017), The European Border and Coast Guard Addressing 
migration and asylum challenges in the Mediterranean? CEPS Task Force Report, 1 February. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aims, objectives and research questions 
1.1.1 Aims  
This study was commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs at the request of the European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions (PETI). The current 
research aims to update the previous study conducted by a CEPS-led consortium: “Fit for purpose? The 
Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants”. Therefore, the 
study takes stock of and evaluates the developments that have taken place since 2016. The study also takes into 
account the impacts of the policing of civil society actors (CSAs) in the EU as well as in third countries of origin 
and destination. 
1.1.2 Objectives 
First, we analyse the EU legislative developments, namely the Commission’s regulatory performance and fitness 
(REFIT) exercise and the concerns expressed by the European Parliament as well as citizens related to the 
Facilitators’ Package. Second, we analyse policy changes and various forms of policing of CSAs assisting refugees 
and migrants, as well as their family members, service providers and other professionals. Third, we capture some 
of the unintended consequences related to the high prioritisation of measures to combat migrant smuggling, 
specifically the individual and societal costs in Europe and countries of origin, transit and destination and the lack 
of a holistic picture of migration. Finally, the study puts forward evidence-based recommendations. These range 
from legal changes for amending the Facilitators’ Package in light of the EU’s legal framework and international 
standards to changes in political priorities and the employment of a more evidence-based approach on 
migration.  
1.1.3 Research questions 
In light of the above-mentioned aims and objectives, this study raises the following research questions: 
1. What have been the recent developments at the EU level related to the Facilitators’ Package (section 2 in 
this study)? 
o To what extent did the REFIT take into consideration the conclusions of previous research and studies 
(See section 2.1.) 
o What are the remaining concerns of the European Parliament and EU citizens related to the 
Facilitators’ Package? (See sections 2.2 and 2.3.) 
2. What are the dynamics of policing humanitarianism, witnessed across the EU since 2016? (See section 3 
and Annex 1). 
o What are the most important developments in law and policies of selected EU Member States, which 
enable suspicion, intimidation, harassment, disciplining and the formal criminalisation of 
humanitarian actors? (See section 3.1.)  
o What have been the most significant cases of suspicion, intimidation, harassment, disciplining and 
misguided prosecutions of humanitarian actors? (See sections 3.2. and 3.3.) 
3. What kinds of ‘unintended’ impacts are anti-smuggling policies having? (See section 4.) 
o How does this affect the rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy in the EU? (See section 4.1.) 
o How does policing humanitarianism affect social trust? (See section 4.2.) 
o How do such policies impact on the experiences of refugees and other migrants as well as countries 
of origin, transit and destination? (See section 4.3.) 
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4. How can EU legislation and policies be improved or changed in line with other EU, regional and 
international standards? (See section 5.)  
1.2 Our approach, scope and definitions 
1.2.1 Our approach 
The analysis in the initial study has already shown that the Facilitators’ Package adopted in 2002 was a bad law 
and also an old “third pillar” law that does not fully embrace increased EU competences in the matters of criminal 
law after the Treaty of Lisbon. However, if the rule of law is well functioning, its deficiencies could be remedied 
through traditional criminal justice checks and balances, professional codes and standards of judiciary, law 
enforcement and border and coast-guard officials. Many of these have upheld or proactively cooperated with 
those who uphold the fundamental rights of irregular migrants and asylum seekers. It is only recently that the 
context has changed, although the Facilitators’ Package at the EU level has remained the same.  
Since the emergence of the so-called European humanitarian refugee crisis in 2015, anti-smuggling measures 
have increasingly been used as migration management tools, chiefly with the aim of preventing irregular 
migration. This has been in addition to their more traditional role as a criminal justice tool for the pursuit of 
organised criminals and their profit. Migrant smuggling has quickly become a top political priority for the EU and 
subsequently a top operational priority for the EU justice and home affairs agencies. Irregular migration has been 
seen as a key issue among certain national politicians for mobilising their electorates. Therefore, particularly in 
pre-election periods, ‘fake news’ and conspiracies about the CSAs have been spread as well as accompanying 
outbursts of hate-speech and xenophobic rhetoric towards migrants and those who assist them.69  
In this context, officials and professionals have been pressured ‘by political masters’ to show results. The 
traditional criminal justice checks and balances that had been effective earlier (prior to 2015) have failed. In some 
cases, they have come too late, after highly politicised cases had been opened against CSAs who acted in 
solidarity with migrants and refugees. In other cases, ‘the fight on migrant smuggling’ has been used by some 
governments or individual politicians to advance their own agendas – as a card in national political 
communication, electoral campaigns and as a ‘window screen’ in the context of wider rule of law challenges. 
Humanitarian actors, individuals and service providers engaging with refugees and other migrants have been 
targeted by methods of suspicion, intimidation and disciplining that fall outside the realm of criminal justice.  
In this study, the authors continue to argue that rather than counting convictions of humanitarian actors, it is 
more important to understand the systemic and escalating policing of CSAs. This notion extends beyond formal 
convictions on the grounds provided in the Facilitators’ Package and often explains how the situation has 
escalated to criminal charges against civil society and other not-for-profit actors. CSAs, along with family 
members, friends and bona fide service providers, do not all fit the definition of highly ‘organised criminal groups’ 
operating for profit. The examples covered in this in-depth study illustrate how instances of suspicion started in 
the media and among some officials or high-level politicians have escalated to intimidation and harassment (by 
police and local authorities). They also show how disciplining measures have been used to indiscriminately target 
CSAs on unrelated grounds, including public order, public land occupation and food hygiene. In this context, 
some formal criminalisation cases against humanitarian actors have been started. Whether these cases have 
resulted in actual criminal convictions or not, they have further reinforced the vicious cycle. We call this dynamic 
the policing of civil society actors. See Figure 1. 
                                                                    
69 See for example Joint communication to the EU by all the UN special procedures, Joint communication of Special Procedures 
ahead of the informal summit of EU heads of state or government, OL OTH 64/2018, op. cit.  
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Figure 1. Dynamics of policing CSAs (shown in the centre) and contextual factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* ‘Intimidation and harassment’ do not have a stable or fixed place in the cycle of policing; while they often occur after 
suspicion, they can take place before, throughout or after disciplining and formal criminalisation.  
Note: The orange ovals represent contextual factors at the Member State level; the blue ovals represent contextual factors at 
the EU level.  
Source: Authors.  
 
1.2.2 Definitions 
● Civil society actors  
In this study, we understand ‘civil society actors’ (CSAs) as a broad category, which includes non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and other civil society, faith-based organisations, individual volunteers, activists and various 
public mobilisations and movements.  
● Policing CSAs 
We use the term policing CSAs over ‘judicial harassment’ as we also cover non-judicial methods of policing, from 
raising suspicion, spreading conspiracies and disinformation or ‘fake news’ about civil society, to actual physical 
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violence and the overuse of force by law enforcement, local or national authorities.70 The goals are very similar – 
to silence and intimidate CSAs and distract or prevent them from continuing their activities.  
● Suspicion 
Some national and/or EU officials and politicians have explicitly claimed or suggested in the media and various 
reports that somehow civil society is mainly responsible for a large number of arrivals or residence of refugees, 
asylum seekers and migrants in an irregular situation. Such rhetoric has shifted the portrayal of civil society from 
it being the unintentional ‘victim’ of the so-called migrant smuggling business model towards assigning it a more 
proactive role, such as a ‘pull factor’ or ‘migrant taxi’, and towards accusations of being collaborators with migrant 
smugglers or of being labelled as belonging to organised criminal groups. Suspicion alone has had the effect of 
harming the reputation of certain organisations, and the civil society sector as such has reported decreasing 
public trust and donations.  
● Intimidation/harassment 
The suspicion often results in intimidation and harassment on many levels – individual, organisational and 
societal. For example, lay people reacting to media articles that raise suspicion about CSAs have made various 
threats against organisations and the people working for them. Populist and opportunistic politicians and officials 
are further propelling such suspicion among responsible authorities. The testimonies gathered in previous 
studies indicate that such suspicion is spreading among some law enforcement, judicial, border and coast guard 
officials. The intimidation and harassment can be exerted alone, for example, in the form of direct threats and 
repeated bodily searches or checking of ID documents. In two cases, the testimonies mention the rapes of female 
volunteers by the law enforcement agents.71 In addition, there are ample cases of certain non-formal behaviours 
being disciplined by police or local authorities. Such measures are discretionary and directed against certain civic 
mobilisations, protests and squatting. They manifest as the overuse of arrests, disproportionate use of force 
against volunteers, reported incidents of clashes with riot police and use of water cannons and tear gas. 
● Disciplining 
Interviews and on-line surveys in previous studies have shown that at the local and national levels, humanitarian 
actors have been charged and sanctioned with offences not related to smuggling. Laws on public order, food 
hygiene, safety and other grounds have been disproportionately applied against humanitarian actors. For 
example, in Italy, volunteers received indictment orders not to go to the places where asylum seekers gather; in 
France, volunteers were banned from providing food on the grounds of hygiene and public health norms.  
● Formal criminalisation  
This study shows that, once initiated, criminal cases serve to discourage CSAs from pursuing their mission and 
diminish their operational capacity as well as cause reputational harm. This is the case even where such arrests 
result in acquittal. In this study, we therefore assess several well-known cases that were opened against 
humanitarians (including in countries that officially exempted humanitarian actors under the letter of the law). 
The study takes the view that all initiated criminal proceedings, even if they eventually led to acquittal or were 
dropped – should be assessed not on the basis of the outcome, but on the basis of their societal and individual 
impacts. These include their ‘chilling effect’ on EU citizens’ freedoms of association, assembly and conscience as 
well as societal mistrust (see section 4).  
● The impacts of policing CSAs on rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights  
                                                                    
70 The Human Rights Defender’s use terminology of “judicial harassment”. The policing of civil society actors is broader as it 
also encompasses non-judicial harassment. “Judicial Harassment, for Example can include criminal charges, civil lawsuits or 
administrative proceedings. Accusations often used against HRDs range from violations of protest laws, NGO laws or public 
order to entirely fabricated charges of terrorism, subversion or crimes against the security of the state. Many HRDs are 
convicted to very long prison terms, which are often also aimed at intimidating the broader human rights community. Even 
in cases where HRDs are eventually acquitted, judicial harassment diverts time, energy and resources away from their human 
rights work. 
71 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op. cit. 
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We link interference with humanitarian and other CSAs with the broader issues of the rule of law, democracy and 
fundamental rights. First, in our view, attacks on humanitarian actors are possible because of a lack of respect for 
fundamental rights and democratic deliberation based on facts and because of a lack of rule of law oversight in 
different EU Member States. Attacks on CSAs negatively affect not only the question of upholding human dignity 
and saving the lives of refugees and other migrants, but also the future of EU societies. The impacts on freedom 
of assembly and freedom of speech are of particular concern, as they affect possibilities to defend human rights 
and to oppose certain political ideas via democratic and legal avenues, public discourse and civic action. In 
addition, the rule of law requires legal certainty that persons who do not have criminal intentions and who act 
within their mandate will not be prosecuted under an over-stretched concept of crime. Criminal justice 
safeguards, such as the presumption of innocence and proofs of criminal intent are other impacted areas.  
● Policing CSAs as an ‘institutional’ issue requiring a rule of law approach 
This study proposes an additional checklist of when certain acts should be seen not as ‘a one-off’, but as a part of 
systemic and institutional policing of CSAs that requires the EU to pursue the rule of law approach vis-à-vis the 
EU Member State in question:  
• First, changes in EU Member States’ anti-smuggling legislation and policies are explicitly targeting CSAs 
assisting refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. This indicates the institutional nature of 
the measure. Particular attention should be paid to cases where such policing measures are proposed as a 
follow-up to suspicion about CSAs and their activities, or that are based on unfounded accusations or other 
disinformation and conspiracies that are spread by high-level politicians or other officials. The context of 
elections and political mobilisations here are key.  
• Second, another important factor is the non-compliance of Member States with the recommendations 
proposed by EU institutions, regional and international human rights bodies. The repeated and unaddressed 
concerns expressed in different avenues signal that interference with civil society space is taking 
institutional or systemic shape.  
• Third, there is evidence of targeted and repetitive behaviour emerging from personal testimonies and media 
monitoring. This could also indicate the institutionalised and systemic nature of policing, targeting the CSAs 
that are assisting refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants.  
• Fourth, there is some albeit limited statistical evidence on the overuse of anti-smuggling grounds in 
investigations and prosecutions against individuals who do not have criminal intent – humanitarian 
organisations, family members and friends, bona fide service providers or smuggled migrants themselves. 
Where there is a wide gap between the people being suspected, arrested and convicted for the facilitation 
of migration, for example, it might indicate that a disproportionate number of innocent people are being 
investigated and prosecuted with no good grounds. This stands in contrast to human trafficking, which is a 
well-defined crime, the definition of which captures different elements of the criminal intent.  
1.2.3 Scope 
This study highlights important developments across the EU. Nevertheless, we focus on developments 
specifically in five countries – Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Hungary. Three of these countries have been 
subject to previous research.72 Italy and Greece are two first-entry countries from the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean that have formally exempted humanitarian assistance. Yet, several cases of formal criminalisation 
of humanitarian actors have reached the courts in Italy and Greece, along with France and Hungary. Meanwhile, 
Belgium, France and Hungary do not have formal exemptions. However, different dynamics have played out 
there. Whereas in France the principle of fraternité has been upheld by the courts, in Hungary the crackdown on 
CSAs and the rule of law backsliding are interlinked, raising challenges for the upholding of EU values. 
For these five countries, the case studies provided demonstrate the interface between legal and policy changes. 
They show that the experiences of CSAs, and in particular humanitarian actors and professionals (doctors, 
                                                                    
72 Carrera, et al. (forthcoming), op. cit. 
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lawyers, journalists, landlords and shipowners), must be seen in the legal and socio-political context that differs 
both across and within Member States.  
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology employed to conduct this updated study draws on the previous research for the European 
Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) by Carrera et al. in 2016. Due to the time 
constrains, this research uses evidence gathered by three of the authors for a recent research project funded by 
the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).73 It does not offer new interviews or surveys. The study 
relies on existing studies conducted in this field. It also documents the tendencies in criminalising humanitarian 
actors by showcasing the authors’ media monitoring, which has been ongoing since the 2016 study.  
1.3.1 Desk research  
The desk research conducted for this study encompassed the following aspects:  
● ‘state of art’ overview;  
● relevant EU policy developments, notably documents from the European Commission, European 
Parliament, etc; 
● relevant studies and impact assessments (such as those by Inner City Fund International (ICF), Tipik Legal 
and our previous study for the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee); 
● relevant findings from international and regional human rights mechanisms, including case law; and 
● relevant studies and opinions of the EU agencies (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Frontex, 
Europol and Eurojust). 
1.3.2 Media monitoring  
Fast-paced developments are often better reflected in the media, although relying on such sources as evidence 
necessarily comes with a need to assess sources in context and to recognise media bias. Keeping in mind the 
focus on the English media, the authors have cooperated with the Platform for International Cooperation on 
Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) in gathering and illustrating developments with accounts from the media from 
September 2016 to October 2018. The authors have also consulted a range of French, Italian and Spanish sources 
(see Annex 1).  
1.3.3 Compilation of civil society reports and academic research 
Since 2016, there has been an increased focus on this phenomenon from academia. Therefore, new relevant 
academic monographs and peer-reviewed articles on the subject of migrant smuggling and the role of 
humanitarian organisations are discussed in this study and attached in a separate compilation so as to showcase 
the new and emerging evidence in this field. Civil society reports that have gathered first-hand testimonies and 
which meet the criteria of academic rigor are also included in this compilation (see Annex 2). 
                                                                    
73 Ibid. 
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2. LATEST POLICY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE FACILITATORS’ PACKAGE  
KEY FINDINGS 
• The European Commission has conducted a REFIT evaluation of the Facilitators’ Package, where it 
concluded that there was no need to change the EU’s legal framework in this field. It did, however, 
recognise that there is fear among civil society actors of being criminalised.  
• The REFIT relied on various studies conducted in the period between 2014 and 2016 that have confirmed 
the need to narrow the definition of crime, by including a material or other financial benefit requirement, 
and to introduce a mandatory exemption of humanitarian actors from the criminalisation in order to 
bring about more legal certainty.  
• The European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions (PETI) has received a petition from Paula Porras 
Schmidt on the case of Proem-AID and Team Humanity volunteers who were arrested on 14 January 
2016 in Lesvos, Greece. The petitioner called for non-criminalisation of entry when there is no financial 
or other material benefit and for the obligatory exemption of humanitarian actors by the EU institutions. 
The Commission, in reply to this petition, has maintained the arguments that were put forward in the 
REFIT evaluation.  
• Since 2016, the number of cases where CSAs, family members, service providers and carriers have been 
criminalised has increased (see the further assessment in section 3 and Annex 1). EU citizens have been 
mobilising on this issue at the EU level, including campaigns via the WeMove.org and Change.org 
platforms, various observatories (like Civic Space Watch) and at the national level (see Annex 2). These 
public mobilisations culminated with the European Citizens’ Initiative “We are a welcoming Europe”. 
Among its goals, it is calling for the non-criminalisation of acts of solidarity with refugees and migrants, 
including those in an irregular situation.  
• In light of citizens’ concerns, increased academic evidence and civil society reports on policing and 
criminalisation of humanitarian actors, in addition to the politicisation of NGOs proactively engaged in 
search and rescue (SAR), the European Parliament in July 2018 called for guidelines defining ‘what should 
not be criminalised’ as migrant smuggling and for the exemption of humanitarian assistance. The 
European Parliament reiterated its earlier stance that the Facilitators’ Package should target organised 
criminal networks and that a more holistic approach on migration, particularly in cooperation with third 
countries, is needed.  
 
2.1 REFIT conclusions in light of the latest studies: A missed opportunity 
The European Commission via its REFIT exercise has evaluated whether the Facilitators’ Package, as “one of the 
tools to counter migrant smuggling and thus contribute to reducing irregular migration, achieves its objectives 
and is still fit-for-purpose”.74 In this exercise, the Commission mainly relied on two studies that were carried out 
for evaluation purposes75 – namely, the study entitled “Overall report on the transposition of Facilitators Package” 
elaborated by Tipik Legal in 201476 and the “Evaluation and Impact Assessment Study on a proposal for a revision 
of the EU legal framework related to the facilitation of irregular migration (migrant smuggling)” conducted by 
                                                                    
74 European Commission (2017), REFIT evaluation of the EU legal framework against facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit 
and residence: The Facilitators Package (Directive 2002/90/EC and Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA, Staff Working 
Document, SWD(2017) 117 final, Brussels, 22 March 2017 (further referred to as REFIT), p. 1.  
75 As mentioned in European Commission (2017) REFIT Evaluation, p. 11.  
76 This study is referred in footnote 53 of the European Commission (2017) REFIT p. 11: “The study was carried out by TIPIK 
Legal. It covered all Member States except DK”. It was not publicly available. The country by country assessments were kindly 
provided by the European Commission.  
Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 28 
the ICF in 2016.77 In addition, the Commission conducted a public consultation with various stakeholders in the 
period between 2014 March and 2016 March, which was annexed to the REFIT evaluation.78  
The European Commission, in the REFIT exercise, also considered the study commissioned by the European 
Parliament’s LIBE Committee on “Fit for Purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of 
humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants”,79 the FRA study conducted in 201480 and the UK’s House of Lords 
report on the “EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling” finalised in 2015,81 as well as evidence and opinions 
from different sources and stakeholders preceding the REFIT assessment. The European Commission further 
considered studies conducted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Working Group on Smuggling of 
Migrants, including on the issue of “Financial or Other Material Benefit” in the UN Protocol against the Smuggling 
of Migrants.82  
This section examines the extent to which the REFIT took the above-mentioned studies into consideration. Tables 
1 to 3 compare the key challenges related to the Facilitators’ Package, its impacts and recommendations. First, 
Table 1 presents the main gaps in the legal framing of the Facilitators’ Package responsible for the risk of 
criminalisation of humanitarian assistance. Second, the direct and unintended consequences EU legislation has 
for those providing support or services to undocumented migrants is shown in Table 2. Finally, Table 4 lays down 
the key recommendations proposed to address the issues identified.  
2.1.1 Key challenges identified in the legal framing of the Facilitators’ Package 
Different studies have been critical about the over-broad and vague legal definition provided in the Facilitators’ 
Package on what exactly constitutes a crime of facilitation of entry/transit and residence. The main concern was 
that in principle, it allows for the criminalisation of CSAs, family members and service providers for actions of 
solidarity and compassion without a criminal intent. The two reasons for this are (i) the lack of a financial and 
material benefit requirement as well as (ii) the lack of an obligatory clause exempting humanitarian assistance. 
Table 1. Key challenges identified in the legal framing of the Facilitators’ Package 
Key challenges  FRA 
(2014) 
House of 
Lords 
(2015) 
Carrera 
et al. 
(2016) 
ICF 
(2016) 
UNODC 
(2017) 
REFIT 
(2017) 
Lack of financial or other material benefit 
requirement 
√ √ √ √ √ X 
                                                                    
77 N. Bozeat, S. Petronella, J. Behrens, M. Labayle, N. Rossella (on behalf of ICF) (2016) “Evaluation and Impact Assessment Study 
on a proposal for a revision of the EU legal framework related to the facilitation of irregular migration (migrant smuggling)”. 
The study was carried out on request of European Commission by ICF International. It covered all Member States and non-EU 
Schengen Associated countries.  
78 Annex II to the European Commission (2017) REFIT evaluation.  
79 Carrera et al. (2016), op. cit. 
80 FRA (2014), op. cit. 
81 UK House of Lords. 4th Report of Session 2015-16 – EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (London, 2015). 
82 For example, UNODC (2011), “International Framework for Action to Implement the Smuggling of Migrants”. The European 
Commission representatives took part in UNODC expert group workshops on the subject, such as expert group meeting in 
Vienna on 15-16 November 2016, that were later referred to in UNODC (2017), “Issue Paper – The Concept of “Financial or 
Other Material Benefit” in the Smuggling of Migrants Protocol”, Vienna. 
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Non-obligatory exemption of the 
humanitarian clause 
√ √ √ √ √ X 
Legal uncertainty among bona fide 
service providers  
√ √ √ √ X X  
Legal uncertainty among actors 
providing humanitarian assistance  
√ √ √ √ √ X  
Criminalisation of migrants who are 
victims of smuggling  
√ X √ √ X X 
Disproportionate sanctions and penalties 
 
√ X √ √ X X 
Heterogeneous implementation by 
Member States 
√ X √ √ √ √ 
Source: Authors.  
 
● Lack of a ‘financial and other material benefit’ requirement for criminalisation 
One of the main shortcomings of the Facilitators’ Package, observed by various studies, is the fact that it obliges 
states to sanction the facilitation of entry, transit and residence, but it does not provide legal certainty. This risks 
not respecting the harm principle83 and poses further challenges to fundamental rights.84 As raised by Carrera et 
al. in the study conducted for the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee in 2016, the Facilitators’ Package departs 
from the idea that punishment will be rightfully imposed by law enforcement and judicial authorities when it 
aims to prevent harm, otherwise it is unduly interfering upon an individual’s liberty and therefore must be 
avoided.  
The UNODC study also stressed that Article 1(1)(a) of the Facilitation Directive (2002/90/EC) 85 defining the crime 
of facilitation of entry and transit lacks the element of financial and other material benefit; therefore, it creates a 
wide scope for criminalisation.86 This goes against international standards set by Article 6 of the UN Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air (UN Protocol against Migrant Smuggling)87 in which the 
offence is characterised by its for-profit element, as evidence of criminal intent. Only 4 out of 28 EU Member States 
are in line with the UN standards.  
The Facilitation Directive’s Article 1(1)(b) is in line with the UN standards, as it requires the profit motive for 
residence and stay. Fifteen EU Member States seem to require some sort of profit to criminalise facilitation of 
residence and stay. The other EU Member States justify the criminalisation of entry, transit and/or residence and 
stay without a profit motive through the derogatory clause left in the UN Protocol against Migrant Smuggling in 
Article 6(4): “Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent a State Party from taking measures against a person whose 
                                                                    
83 Carrera et al. (2016), p. 92. 
84 FRA, p. 15.  
85 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ 
L 328, 5.12.2002, pp. 17–18.  
86 UNODC (2017), op. cit. p. 10. 
87 United Nations General Assembly (2000a), Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Resolution 55/25, 15 November. 
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conduct constitutes an offence under its domestic law.” Thus, the REFIT concluded that the Facilitators’ Package 
is in line with UN standards. 
Other studies have taken a different approach – that the very purpose of the UN Protocol against Migrant 
Smuggling and in particular of Article 6 was to give a standard on what is criminal in migrant smuggling activities. 
It seems that the intention of the drafters of the UN Protocol, who insisted on a material or other financial benefit 
requirement, was at least partly to avoid criminalising family members, civil society organisations and individuals 
acting out of solidarity with refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants: “[T]he Protocol should not require 
States to criminalise or take other action against groups that smuggle migrants for charitable or altruistic reasons, 
as sometimes occurs with the smuggling of asylum-seekers”.88 Yet the REFIT notes that “the appreciation of the 
financial gain element can vary widely across and within Member States, being left mostly to the discretion of the 
judicial authority or even ignored in the national law.”89 
● Lack of a mandatory exemption of humanitarian assistance 
The European Commission confirmed that there was an attempt to remedy the lack of financial or other material 
benefit requirement for the facilitation of entry and stay in the Facilitation Directive’s Article 1(1)(a) by a 
humanitarian exemption clause in Article 1(2). In the REFIT the European Commission claims that “the UN 
Protocol does not contain an explicit exemption of humanitarian assistance from criminalisation such as Art. 1(2) 
of the Directive. In effect, the requirement of a financial or other material benefit as a constituent element of the 
offence rules out the ambiguity that behaviours aimed at providing humanitarian assistance could be 
criminalised”.90 
While the Directive contains explicit reference to ‘exempting humanitarian assistance’, it is important to highlight 
that the clause is not mandatory. It was left up to EU Member States to decide whether they want to explicitly 
exclude such actors. For instance, “[o]nly seven Member States specifically include in national law an exemption 
from punishment for facilitation of unauthorised entry and/or transit intended to provide at least some form of 
humanitarian assistance (BE, EL, ES, FI, IT, MT, UK)”.91  
In addition, the clause does not cover facilitation of residence and it therefore leaves a range of society actors still 
unprotected. Responses to the REFIT stakeholder consultation also showed that legal uncertainty and fears of 
being criminalised have increased among CSAs (see Annex 4). The European Commission acknowledged these 
fears, but concluded that they were not substantiated.  
The lack of an exemption from and definition of humanitarian assistance was also highlighted as one of the key 
problems of the Facilitators’ Package. The ICF, Carrera et al. and FRA have stressed the importance of making such 
an exemption mandatory for all EU Member States, as otherwise they would fall short in granting protection to 
those who are assisting undocumented migrants. The ‘may’ clause in Article 1(2) of the Facilitation Directive has 
in a way confirmed that ‘criminalisation of solidarity’ falls within the competence of the EU Member States, 
disregarding its wider repercussions on the EU’s founding values.92  
Some of these studies attempted to provide a definition of ‘humanitarian assistance’ that could bring more clarity 
to the EU legal framework. For instance, Carrera et al. defines humanitarian assistance as “the provision of services 
that help migrants to access their fundamental rights (including to health care, shelter, hygiene and legal 
assistance) and to live with dignity”.93 The ICF qualifies it “as being any action guided by the principles of: 
humanity, solidarity, impartiality and independence (i.e. the distinction of humanitarian and related objectives 
from economic and financial objectives)”.94 In addition, the ICF included a non-exhaustive list of examples of what 
                                                                    
88 UNODC (2004), p. 333.  
89 REFIT, p. 23. 
90 European Commission (2017) REFIT Evaluation, op. cit., p. 31. 
91 Ibid., p. 14. 
92 Carrera et al. (2018), op. cit. 
93 Carrera et al. (2016), op. cit., p. 47. 
94 ICF (2016), op. cit., p. 103. 
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constitutes humanitarian assistance, such as “providing or assisting migrants to access basic rights including 
health care, shelter, education and local transport, as well as necessities such as food and clothing, or rescue at 
sea”.95 
It seems that in the context of the so-called European humanitarian refugee crisis and given the political salience 
of anti-smuggling as a tool for migration management, even explicit exemptions of civil society have not 
managed to discourage or prohibit the incrimination of this activity (see section 3). As of 2018, out of seven EU 
Member States that have exempted humanitarian actors, prosecutions of CSAs were reported in at least five of 
them – Belgium, Greece, Italy, Malta and the UK.96 This suggests that the letter of the law, while important, is in 
itself not enough to prevent the policing and arrests of humanitarian actors and should be complemented by 
other non-legal measures. Legal clarity can nevertheless offer important protections from eventual prosecutions.  
● Lack of legal certainty among the humanitarian actors  
The inconsistency between the UN Protocol against Migrant Smuggling and the EU Facilitators’ Package was a 
main source of concern for all the studies conducted prior to the REFIT exercise. The Carrera et al. study concludes 
that the EU’s Facilitation Directive is not in line with and does not add to upholding the UN standards as it does 
not prevent the “wide scope of criminalisation allowed by domestic legal regimes”.97 The ICF study, although it 
sees the two documents as not conflicting,98 eventually recommends that the Facilitators’ Package should be 
aligned with the UN standards in order to promote legal certainty and consistency across EU Member States’ 
implementation of international obligations and EU legislation.99 Thus, even though there are different opinions 
on the disparity between the two legal frameworks, all of the evaluations express concern regarding the lack of 
compliance with fundamental rights and lack of clarity and legal certainty in the EU Facilitators’ Package.  
The European Commission, in the REFIT, shares the ICF’s idea that “[d]espite some differences …, the Protocol 
and the Facilitators Package remain coherent with each other”,100 arguing that the EU qualification of the offence 
is just broader. Moreover, regarding opinions about the mismatch between the EU and UN legal frameworks, it 
holds that “[w]hile inconsistencies with international law have been identified as an issue affecting the 
application of the Facilitators Package by 24.6% of the stakeholders who replied to the public consultation, the 
differences between the Facilitators Package and the Protocol did not prove to create difficulties for the EU and 
its Member States”.101 
The European Commission thus failed to problematise the fact that the majority of the EU Member States have 
pushed for a wider scope for the definition to facilitate the prosecution of smugglers102 than the one given in the 
UN Protocol. Preceding studies raised concerns that such a wide margin left to the Member States to criminalise 
various acts without criminal intent is detrimental to the protection of a civil society that upholds the rights of 
refugees and other vulnerable members of the community. 103 
In addition, the results of the public consultation conducted by the European Commission on the EU legislation 
to tackle migrant smuggling104 clearly manifest the risk of punishment of humanitarian assistance due to 
deficiencies in the legislation’s framing (see Annex 4). For instance, in responses to question 7, “Main issues 
affecting implementation for all categories of respondents”, the largest majority of respondents recognised 
“insufficient protection of those providing humanitarian assistance”105 (see Annex 3, Figures A1 and A2). For the 
                                                                    
95 Ibid., p. 103.  
96 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op. cit. 
97 Carrera et al. (2016), op. cit., p. 62. 
98 ICF (2016), op. cit., p. 42.  
99 Ibid., p. 41. 
100 European Commission (2017) REFIT Evaluation, op. cit., p. 31. 
101 Ibid., p. 31. 
102 Ibid., p. 20. 
103 FRA (2014); ICF (2016); Carrera et al. (2016). 
104 European Commission (2017) REFIT Evaluation, op. cit., p. 44. 
105 Ibid., p. 48. 
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following question, “Is the definition sufficiently clear and adequate to meet the objectives?” for almost all 
categories of respondents the answer was “No” (the only exceptions were the categories of “other” and 
representatives of “member states” (see Annex 3, Figure A3).106 For both questions, respondents justified their 
answers by invoking the risk of criminalisation of humanitarian assistance and proposed a revision to provide 
clear distinctions between migrant smugglers and those providing assistance, for instance, by adding the 
element of financial gain to the offence and defining humanitarian assistance.107 
The lack of clarity in the law was thus noted by several stakeholders to be the main source of uncertainty for 
individuals and organisations assisting undocumented migrants regarding the risks of criminal sanction. 
Furthermore, such legal uncertainty is responsible for the heterogeneous implementation by Member States and 
confusion among national authorities, especially those working at the border.108 
● Lack of legal certainty among bona fide service providers 
Finally, although it includes a ‘for profit motive’, the definition of the facilitation of stay and residence in the 
Facilitation Directive Article 1(1)(b) does not provide an element to safeguard bona fide service providers such as 
landlords and taxi drivers. Carrera et al. in their 2016 study and the ICF study proposed a requirement of unjust 
enrichment and/or unjust profit in the qualification of the offence to exclude bona fide service providers. 
Meanwhile, the FRA, UK House of Lords and the REFIT evaluations recognised the problem but did not make any 
further recommendations, as shown in Table 1.  
● Lack of prohibition to criminalise smuggled migrants 
Smuggled migrants are likewise not exempt from punishment according to the EU Facilitators’ Package, despite 
the presence of an explicit provision of this nature in the UN Protocol against Migrant Smuggling. In the EU, 
victims of human trafficking are explicitly exempted (see Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating 
trafficking in human beings and Directive 2012/29/EU on establishing minimum standards on the rights, support 
and protection of victims of crime – the Victims’ Rights Directive).109 There are also “several more specific 
instruments on protection measures and financial compensation to victims of crime”.110 However, victims of 
smuggling might not fall under this framework and can still be penalised, especially because authorities might 
suspect their involvement in the facilitation of entry, stay or transit.  
● Disproportionate sanctions and penalties  
The Facilitators’ Package provides a wide margin of discretion to Member States, as mentioned previously, 
creating discrepancies at the level of law enforcement across Member States. This variation can be dangerous for 
those erroneously accused of ‘migrant smuggling’ despite lacking evidence of criminal intent and/or financial or 
other material benefit. The study conducted by the ICF found out that “[t]he range of penalties adopted by 
Member States varies significantly, from fines as minimum penalties to imprisonment of up to 14 years as 
maximum penalties in cases of aggravating circumstances”.111 Although the REFIT acknowledges the existence 
of disproportionate sanctions and penalties, it does not propose how to address the issue. 
The analysis below pays particular attention to the years of imprisonment and fines, as it does not seek to conduct 
an exhaustive review of all the punitive measures that could be applied by national authorities to such an offence. 
Table 2 shows the penalties and its aggravations applied in the domestic law of each country for the base crime 
of facilitation of entry, transit and residence. See the sanctions with aggravated circumstances in Table 3 and the 
broader discussion on domestic law in the five selected Member States in subsection 2.1.2.  
                                                                    
106 Ibid., p. 48. 
107 Ibid., pp. 48 and 49. 
108 Carrera et al. (2016), op. cit., p. 45. 
109 European Commission (2017) REFIT Evaluation, op. cit., p. 29. 
110 Ibid., p. 29. 
111 ICF (2016), op. cit., p. 27. 
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Table 2. Sanctions for the base crime of facilitation of migrants in five selected EU Member States 
Sanctions 
for smuggling migrants 
in Member States’ 
legislation 
Facilitation of 
entry (without profit) 
Facilitation of  
transit (without profit) 
Facilitation of 
residence 
Belgium112 
Imprisonment of 8 days 
to 1 year and a fine of 
€1,700 to €6,000, or 
with one of these 
punishments alone 
Imprisonment of 8 days 
to 1 year and a fine of 
€1,700 to €6,000, or 
with one of these 
punishments alone 
Imprisonment of 8 days 
to 1 year and a fine of 
€1,700 to €6,000, or 
with one of these 
punishments alone 
France113 
Five years of 
imprisonment and a 
€30,000 fine 
Five years of 
imprisonment and a 
€30,000 fine 
Five years of 
imprisonment and a 
€30,000 fine 
Greece114 
Maximum penalty of 10 
years of imprisonment 
and a fine of at least 
€20,000; 
Carriers: (a) by a 
maximum penalty of 10 
years of imprisonment 
and a fine of €10,000 up 
to €30,000 for every 
transported person 
Carriers: (a) by a 
maximum penalty of 10 
years of imprisonment 
and a fine of €10,000 up 
to €30,000 for every 
transported person 
 
 
Facilitation to reside or 
stay: at least 1 year of 
imprisonment and a fine 
of at least €5,000 
 
Provision of shelter for 
hiding: (a) by a maximum 
penalty of 10 years of 
imprisonment and a fine 
of €10,000 up to 
€30,000 for every 
transported person 
Hungary115 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 years 
X 
Imprisonment not 
exceeding 2 years 
Italy116 
Imprisonment from 1 to 
5 years and with a fine 
of €15,000 for each 
person 
Imprisonment from 1 to 
5 years and with a fine 
of €15,000 for each 
person 
Unfair advantage to 
favour stay (with material 
benefit): imprisonment 
                                                                    
112 Article 77, Belgium Law of 15 December 1980, on access to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of aliens. 
Cited by Tipik Legal study on Belgium, 2014. 
113 Article L.622-1, of the French Code of Entry and Stay of Aliens and of the right of Asylum. Cited by Tipik Legal study on 
France, 2015. 
114 Articles 29–30, Law 4251/2014, Greek Immigration and Social Inclusion Code (ex Law 3386/2005, Article 87(5)). Cited by 
Tipik Legal study on Greece, 2014. 
115 Articles 353 – 354, Act C of 2012 on the Hungarian Criminal Code. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Hungary, 2015. 
116 Article 12, Italian Legislative Decree 25 July 1998, n. 286 – Single Act of the provisions governing immigration and the status 
of foreigners. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Italy, 2014. 
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up to 4 years and a fine of 
up to 30 million lire;117 
5-bis. The provision of 
accommodation for 
undue profit: 
imprisonment from 6 
months to 3 years 
Source: Authors’ compilation.  
 
Directive 2002/90/EC does not go into detail regarding what comprises “[e]ffective, proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions” and leaves complete freedom to Member States to decide on it. As can be observed in Table 2, the 
majority of sanctions vary from 1 to 10 years of imprisonment, and financial sanctions range from €1,700 to 
€30,000. Thus, there is no harmonised penalty system among Member States, and some of these sanctions are 
extremely disproportionate, if taking into account that a volunteer providing relief to a migrant in distress could 
face 10 years of prison in Greece. Clearly, the dissuasive factor outweighs the need for proportionality in these 
domestic laws.  
Moreover, Article 1 on penalties in Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA instructs Member States to penalise 
smugglers with custodial sentences with a maximum sentence of not less than 8 years (or a maximum of 6 years 
if it is to preserve the coherence of the national penalty system)118 when committed for financial gain, as part of 
a criminal organisation or when endangering life. Table 3 gives an overview of the aggravating sanctions 
prescribed in domestic legislation if the crime was committed for financial gain or involved taking part in the 
actions of a criminal organisation. As can be observed, these range from 1 to 15 years of imprisonment and fines 
from €1,000 to €750,000, presenting the same problem of lack of harmonisation and disproportionality.  
Table 2 is based on Tipik Legal’s study from 2014–15. However, it is important to note that in the Hungarian case, 
there has been an increase in the penalties for this type of offence since 2015. The felony for facilitation of entry 
is now punishable by 1 to 5 years, whereas the earlier provision foresaw up to 3 years.119 Furthermore, “[t]he new 
law foresees a plethora of ways to increase the penalty to 20 years, when violence is used against migrants or/and 
when smugglers act in an organised manner”.120 In 2018 an amendment to Act C of 2012 on the Penal Code, as 
part of the ‘Stop Soros’ package, sought to punish by 1 year of imprisonment new activities generally undertaken 
by those associated with NGOs aiding irregular migrants121 (donations, taking part in or organising their 
activities).122  
The disproportionality of penalties in Greece is the most striking among the five Member States. The penalty for 
facilitating the entry or transit of an irregular migrant into Greece is 10 years of imprisonment,123 which is the 
                                                                    
117 Article 12(5), Italian Legislative Decree 25 July 1998, n. 286 – Single Act of the provisions governing immigration and the 
status of foreigners. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Italy, 2014. 
118 Council of the European Union (2002), Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA on the strengthening of the penal 
framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ L 328/2, 28.11.2002, Article 1, Paragraph 
4. 
119 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op. cit., p. 80. 
120 Ibid., p. 80. 
121 353/A amendment to Act C of 2012 on the Hungarian Criminal Code. In Bill T/333, Unofficial translation by Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee. 
122 353/A (3), amendment to Act C of 2012 on the Hungarian Criminal Code. In Bill T/333, Unofficial translation by Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee (https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T333-ENG.pdf). 
123 Law 4251/2014, Immigration and Social Inclusion Code, Article 29(5) (ex Law 3386/2005, Article 87(5)). Cited by Tipik Legal 
study on Greece, 2014. 
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same amount for human trafficking,124 a much more serious crime as it is per nature violent and involves 
undignified and inhuman conditions for the victim. The additional charges are also disproportionate in Greece, 
given their severity and the lack of mechanisms to protect service providers, family members, migrants and 
humanitarian actors.  
Table 3 below lists the sanctions when migrant smuggling was conducted in aggravating circumstances, namely 
for the financial gain or other material benefit, or when acting as a part of ‘organised criminal group’, which 
previous studies have seen as problematic.  
Table 3. Sanctions for migrant smuggling in aggravating circumstances  
Aggravating 
circumstances: 
Financial benefit 
and be part of a 
crime 
organisation 
Facilitation of 
entry 
Facilitation of  
transit 
Facilitation of 
residence 
Hungary125 
Financial gain: 1 to 5 
years 
On a commercial scale: 
between 2 to 8 years. 
X X 
France126 
Organised group: 10 
years of imprisonment 
and a €750,000 fine. 
Organised group: 10 
years of imprisonment 
and a €750,000 fine. 
Organised group: 10 years 
of imprisonment and a 
€750,000 fine.. 
Italy127 
Organised Group: 
imprisonment from 5 to 15 
years and a fine of 
€15,000 for every person. 
Direct or indirect financial 
profit: The imprisonment 
is increased by a third to 
a half, and a fine of 
€25,000 per person. 
Organised Group: 
imprisonment from 5 to 15 
years and a fine of 
€15,000 for every 
person.128 
Direct or indirect financial 
profit: The imprisonment 
is increased by a third to 
a half, and a fine of 
€25,000 per person. 
Unfair advantage to favour 
stay: imprisonment up to 4 
years and a fine of  €15,500 
EUR.129 Organised group: 
the sanction is increased 
from a third to a half. 
                                                                    
124 United States Department of State, 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report – Greece, 27 June 2017 
(http://www.refworld.org/docid/5959ecc73.html). 
125 See Art. 353 (1.a), Art. 353(3.d), Art. 459(1) point 28, in Btk. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Hungary, 2015. 
126 See Article 132-71 in the Criminal Code, and Art. L. 622-5 in CESEDA. Cited by Tipik Legal study on France, 2015. 
127 See TUI, Art. 12(1) (3.d), Art. 12(1) (3-ter.b), Art. 12(1)(5). Cited by Tipik Legal study on Italy, 2014. 
128 Art. 12(1) 3. (d) and (e) of the Italian Legislative Decree 25 July 1998, n. 286, Single Act of the provisions governing 
immigration and the status of foreigners. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Italy, 2014. 
129 The original Italian Law cited by Tipik Legal study on Italy, 2014 contains a reference to “a fine of up to 30 million lira”.  
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Greece130 
Financial gain or 
organised crime: at least 
10 years of imprisonment 
and a fine of at least 
€50,000. 
Ship masters or captains of 
ships, floating crafts or 
aircrafts and drivers: at 
least 10 years of 
imprisonment and a 
€30,000 to €60,000 fine 
for every transported 
person, if the offender acts 
for financial gain. 
Ship masters or captains of 
ships, floating crafts or 
aircrafts and drivers: at 
least 10 years of 
imprisonment and a 
€30,000 to €60,000 fine 
for every transported 
person, if the offender acts 
for financial gain. 
 
Financial gain: at least 2 
years of imprisonment and 
a fine of at least €10,000 
shall be imposed. 
Belgium131 
Directly or indirectly a 
patrimonial gain: 
1 to 5 years imprisonment 
and a €5,000 to €50,000 
fine. 
Organised crime132: 
15 to 20 years 
imprisonment and a 
€1,000 to €150,000 fine. 
Directly or indirectly a 
patrimonial gain: 
1 to 5 years imprisonment 
and a €5,000 to €50,000 
fine. 
 
Organised crime: 
15 to 20 years 
imprisonment and a 
€1,000 to €150,000 fine. 
Directly or indirectly a 
patrimonial gain: 1 to 5 
years imprisonment and 
€5,000 to €50,000 fine. 
 
Organised crime: 
15 to 20 years 
imprisonment and a €1,000 
to €150,000 fine. 
Source: Authors’ compilation.  
 
2.1.2 Heterogeneous implementation by Member States 
The present section analyses the study conducted by Tipik Legal in 2014–15 on the transposition of the 
Facilitators’ Package in each Member State, under request by the European Commission. This assessment served 
as the basis for the “Overall report on the transposition to national law of Facilitators Package”, which is one of 
the primary sources of the REFIT evaluation. This section does not seek to conduct an exhaustive examination on 
the transposition of the Facilitators’ Package in all Member States; instead, it pays specific attention to the main 
issues regarding the elements of ‘financial and material benefit’ and ‘humanitarian exemption’ in five countries, 
namely, Hungary, France, Italy, Greece and Belgium. Finally, it analyses the issues arising from the different levels 
of penalties for smuggling migrants in the domestic law of these countries.  
 
                                                                    
130 See Law 4251/2014 Art. 29(5) and (6), Art. 30. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Greece, 2014. 
131 In Law of 15 December 1980, on access to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of aliens: Art. 77 bis 2nd to 
4th paras, Art. 77quinquies. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Belgium, 2014. 
132 In the Criminal Code of 8 June 1867, Art. 324. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Belgium, 2014. 
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Table 4. Transposition of the Facilitators’ Package into national legislation 
Transposition of the 
Facilitators’ Package into 
national legislation 
(2014–15) 
Material or 
financial 
benefit for 
entry 
Material or 
financial benefit 
for transit 
Material or 
financial 
benefit for 
residence / stay 
Humanitarian 
exemption 
Hungary X X133 √ X 
France X X X √  
Italy X X √ √ 
Greece X X X √ 
Belgium X X X √ 
Source: Authors’ compilation.  
 
According to Directive 2002/90/EC, the definition of the criminal offence for facilitation of stay is conditioned on 
financial gain. However, as shown in Table 4, only two countries, Hungary134 and Italy,135 have transposed this 
requirement into their domestic law. Meanwhile, in other Member States this element is just an aggravation to 
the offence.136 In this setting, those providing humanitarian assistance are vulnerable to criminalisation when 
acting within the territory of most of these countries. For instance, that is the case in Greece, where the 
humanitarian exemption is only applied regarding assistance to migrants in distress at sea.137 At the same time, 
the relief support on land is very important to ensure migrants and asylum seekers have access to minimum 
rights, as they cannot resort to public or private services in order to avoid expulsion or arrest. In Greek law, a wide 
spectrum of public actors is prohibited from providing services to undocumented migrants, and the majority of 
service providers (doctors, landlords, etc.) are obliged to report them to the authorities.138 Thus, humanitarian 
volunteers and civil society organisations unfairly risk facing severe penalties for smuggling due to the lack of 
safeguards for their activities.  
                                                                    
133 The legal provision for the facilitation of transit was not mentioned by Tipik Legal’s study on Hungary. 
134 See Article 354, Btk. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Hungary (2015). 
135 See Article 12(5) and (5-bis), in the Italian Legislative Decree 25 July 1998, n. 286. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Italy (2014). 
136 See in Greece, Law 4251/2014, Article 29(5) (6), and Article 30; Belgium, Article 77, Law of 15 December 1980, on access to 
the territory, residence, establishment and removal of aliens. France, CESEDA, Article L. 622-1 and L. 622-4, 3°point, and in the 
Criminal Code Article 121-3, 1st subparagraph. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Greece (2014), Belgium (2014), France (2015). 
137 Law 4251/2014, Article 30(6). Cited by Tipik Legal study on Greece (2014).  
138 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op. cit., p. 71. 
Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 38 
In Italy, the section of the legislation on the facilitation of stay sets higher standards regarding safeguards for civil 
society than the Facilitators’ Package.139 It diminishes the risks of criminalisation of humanitarian assistance as 
well as service providers, such as landlords. The criminal offence of facilitating the permanence of irregular 
foreigners is conditioned on taking ‘unfair advantage’ out of their situation or drawing ‘undue profit’ when 
providing accommodation.140 In 2013, in order to bring more clarity to the element of ‘unfair advantage’, the 
Italian Supreme Court confirmed that “there must also be specific intent to procure an ‘unjust profit’ by taking 
advantage of the migrant’s irregular situation, resulting in ‘unfair and excessively onerous conditions on the 
tenant (migrant)’”.141 In addition, it also noted in 2015 that ‘undue profit’ could be “drawn from contract terms 
much more beneficial to the owner, even if such terms are not excessively detrimental to the migrant”.142 
Even though Hungary complies with the Directive on the definition of the crime for stay, its legislation on the 
matter went through amendments in 2018, as part of the ‘Stop Soros’ package proposed by the Fidesz 
government.143 The objective of such a change is to criminalise anyone engaging or not with civil society 
organisations and who assists irregular migrants to enter or reside in Hungary even if they act for no financial 
benefit.144 The misdemeanour can also occur if the support is given to a foreigner who intends to apply for 
international protection or if it merely consists of giving information or legal advice (discussed in more detail in 
subsection 3.1.1).145 
The Facilitators’ Package grants a lot of freedom for Member States to transpose the EU acquis into their domestic 
law. In this context, there is a great risk that with the rise of illiberal and anti-migration governments in the EU, 
some may take the same path as Hungary. Given the chance of a legislative revision, it would likely result in 
harsher security measures to the detriment of safeguards for civil society (the exemption of family members, 
volunteers providing humanitarian assistance, victims and service providers), whereas the shrinking space of civil 
society in these same countries has been noted.146 At present, this risk is especially true in Italy in light of its 
position as a first country of entry and the conservative stance of Italy’s interior minister Matteo Salvini on 
migration. 
In addition to this setting, the European Commission has been turning a blind eye to national laws that fall short 
in the transposition and implementation of the Directive’s standards. In such cases, the Commission could initiate 
legal action against Member States at the Court of Justice of the European Union, as EU directives have a direct 
legal effect. However, the Commission has recently stated the following: 
It should be stressed that in the area of criminal law, EU legislation only provides for minimum rules on 
criminal offences and sanctions. Therefore, even if the definition of the offence currently set out in 
Directive 2002/90/EC were to be modified as to prescribe criminalisation of facilitation of irregular entry 
and transit only when conducted for financial gain, Member States would still maintain the freedom, 
within the limits of EU law, to go further than what is prescribed in the Directive and choose to 
                                                                    
139 Article 12(5) and (5-bis), Italian Legislative Decree 25 July 1998, n. 286. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Italy, 2014. 
140 Ibid. 
141 See “Supreme Court, Sentenza 597/2013, 24 April 2013; Supreme Court, Sentenza 46070/2003, 23 October 2003; Supreme 
Court, Sentenza 5093/2012, 17 January 2012. The same reasoning had already been established in 2003, in a case where it had 
not been ascertained, however, from the conditions of the contract that the landlord had intended to impose unduly onerous 
responsibilities on the tenant. See Supreme Court, Sentenza 46066/2003, 16 October 2003”. In footnote 59 of UNODC (2017) 
Issue Paper – The Concept of “Financial or Other Material Benefit” in the Smuggling of Migrants Protocol (Vienna, 2017), p. 40. 
142 See footnote 60 “Supreme Court, Judgment no. 17117, 20 January 2015. The meaning and effect of “intent to gain”. Court 
of Catania, Proc. n. 93/2016 R. I.M.C., 21 January 2016”. In UNODC (2017) Issue Paper – The Concept of “Financial or Other 
Material Benefit” in the Smuggling of Migrants Protocol (Vienna, 2017), p. 40.  
143 353/A amendment Btk. In Bill T/333, Unofficial translation by Hungarian Helsinki Committee (https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-
content/uploads/T333-ENG.pdf). 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Civic Space Watch (https://civicspacewatch.eu/about-the-watch/). 
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criminalise the facilitation of unauthorised entry and transit, also when conducted without the aim of 
achieving a financial profit.147 
The answer given by the Commission seems to disregard that those standards serve a purpose, which is to 
harmonise Member States’ legislation in order to have a common and effective response to the issue. Extending 
criminal liability to everyone facilitating residence does not “go further than what is prescribed”, but rather sets 
lower standards according to human rights and European fundamental rights. Thus, even though Member States 
have some liberty regarding the wording or to set higher standards than the Directive’s, its essence and predicted 
outcomes still must be followed. 
Furthermore, contrary to the Commission’s view, a mandatory exemption has already been effectively 
implemented in the Directive on Human Trafficking where it explicitly prohibits the criminalisation of victims:148 
(14) Victims of trafficking in human beings should, in accordance with the basic principles of the legal 
systems of the relevant Member States, be protected from prosecution or punishment for criminal activities 
such as the use of false documents, or offences under legislation on prostitution or immigration, that they 
have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence of being subject to trafficking. The aim of such 
protection is to safeguard the human rights of victims, to avoid further victimisation and to encourage 
them to act as witnesses in criminal proceedings against the perpetrators. This safeguard should not 
exclude prosecution or punishment for offences that a person has voluntarily committed or participated 
in.  
As can be seen in Table 4, none of the countries included the condition of financial gain in the qualification of the 
offence for facilitation of entry and transit, despite having previously agreed to the definition of the UN 
Protocol.149 This element often serves as an aggravation to the offence, resulting into higher sanctions (Table 3). 
Such broad legislation has proven to be costly and ineffective at dismantling the smuggling business model, since 
national authorities often do not know how to filter which cases are important to pursue.150 Thus, a great amount 
of time and resources are spent in cases that are committed by low-key actors such as migrants, their family 
members or ‘humanitarian actors’. This is not a consequence of the inability of national authorities alone, but 
rather permissive and broad legislation at the national and EU levels. Therefore, the Facilitators’ Package has not 
been contributing to the European Commission and Member States’ aim to “disrupt the criminal networks, that 
make significant profits out of the smuggling of migrants to and within Europe, putting their very lives at risk every 
day, and not to prosecute individuals and organisations that would provide genuine assistance to those in 
need.”151 
What is more, in some cases investigation and prosecution against volunteers and other low-key actors have been 
identified as politically motivated.152 In these cases, the aim is often to intimidate NGOs providing humanitarian 
assistance on land or at sea, discourage small-scale entities and show results from the fight against smuggling 
migrants. In any case, both circumstances prove the need for solid and detailed legislation from the EU level to 
effectively fight the real criminal organisations while protecting those providing humanitarian assistance, 
                                                                    
147 Notice to Members, PETI Committee (2017), op. cit. 
148 European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2011), Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011 on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, 
OJ L 101/3, 5 April. Emphasis added. (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011L0036&from=en). 
149 Article 6 (1) Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal 
offences, when committed intentionally and in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit: (a) The 
smuggling of migrants. In UN General Assembly (2000), Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15.11.2000 
(http://www.refworld.org/docid/479dee062.html). 
150 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op. cit., p. 60. 
151 Notice to Members, PETI Committee (2017), op. cit., Emphasis added. 
152 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op. cit., p. 61. 
Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 40 
migrants and their relatives. To accomplish the latter, a detailed mandatory exemption is important as well as the 
inclusion of fundamental human rights provisions in the EU acquis text.  
Table 4 can be misleading as it shows that almost all countries apply some kind of exception to punishing 
humanitarian assistance, although it is important to note that they also lack clarity or apply this exception to very 
specific cases. Therefore, in these same Member States, several cases of actual criminalisation of humanitarian 
assistance have been reported by the media and civil society organisations.153 
Belgium and Hungary have two opposite approaches to the exception of humanitarian assistance in the 
legislation on smuggling migrants; however, in both cases there are people who have been unfairly criminalised 
for it.154 In Belgium, the lack of clarity in the legislation is an issue for the protection of civil society acting in 
solidarity. Article 77(2), exempting humanitarian assistance for the facilitation of entry, transit and stay, does not 
go into detail on the types of activities humanitarian assistance covers, leaving a lot of margin of discretion to 
authorities.155 Finally, in Hungary there is no exemption whatsoever, but there is a climate of political persecution 
and illiberal policies, which has been shrinking the civil society space and criminalising relief activities towards 
migrants. 
In the Italian case, rescue activities and humanitarian assistance are only exempt in its territory.156 Nevertheless, 
many NGOs rescue people from dinghies in distress close to the Libyan coast and international waters. Still, the 
exception of humanitarian assistance in Italian law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea do not protect 
people from criminalisation – several cases involving the prosecution of fishermen157 and service providers 158 
have been reported. Moreover, the political criminalisation of SAR boats, especially in Italy and Malta,159 have led 
to a tragic situation in the Mediterranean. At present, despite a decrease in the number of migrants crossing the 
sea, the number of drownings have risen sharply,160 due to the lack of NGO rescue boats operating in the 
Mediterranean;161 meanwhile, merchant ships are avoiding routes with dinghies in distress due to the 
inconvenience of having their boat stranded in European ports. 162 
                                                                    
153 See for further information the media monitoring, campaigns and reports compiled by CEPS and PICUM in Annexes 1–3. 
154 Ibid.  
155 Law of 15 December 1980, on access to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of aliens. Cited by Tipik Legal 
study on Belgium, 2014. 
156 Article 12(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 54 of the Criminal Code, the activities of rescue and humanitarian 
assistance provided in Italy towards foreigners in need, however present in the territory of the State, does not constitute a 
crime. In the Italian Legislative Decree 25 July 1998, n. 286 – Single Act of the provisions governing immigration and the status 
of foreigners, cited by Tipik Legal study on Italy, 2014. 
157 L. Tondo (2018), “Tunisian fishermen await trial after ‘saving hundreds of migrants’”, The Guardian, 5 September 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/05/tunisian-fishermen-await-trial-after-saving-hundreds-of-migrants). 
158 L.M. Monella (2018), “Italian jailed and fined after unwittingly driving migrants across border with BlaBlaCar”, Euro News, 4 
September (http://www.euronews.com/2018/09/04/italian-jailed-and-fined-after-unwittingly-driving-migrants-across-
border-with-blablacar); Euractive (2017), “Italian prosecutor investigating NGO rescuers says has no proof of wrongdoing”, 4 
May (http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/italian-prosecutor-investigating-ngo-rescuers-says-has-
no-proof-of-wrongdoing/). 
159 La Vanguardia (2018), “Italia inmoviliza el barco de Proactiva Open Arms y acusa a la ONG de promover la inmigración 
illegal”, 14 March (https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20180319/441667332120/italia-retiene-barco-proactiva-
open-arms-inmigracion-ilegal.html); and I. Martin (2018), “Transport Malta insists Sea-Watch 3 cannot leave port”, 6 August 
(https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20180806/local/transport-malta-insists-sea-watch-3-cannot-leave-
port.686158). 
160 UNHCR (2018), “Mediterranean crossings deadlier than ever, new UNHCR report shows”, 3 September 
(http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/9/5b8935964/mediterranean-crossings-deadlier-new-unhcr-report-shows.html). 
161 L. Tondo (2018), “No NGO rescue boats currently in central Mediterranean, agencies warn”, 12 September 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/12/migrant-rescue-ships-mediterranean). 
162 H. Strange (2018), “Ships ‘not willing to save Mediterranean migrants’ say aid groups as Aquarius seeks safe harbor” 12 
August (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/12/ships-not-willing-save-mediterranean-migrants-say-aid-groups/). 
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As mentioned above, the Greek humanitarian exemption is very specific, it comprises only SAR and the facilitation 
of entry for asylum seekers rescued at sea.163 This exception in the law has proven to be flawed in the protection 
of those assisting migrants in distress. That is first because rescuers cannot identify whether the individual is in 
need of international protection,164 and second because the legal framework contains an exemption from 
punishment but not from prosecution.165 At present, Sara Mardini, a 23-year-old Syrian refugee, and Sean Binder, 
a 24-year-old German volunteer who lives in Ireland, have been in custodial imprisonment since August 2018, 
accused of facilitation of migrants’ illegal entry in order to gain profit from it.166 Both are part of the volunteer 
crew of the Emergency Response Centre International (ERCI), involved in SAR activities in Lesvos. Under Greek 
law, they could be held in custody for up to 18 months before trial, and face very high penalties if convicted, 
“perhaps the most serious any aid worker has ever faced”. 167 
In the French case, humanitarian assistance and family members are exempted only regarding the facilitation of 
residence at the time of the study,168 although the Constitutional Council in France recognised that Article L.622-
4 was inconsistent with the principle of fraternité enshrined in the French constitution.169 Thus, it included 
facilitation of transit in the humanitarian exemption in July 2018.170 However, helping migrants to cross the 
border is still not covered by this article. This gap in the law enables the repetition of cases such as the 
criminalisation of Caroline Christinaz, the Swiss journalist. She was investigated on suspicion of assisting the 
illegal entry171 of four migrant minors, who were freezing cold when crossing the dangerous border with Italy.172 
Yet, this gap does not seem to be a concern for some French authorities. Notably, Deputy Director for Immigration 
Jean de Croone stated that helping a migrant to cross the border does not consist of humanitarian help but rather 
creates the situation of illegality of the migrant.173 This statement disregards the point that “[w]hile such 
humanitarian needs may not appear as imminent as the risk of drowning at sea, our research revealed that land 
borders also pose extremely grave and in some cases life or death situations of humanitarian need”.174 
Despite some advancement of the safeguard for civil society acting in solidarity, the French legislature decided 
to add other changes that fall short the previous provisions in Article L.622-4, para. 3. Currently, it provides less 
clarity and more limited protection to those providing aid than before. The old version contained a list of activities 
to be exempted from resulting in criminal liability, notably “food, housing services or medical care aimed at 
                                                                    
163 Greek Law 4251/2014, Immigration and Social Inclusion Code, Article 30(6) (ex Law 3386/2005, Article 88(6)): “(6) The above 
sanctions shall not be imposed in case of rescue of persons at sea as well as of the transportation of persons in need of 
international protection according to the international law of the sea”. Cited by Tipik Legal study on Greece, 2014. 
164 UNODC (2017), Issue Paper – The Concept of “Financial or Other Material Benefit” in the Smuggling of Migrants Protocol 
(Vienna, 2017), p. 36. 
165 Ibid. 
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173 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (2018), hearing on “The Implementation of the Facilitation Directive 
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ensuring dignified and decent living conditions for the alien or any other assistance aiming at preserving his/her 
dignity and natural integrity”,175 which was reduced to “all other help given for exclusive humanitarian 
purpose”.176 
The heterogenous implementation of the EU Facilitators’ Package is an outcome of the Commission’s reluctance 
to ‘Lisbonise’ this legislative tool. For example, Carrera et. al. in their recent book claim that such a choice would 
have prioritised societal interests:177 
The Commission’s decision not to revise EU criminal law on migrant smuggling leaves much to be desired 
in terms of justification and coherence. Rather than examining critically the legality and effectiveness of 
the current EU substantive criminal law framework on migrant-smuggling, it justifies choices in 
criminalisation on the grounds of boosting investigatory and prosecutorial interests. In this manner, 
substantive criminal law becomes a mere tool for prosecutorial efficiency, rather than reflecting 
normative or societal choices for criminalisation.  
The Commission had new possibilities to inject ‘more EU’ within the former ‘third pillar’ legislation with the Treaty 
of Lisbon entering into force, and in particular after its Protocol 36 on ‘Transitional Provisions’ (Title VII, Article 10) 
of the Lisbon Treaty, came to an end in December 2014. The new EU legislation in criminal matters was meant to 
move beyond ‘minimum approximation’ towards ‘more harmonisation’.178 It also obliged EU policy makers to 
take into account fundamental rights safeguards and potential impacts while legislating on EU law criminal 
matters. Mitsilegas also argued that post-Lisbon instruments provide new possibilities in the EU criminal law to 
decriminalise certain activities in the field of EU criminal law.179 For example, the EU human trafficking directive 
has been ‘Lisbonised’. Therefore, declining to ‘Lisbonise’ the EU Facilitators’ Package created a division between 
the ‘old’ third pillar instruments and the EU legal framework on migrant smuggling.  
2.1.3 Key impacts evidenced in practice 
The analysis below covers the chief impacts resulting from application of the Facilitators’ Package in practice. 
Table 4 summarises the main findings in selected studies preceding the REFIT and the Commission’s assessment 
in the REFIT.  
 
Table 5. Key impacts in practice  
Direct and unintended consequences 
related to the Facilitators’ Package 
FRA 
(2014) 
House of 
Lords 
(2015) 
Carrera 
et al.  
(2016) 
ICF 
(2016) 
UNODC 
(2017) 
REFIT 
(2017) 
Evidence of prosecutions and convictions √ √ √ √ √ X 
                                                                    
175 Article L. 622-4 paragraph 3 of CESEDA. Cited by Tipik Legal study on France, 2015. 
176 Ibid., emphasis added.  
177 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op. cit., p. 21. 
178 S. Carrera, N. Hernanz and J. Parkin (2013) "The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the European Parliament Assessing progress, shortcomings 
and challenges for democratic accountability in the area of freedom, security and justice", CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in 
Europe, No. 58, CEPS, September. (https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/LSE%20No%2058%20Lisbonisation%20of%20EP.pdf).  
179 V. Mitsilegas (2018) "Extraterritorial Immigration Control, Preventive Justice and the Rule of Law in Turbulent Times" in 
Santos Vara, J , S Carrera and T Strik (eds) Constitutionalising the External Dimension of EU Migration Policies in Times of Crisis: 
Legality, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Reconsidered, Cheltenham , Edward Elgar. 
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Evidence of policing civil society actors  √ X √ √ X X 
Negative impact on humanitarian 
assistance, SAR and basic services  
√ X √ √ √ X 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
● Lack of evidence of prosecutions and convictions  
The European Commission in its REFIT concludes: “Based on the available quantitative and qualitative 
data collected through various sources, it is not possible to draw an accurate and conclusive picture on 
the effects of the crime definition in the Facilitators Package in general and of the humanitarian 
assistance exemption in particular.”180 
The decision of the Commission to keep the wide definition of the offence for entry and transit contrasts 
with what is stated in the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling (2015–20). The latter emphasises 
“the need to focus on the “business model” of smuggling, “ensur[ing] that appropriate criminal sanctions 
are in place while avoiding risks of criminalisation of those who provide humanitarian assistance to migrants 
in distress” [emphasis added].181 
What is more, the wide margin of discretion left to Member States to decide what qualifies as an offence 
also fails to comply with the Facilitation Directive’s own specific objective – “finding a common definition 
of smuggling”.182 
After analysing these studies, the European Commission concluded in the REFIT that one of the 
challenges or potential negative impacts of the Facilitators’ Package is to address the “perceived risks” 
of criminalisation of humanitarian assistance.183 Unlike the other evaluations conducted by academia 
and relevant institutions, the Commission considers the risks of criminalisation of humanitarian 
assistance arise as a consequence of “an inefficient implementation of the EU acquis by Member States” 
rather than deficiencies in the legal framing of the Facilitators’ Package.184 Thus, the European 
Commission concluded that there is no need for a legislative change, but only to improve certain 
operational measures, such as “reinforced exchange of knowledge and good practice between 
prosecutors, law enforcement and civil society”.185  
The European Commission supported this conclusion by saying that “there appears to be rather limited 
evidence that social workers, family members or citizens acting out of compassion have been prosecuted 
and convicted for facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit or residence”.186  
The European Commission has nonetheless included a footnote that “[p]roblems faced by some 
individuals or organisations were mentioned by some respondents in the framework of the public 
consultation and/or have been reported by some NGOs”.187 In the same footnote, the Commission 
acknowledged some evidence gathered by FRA and the International Organization for Migration 
                                                                    
180 European Commission (2017) REFIT Evaluation, op. cit., p. 23. 
181 UNODC (2017), op. cit. p. 13. 
182 European Commission (2017) REFIT Evaluation, op. cit., p. 6. 
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187 Ibid., p. 22. Footnote 100.  
Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 44 
(IOM).188 In the REFIT, the Commission also mentioned two court cases in France, pointing out that even 
though cases of prosecution are not inexistent, they have not resulted in any criminal sanctions but in 
acquittal.  
Developments since 2016 show evidence of disproportionate numbers of investigations and eventual 
acquittals of CSAs (see Annex 1). This study relates the fact that criminal investigations and prosecutions 
can be started without having to gather and prove any evidence of ‘criminal intent’, but only ‘intentional 
assistance to enter/transit/stay and reside’ to someone who is not in possession of valid travel 
documents in the EU. Criminal investigations of activities without any profit motives, violence or without 
belonging to an organised crime group at once infringe upon the presumption of innocence and distract 
the time and resources of national authorities from other more harmful crimes. Going after the ‘low-
hanging fruit’ of humanitarian actors distracts from the advancement of the intended public goal – 
dismantling organised criminal groups. It can be seen as a waste of public and limited resources to fight 
crime.  
A prosecution can cause damages to the individual erroneously accused, thus it should be avoided at all 
costs according to the harm principle.189 The risk of criminalisation of humanitarianism and service 
providers besides individual harms also include societal costs and hence have broader implications. 
National authorities have often proven to be incapable of determining at early stage which cases should 
be taken forward. 190 
National practitioners also lack guidance on the application of the Facilitators’ Package due to its 
vagueness. The European Commission’s REFIT insists that the risks are not as significant as there are other 
legal instruments to prevent the punishment of humanitarian actions. The genuine application of 
criminal law, for example, would exempt acts committed in a state of necessity to avert a danger and 
international law obliges assistance to anybody in distress at sea.191 In this way, the Commission opposes 
the need to reform the EU Facilitators’ Package, despite the evidence of such developments. For 
example, in their report the UK’s House of Lords  highlights cases where fishermen were still charged for 
the offence of smuggling migrants; the same report stresses that those legal instruments would not 
protect service providers such as landlords.192  
● Evidence of policing CSAs  
The studies conducted by Carrera et al. for the LIBE Committee193 and by the ICF194 reported 
methodological challenges in the collection of evidence from domestic courts related to the 
criminalisation of humanitarian assistance. However, the Carrera et al. study also revealed that “it is 
misleading to regard a criminal conviction as the only index of punitiveness”.195 As explained in section 
1 of this study, also of concern is the policing of CSAs: How can we establish the systemic nature and 
escalation of such instances?  
                                                                    
188 European Commission (2017) REFIT Evaluation, p. 22, Footnote 100. Other information has been reported in the FRA 
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global review’, 2016, p. 121 (https://www.iom.int/news/migrant-smuggling-iom-publishes-first-global-report-evidence-
base”). 
189 Carrera et al. (2016), op. cit., p. 92. 
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In 2016, there was already evidence gathered by academia and civil society196 of different forms of 
policing CSAs, such as disciplining, harassment, intimidation and suspicion and these were seen as 
unintended consequences of the Facilitators’ Package.197 The studies noted above show signs of their 
systematic recurrence over the years, justifying the need for a revision of the EU acquis. Notwithstanding 
that they were a common topic in three different studies, the REFIT did not acknowledge these other 
forms of criminalisation in its conclusion. The Carrera et al. (2016) study concluded that all of these forms 
of policing and criminalisation negatively affect not only migrants, but also actors providing 
humanitarian assistance, service providers, family members, and society as a whole. In addition, Jennifer 
Allsopp in 2016198 argued that such policing sends a strong message that interacting with 
undocumented migrants can be a criminal offence;199 this may consequently foster the rise of 
discrimination (based on race, ethnic origin or religion), xenophobia and hate crimes, which have the 
effect of disrupting social cohesion in society as a whole. 200 Also, the logic of criminalisation spreads fear 
and affects trust in public institutions, especially in the criminal justice system.201 CSAs and migrants may, 
for example, be less willing to approach police and other law enforcement agents with evidence of 
harmful crimes committed by violent organised smugglers and other nefarious groups. Again, this has 
consequences for society as a whole. 
● Negative impacts on humanitarian assistance, SAR and basic services 
Other unintended consequences of the Facilitators’ Package are the fear of sanctions and a deterrent 
effect on the work of individuals and civil society organisations providing humanitarian assistance to 
migrants in distress. Regarding the former, the REFIT concluded that “[a]lthough perceived risks of being 
criminalised for providing humanitarian assistance must be taken into serious consideration, they do not 
appear to be so prominently linked to the legal framework in place as to its understanding and actual 
application”.202  
Likewise, the Commission also claims that there is not enough evidence regarding its deterrent effect.203 
It explains that civil society initiatives devoted to refugees and migrants have actually significantly 
increased, especially in Germany and Greece, and in the commercial sector among shipowners, for 
instance.204  
Amid the lack of response by the EU and Member States to the arrivals of refugees and other migrants, 
civil society organisations have often acted as first responders and filled this vital gap, for example in 
Italy, Greece and Hungary in 2015.205 Accordingly, the European Commission in its REFIT recognised the 
risk of criminalisation of humanitarianism as a growing problem since more people could fall under its 
scope. Subsequent research shows that the risk of criminalisation discourages acts of solidarity with 
refugees and other migrants, notably proactive SAR conducted by NGOs.206  
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Sometimes civil society actors or other professional were also requested to cooperate with law 
enforcement authorities by providing information about their clients or sharing the other information.207 
For example, in the UK, NHS doctors were obliged to share information about their patients, for the 
purpose of countering irregular migration.208 Such practices not only were violating the  human dignity 
and other fundamental rights of migrants, but also counterproductive in dismantling the criminal 
networks. The empiric research, found that when civil society was absent or denied access human 
traffickers came in the scene to fill in the ‘void’ – they provided food, shelter and responded to other 
basic needs in return for sexual or labour exploitation.209  
Sometimes civil society was also requested to be part of anti-migrant smuggling operations and to take 
pictures taken during the SAR operations, that could be later used to identify the person who was 
steering the boat. 210  Such requests were disregarding humanitarian mandate and impartiality principles 
and increased the mistrust towards the law enforcement and criminal justice actors (see Section 4.2.). As 
to avoid such situations the firewall concept has been recommended by the previous and current UN 
Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants.211  
A lack of ‘firewall’ – a formalised separation between basic service provision and immigration control, 
whether in law, or in practice - negatively impacts the work of social services providers at the local and 
regional level when fulfilling their commitments and responsibilities to protect the fundamental rights 
of migrants in irregular situation.212 It is also central for civil society actors to keep their independence 
and impartiality so as to maintain trust with their clients, i.e. asylum seekers and immigrants. Firewall 
projects should also facilitate trust-based cooperation with law enforcement and other governmental 
authorities. 
2.1.4 Comparison of conclusions and recommendations 
For all of the reasons mentioned above, a legislative revision of the EU Facilitators’ Package was recommended 
by the FRA study, the UK’s House of Lords assessment, Carrera et al.’s study for the LIBE Committee and the ICF 
report (Table 5). While the UNODC did not provide recommendations for the EU Member States specifically, only 
the REFIT evaluation opposed a legislative change.  
 
Table 6. Comparison of conclusions and recommendations 
Recommendations 
FRA 
(2014) 
House of 
Lords 
(2015) 
Carrera 
et al.  
(2016) 
ICF 
(2016) 
UNODC 
(2017) 
REFIT 
(2017) 
Legislative reform of the Facilitators’ 
Package is needed 
√ √ √ √ X X 
                                                                    
207 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op.cit. 
208 L. Vosyliūtė and A.L. Joki (2018), "The social inclusion of undocumented migrants", ReSOMA Discussion Brief, October. 
209 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op.cit. 
210 Carrera et al. (forthcoming), op.cit. 
211 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, 25 September 2018. Retrievable from 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/298/96/PDF/N1829896.pdf?OpenElement. 
212 F. Crépeau and B. Hastie (2015) “The Case for ‘Firewall’ Protections for Irregular Migrants”, European Journal of Migration 
and Law, 17(2-3), 157-183. 
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Guidelines/more effective 
implementation of the current 
Facilitators’ Package is needed 
√ X X X √  √  
Mandatory exception of humanitarian 
assistance  
√ √ √ √ √ X 
Inclusion of a financial benefit or other 
material benefit requirement for 
facilitation of entry, transit and residence 
X √ √ √ √ X 
Include an unjust enrichment/unjust 
profit requirement to exclude bona fide 
service providers 
√ X √ √ √ X 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
All of the reports agree that humanitarian assistance needs to be exempted from criminalisation in the EU, with 
the exception of the REFIT. The UNODC addresses the lack of clarity in promoting guidance regarding the 
definition of the offence or humanitarian assistance, as well as guidance for better compliance with the Protocol’s 
purposes and principles:  
Irrespective of whether or not ‘financial or other material benefit’ is included within National law as an 
element of smuggling of migrant offences, the overall framework within which relevant laws are 
understood and applied needs to include safeguards to ensure that faith-based organizations, civil 
society and individuals acting without any purpose to obtain a financial or other material benefit are 
excluded from the application of smuggling offences while ensuring that such exclusion cannot be 
used as a loophole to escape justice.213 
However, the European Commission in its REFIT gives only very general and broad conclusions on non-legislative 
measures and proposes a new notion of ‘genuine humanitarian assistance’, implying that there are forms of 
humanitarian assistance that are not genuine:  
The effective implementation of the existing legal framework and a reinforced exchange of knowledge 
and good practice between prosecutors, law enforcement and civil society could contribute to 
improving the current situation and avoid criminalisation of genuine humanitarian assistance. This 
includes enhancing the effectiveness of the legislation on the spot, offsetting the risk of unintended 
consequences, and in particular the risk that no assistance is provided to those in need, in breach of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the non-refoulement principle and other international human rights 
commitments.214 
The UNODC study proposed to apply non-legislative measures such as guidance at the national level on the UN 
Protocol against Migrant Smuggling with respect to its correct implementation, including concepts of 
“humanitarian exemption” as well as financial and other material benefit:215  
Where necessary, guidance to criminal justice practitioners on the scope of concepts such as ‘financial 
or other material benefit’ and ‘profit’, when [they] are included in the national legal framework around 
smuggling of migrants, should have regard to the spirit of the Organized Crime Convention and the 
Smuggling of Migrants Protocol, including their stated purposes.  
                                                                    
213 UNODC (2017), op. cit., p. 71. 
214 European Commission (2017) REFIT Evaluation, op. cit., p. 35, emphasis added. 
215 UNODC (2017), op. cit., p. 71. 
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The European Commission states that the EU legal framework’s “full and correct implementation should be 
prioritised, in the context of the Action Plan”.216 As a positive development, the European Commission concluded 
that it will reinforce the pursuit of Member States’ non-compliance with the risk infringement procedures: “In 
parallel, instances of non-conformity will continue to be pursued with Member States to ensure correct 
transposition and application of the current EU legal framework. If necessary, the Commission will use its powers 
under Article 258 [of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU], including initiating 
infringement procedures.”217 
The key feature of the Facilitators’ Package is the lack of clarity, particularly how it affects the fundamental rights 
of refugees and migrants and those who act in solidarity with them. The wide margin of appreciation granted to 
Member States in the Facilitators’ Package is not likely to be sufficiently addressed and remedied via infringement 
procedures. Up until today there have been no infringement procedures on this question initiated, despite 
emerging evidence of the criminalisation of humanitarian actors and bona fide service providers (see the 
discussion in section 3).  
2.2  EU citizens’ concerns reaching EU institutions  
2.2.1 Petition 1247/2016 
Article 227 TFEU foresees that “any citizen, acting individually or jointly with others, may at any time exercise his 
right of petition to the European Parliament”. Such petitions addressed to European Parliament’s PETI Committee 
give EU citizens, civil society and enterprises an opportunity to call “attention to any infringement of a European 
citizen’s rights by a Member State or local authorities or other institution.”218 
In October 2016, a lawyer from Spain, Paula Schmid Porras, has presented Petition 1247/2016 to the PETI 
Committee. She has raised concerns similar to those identified in the studies mentioned above, about the 
criminalisation of humanitarian assistance in the European Union.  
The petition is based on a concrete case. Her clients were three Spanish lifeguards – Manuel Blanco, Julio Latorre 
and Enrique Rodriguez. They were volunteering on Lesvos island for the Spanish non-profit organisation Proem-
AID. On 14 January 2016 they were arrested together with Salam Aldeen and Mohammed Abbassi – two 
volunteers from the Danish organisation Team Humanity.219 Despite assistance to migrants in distress being a 
duty under international maritime law (as recalled by the REFIT),220 and despite the official declaration that Greece 
exempts humanitarian actors from criminalisation, the volunteers were accused of migrant smuggling. They had 
to pay bail of €5,000 and were facing up to 10 years of prison. This case and the petition have led to broader civil 
society mobilisation221 calling for the urgent need to reform the Facilitators’ Package in order to avoid the 
recurrent penalisation of people helping undocumented migrants and especially in rescues at sea.  
The petition calls for the European Parliament, the Commission, other institutions and Member States to “take 
steps to ensure that the Directive is modified to require all Member States to exempt from criminal liability those 
humanitarian actors engaged with migrants in an irregular situation”.222 The petitioner, Schmid Porras, reinforces 
the arguments found in the relevant studies analysed above, that the EU’s legal framework is vague, does not 
require material or other financial benefit for criminalisation and does not oblige Member States to exempt 
                                                                    
216 REFIT, p. 35. 
217 Ibid., p. 36. 
218 European Parliament, “Petitions” (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/petitions). Accessed 14 
Sept. 2018. 
219 A. Safdar (2016), “NGOs Decry Charges against Volunteers in Greece”, Aljazeera, op. cit. 
220 European Commission (2017) REFIT Evaluation, op. cit., p. 22.  
221 See the European Citizens’ Initiative, “We are welcoming Europe” https://weareawelcomingeurope.eu/fr/ and a number of 
NGOs and civil society organisations (see Annex of the Petition 1247/2016). 
222 European Parliament (2017), Petition No 1247/2016 by Paula Schmid Porras (Spanish) on behalf of NGO Professional 
Emergency Aid (PROEM-AID) concerning the criminalisation of persons engaging with migrants in an irregular situation and 
the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance at sea, Committee on Petitions, Brussels, 31.7.2017, p. 1.  
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humanitarian assistance. The petitioner brings special attention to the fact that the Facilitators’ Package was 
designed in a way that violates international law when leaving leverage for Member States to criminalise 
humanitarian actors assisting at sea. The petition recalls the duty under the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea223 that “sets out the long-standing obligation of a State to require the master of a ship flying its flag to render 
assistance to persons and ships in distress at sea”.224  
The Commission stated in its reply to the petition of 31 of July of 2017 (four months after the REFIT was published), 
that “[t]his conduct [SAR] is different from choosing to transport migrants, who may even be in no immediate 
danger, through the territory or across the border of a Member State, to help them reach another destination”.225 
In this statement, the Commission disregards physical and operational gaps left by EU and Member State 
operations after the withdrawal of Mare Nostrum and reiterates the intent to leave a wide margin of discretion to 
Member States on whether to punish this type of offence in light of their attempts to stem irregular migration. 
The petitioner raises concerns over non-compliance with the fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter, as 
well as the violation of international humanitarian law and the lack of a more holistic approach to irregular 
migration when recalling Articles 67,226 67(2)227 and 79(1)228 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the 
commitments made by the Commission to work on  
[a] Common European immigration policy [that] should build on the universal values of human dignity, 
freedom, equality and solidarity espoused by the EU, including full respect of the Charter of 
Fundamental rights and the European Convention of Human Rights. Based on its humanitarian 
traditions, Europe will also continue showing solidarity with refugees and persons in need of 
protection.229 
The petition also mentions the major inconsistencies between the EU’s legislation and its own internal and 
international commitments on the matter. For instance, Schmid Porras notes the gap between the Facilitators’ 
Package and the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, more specifically, with respect to the lack of a 
financial gain element for the qualification of the crime of migrant smuggling. The petitioner is also concerned 
that 
the Commission will make, in 2016, proposals to improve the existing EU legal framework to tackle 
migrant smuggling, which defines the offence of facilitation of unauthorized entry and residence, and 
                                                                    
223 Article 98.1, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides as follows: “Every State shall 
require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the 
passengers: 
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; 
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as 
such action may reasonably be expected of him”. 
18) The same report concludes and recommends that “Human rights and refugee law principles are an important point of 
reference in handling rescue-at-sea situations” (p. 14). 
19) Failure to respect the duty to rescue is usually a criminal act. 
224 Petition 1247/2016, op. cit., p. 7.  
225 Notice to members, Subject: Petition No 1247/2016 by Paula Schmid Porras (Spanish) on behalf of NGO Professional 
Emergency Aid (PROEM-AID) concerning the criminalisation of persons engaging with migrants in an irregular situation and 
the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance at sea. 
226 Article 67 TEU provides that “the Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for 
fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States”. 
227 Article 67(2) TEU provides that “it shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a common 
policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards 
third-country nationals”. 
228 Article 79(1) TEU provides that “the Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the 
efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the 
prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings”. 
229 European Commission (2008), A common immigration policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools (Brussels, 17.6.2008 
(COM(2008) 359 final)), as quoted in Petition 1247/2016, p. 5. 
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strengthen the penal framework. It will seek to ensure that appropriate criminal sanctions are in place 
while avoiding risks of criminalisation of those who provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in 
distress.230 
The European Commission, having to reply to the same arguments raised by the studies analysed by the REFIT, 
reiterates in its response to the PETI Committee, that unlike the UN Protocol against Migrant Smuggling, the 
Facilitators’ Package contains a clause to exempt the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance.231 The petitioner 
proposes an obligatory exemption of humanitarian actors in Article 1(2) of the Directive 2002/90/EC defining the 
facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence by changing the ‘may’ clause to a ‘shall’ clause.232 The 
petitioner argues that criminalising acts of solidarity has a very negative effect on European society as a whole 
and its image abroad, as it escalates the cases of racism, intolerance and integration problems.233  
Still, the Commission decided to maintain its previous conclusion made in the REFIT: “While the quality, quantity, 
and comparability of the information that could be collected through this evaluation is unfortunately limited, it 
does not indicate the actual widespread and repeated prosecution and conviction of individuals or organisations 
facilitating irregular border crossings or transit for reasons of humanitarian assistance.”234 
The Commission recommended non-legislative measures, such as promoting better implementation of the 
Facilitators’ Package with the assistance of Eurojust and FRA, along with civil society organisations. When 
responding to the request to impose on Member States the financial or other material element requirement, the 
Commission stressed its limited competence in the area of criminal justice: 
It should be stressed that in the area of criminal law, EU legislation only provides for minimum rules on 
criminal offences and sanctions. Therefore, even if the definition of the offence currently set out in 
Directive 2002/90/EC were to be modified as to prescribe criminalization of facilitation of irregular entry 
and transit only when conducted for financial gain, Member States would still maintain the freedom, 
within the limits of EU law, to go further than what is prescribed in the Directive and choose to 
criminalize the facilitation of unauthorized entry and transit, also when conducted without the aim of 
achieving a financial profit.235 
Nevertheless, the Commission also has not yet used an opportunity to ‘Lisbonise’ the old third pillar legislation 
and also its current competence to ensure minimum safeguards to protect fundamental rights when fighting 
organised crime, such as the rights to a presumption of innocence, fair trial and proportionality of fines among 
others.236 
The Petitioner has called for the implementation of the TEU Article 214:3 that requires establishing an EU 
framework for humanitarian operations: “The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures defining the framework within which the Union's 
humanitarian aid operations shall be implemented.”  
During the time of the REFIT, the Commission was unaware of the European definition of ‘humanitarian 
assistance’, despite the widespread acceptance of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid in 2008:237 
“Besides, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ European definition of what constitutes humanitarian assistance in each 
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Statement, 2008/C 25/01. OJ C 25, 30.1.2008, pp. 1-12 (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/consensus_en.pdf). 
Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants: 2018 update 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 51 
and every situation. Member States generally do not define the concept of humanitarian assistance in their 
legislation, but leave it to the appreciation of the competent national authorities.”238 
Interestingly, it still looks that the European High Level Consensus of Humanitarian Aid of 2008 and the UN 
Protocol against Migrant Smuggling are tools for external and not internal consumption. For example, when the 
European Commission looks abroad to cooperate with third countries on anti-smuggling activities, the 
ratification and correct application of the UN Protocol is promoted, while the EU and its Member States apply the 
same Protocol on a rather derogatory basis of Article 6:4. The baseline for any prosecution should be the ‘criminal 
intent’ or lack of it. Similarly, in the context of cooperating with third countries the EU is actively using and 
advocating a notion agreed at the EU level on humanitarian aid, which is “a fundamental expression of the 
universal value of solidarity between people and a moral imperative”.239 Moreover, the objective of humanitarian 
aid is also well defined in para. 8 of the European Consensus: “The objective of EU humanitarian aid is to provide 
a needs-based emergency response aimed at preserving life, preventing and alleviating human suffering and 
maintaining human dignity wherever the need arises if governments and local actors are overwhelmed, unable or 
unwilling to act”.240 Thus, although TEU Article 214 is placed under heading five, “External Action of the Union 
(ECHO & EEAS)”, the European High Level Consensus of Humanitarian Aid of 2008 and even the UN Protocol 
against Migrant Smuggling appear solely applicable to the external dimension, the EUs soft power and credibility 
when cooperating with third countries would require consistent implementation of EU law inside the Union, or 
in other words – to practice inside what they preach when going outside.  
 
The petitioner Paula Porras Schmid was called to the hearing of the EP PETI Committee to follow up on her 
petition on 21 November, 2018. Although, on 7 May 2018, the Court of Mytilene acquitted the five volunteers 
concerned,241 the very act of their prosecution has exacerbated mistrust in society – towards civil society and 
towards the criminal justice systems.242 The petitioner insisted on prohibition of criminalisation of humanitarian 
actors, as new misguided prosecutions took place in Greece. Two of the volunteers – Sarah Mardini and Sean 
Binder – were held in high-security preventive custody at the time of the PETI hearing.243 The EP PETI Committee 
decided to keep the petition open and to send inquiries to the Italian and Greek governments as well as to 
Dimitris Avramopoulous, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship. The chairperson of this 
Committee, MEP Cecilia Wikstrom, concluded that it “may be the most important petition received by the PETI 
Committee for this mandate of the European Parliament”.244 And MEPs during this hearing stated that decisive 
action is needed at EU level, otherwise EU institutions become responsible for allowing EU Member States to 
prevent and prosecute humanitarian actors and human rights defenders.245 The EP PETI Committee concluded 
that criminalisation of civil society is contrary to founding EU values and principles as well as in contravention of 
international human rights, humanitarian and maritime laws and therefore requires speedy, clear and obligatory 
EU level guidance. 246   
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2.2.2 European Citizens’ Initiative: “We are a welcoming Europe”  
The European Citizens’ Initiative, “We are a welcoming Europe”, was registered by the Commission on 15 February 
2018 and is composed of a coalition of over 170 civil society organisations across Europe, coordinated by the 
Migration Policy Group for the EU NGO Platform on Asylum and Migration, whose aim is to stop the 
criminalisation of humanitarian assistance and reclaim the right to help.247 After its inscription, the initiative has 
a year to collect 1 million signatures in order be heard by the European institutions.248 The petition includes 
national level campaigns in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. As of end of November 2018, there were 
approximately 90 thousand signatures gathered and three months remaining to complete collection of 
signatures.  
The petition says that “[t]oday, we, the citizens of Europe, are raising our voices to change the discourse on 
migration and build a Europe that welcomes those in need and reflects our principles of solidarity, dignity and 
human rights”.249 Under the “We are a welcoming Europe” slogan, the initiative proposes three main areas of 
action: first, allowing for community sponsorship of refugees; second, decriminalising humanitarian assistance 
and basic service provision; and third, defending victims of labour exploitation and human rights abuses. 
At times when governments are unable to respond quickly and effectively, civil society has stepped in to 
guarantee people’s access to fundamental rights. However, during the migration ‘crisis’, or better said 
humanitarian crisis, civil society’s assistance to undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees was often 
seen in conflict with the fight against irregular migration.250 The initiative also denounces the Facilitators’ Package 
as enabling the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance, through prosecution or convictions, but also through 
intimidation. For instance, as pointed out by Frontex, NGOs have been considered a pull factor for irregular 
migrants to risk dangerous journeys to come to Europe.251 This discourse, based on a logic of criminalising 
migration, tends to put the blame on civil society organisations and consequently can have a detrimental impact 
by engendering a difficult environment for volunteers and NGOs to work in. The initiative reminds the EU that 
the criminalisation logic interferes not only with migrants’ rights but also society’s civil rights.252 
Therefore, besides tackling the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance, the initiative also wants to build a 
discourse and immigration policy that actually reflects and complies with European society’s values and 
principles, enshrined in the EU Treaties (TEU), of solidarity, dignity and human rights.  
The main three points of the initiative are the following: 
1) Support community sponsorship. Citizens across Europe want to sponsor refugees and those 
fleeing persecution to offer them a safe home and a new life through safe and legal ways. In order 
to do that it is necessary that the Commission offers direct support to local groups that help 
refugees who are granted national visas.253 
2) Prevent the criminalisation of humanitarian service provision. 
3) Finally, provide access to justice for victims of exploitation and abuse. “We are a welcoming 
Europe” urges the “Commission to guarantee more effective ways and rules to defend all victims of 
labour exploitation and crime across Europe and all victims of human rights abuses at our 
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248 “Organisers of successful initiatives will participate in a hearing at the European Parliament. The Commission will have 3 
months to examine the initiative and decide how to act on it”. See in “European citizens’ initiative”, European Parliament 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/citizen-s-initiative). 
249 “We are a welcoming Europe” (https://weareawelcomingeurope.eu/en/about/). 
250 “We are a welcoming Europe” (https://weareawelcomingeurope.eu/en/about/). 
251 Carrera et al. forthcoming; and Heller and Pezzani (2017). 
252 “We are a welcoming Europe”, op. cit. 
253 Ibid. 
Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants: 2018 update 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 53 
borders”.254 Often undocumented migrants “do not get justice or file complaints because they fear 
they will be deported by the authorities. But this would not be the case if the complaints 
mechanisms under EU law were effective”. They “call [for] the European Commission to listen to its 
citizens who want a working justice system for all and guarantee more effective ways and rules to 
defend victims of exploitation and human rights abuses”.255 
The movement highlights the same issues that the petition and other studies have previously done, stemming 
from the lack of legal clarity that enables Member States and national authorities to criminalise any interaction 
with undocumented migrants, from distributing food to buying a train ticket or even rescuing people at sea.256 
Moreover, other civil society organisations are fighting for a popular ownership of Europe.  
In addition, there are new mobilisations in the area of migration. For example, MEGA or “Make Europe Great for 
All” is a campaign promoted by a vast network of civic associations and movements coordinated by the European 
Civic Forum and co-funded by the Europe for Citizens Programme. Its focus is to promote a European Union more 
open to civil society’s voice and demands in the shaping of the EU’s future – an important process for democracy 
– as well as to combat Euroscepticism and demystify xenophobic and nationalist narratives. 
Finally, Civic Space Watch is another example of a civil society collaborative movement by the European Civic 
Forum to promote a response to the rise of illiberal governments in Europe and safeguard civil society’s space 
while addressing and sharing knowledge on issues faced in the bloc. One of its main objectives is to build “a 
mutual support scheme and a reporting point where civic actors can share new developments on the ground, 
denounce attacks and call for solidarity”.257 On its page “Take Action”,258 “activists can choose among several 
options to ask for the support from other European activists and networks to give visibility to local issues at the 
trans-European level”.259 Along this line, it is currently giving support to the collection of signatures of the 
European Citizens’ Initiative, “We are a welcoming Europe”. 
2.3 The European Parliament’s concerns and objections  
In this section, we focus on the concerns and objections raised by the European Parliament since the very 
inception of the Facilitators’ Package. In July 2018, the European Parliament also passed a resolution proposing 
that the European Commission draft guidelines exempting humanitarian assistance from criminalisation.  
2.3.1 Objections by the European Parliament to the Facilitators’ Package from the very beginning 
The European Parliament has been the main critic of the Facilitators’ Package since its creation. This is a position 
that it has maintained over the years to protect civil society’s rights. In 2000, following the presentation of the 
initiative by the French government with a view to adopting EU legislation on migrant smuggling, the European 
Parliament, which only had consultative powers, proposed several amendments for the consideration of the 
European Council.260 Its propositions exposed the many gaps in the framing of the legislation, namely the lack of 
safeguards for victims of smuggling, people providing humanitarian assistance and service providers; legal 
uncertainty; as well as a strong focus on punishment and deterrence as a solution to the detriment of a more 
holistic approach to curbing irregular migration.  
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The European Parliament had already foreseen the danger of penalising humanitarian aid; therefore, the main 
critique in its report was the lack of distinction between organised criminal groups and humanitarian actors, as 
can be seen in the speech by Mr. Ozan Ceyhun (PSE) (rapporteur from Germany) in the plenary debate:  
While the criminal networks trading in human beings must be combated, NGOs or churches and other 
similar organizations which offer humanitarian aid to persecuted human beings must not be treated 
as criminals. For this reason, it was very important to define facilitation and the honest facilitator 
precisely. The text of the French initiative did not distinguish between individual and organized 
facilitation or between commercial and moral facilitation. That is why a correction was crucial.261  
The original proposal defined the smuggling of migrants as “the act of facilitating intentionally, by aiding directly 
or indirectly, the unauthorized entry, movement or residence”.262 Thus, the lack of any criteria of financial gain in 
the definition of the offence was denounced by MEPs as dangerous. The report explained that anyone interacting 
with undocumented migrants could fall under the wide scope of criminal liability, especially migrants’ relatives 
and humanitarian actors.263 Yet, it would be contrary to the definition of migrant smuggling in Article 27 of the 
Schengen Convention264 and to most national legislation. To exclusively target organised criminal groups, the 
European Parliament amended Article 1 of the General Offence: 
Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the act of facilitating intentionally 
for purposes of direct or indirect gain, by aiding directly or indirectly, the unauthorized entry, movement 
or residence in its territory of an alien who is not a national of a Member State of the European Union is 
regarded as an offence.265 
The European Parliament reinforced it in Amendment (6), recital 3: “Consequently measures should be taken to 
combat the aiding of illegal immigration, for purposes of direct and indirect gain, whether in connection with 
unauthorized crossing of the border in the strict sense or for the purpose of sustaining networks that exploit 
human beings”.266 The purpose of specifying direct and indirect gain was justified as a way to extend the scope 
of criminal liability to anyone taking advantage of undocumented migrants: “It should also be made clear that 
such gain should be either direct or indirect, depending on the nature of the activities, direct financial gain being 
that derived from the direct organization of and participation in the offences in question, whilst indirect financial 
gain is that derived from the work done by immigrants.”267 
Moreover, the European Parliament proposed a set of specific amendments in order to provide more legal 
certainty for the protection of those who act with the intent to provide humanitarian assistance. In Amendment 
11, it adds to Article 4: “Associations, organizations or other legal persons acting for humanitarian reasons shall 
be immune from criminal prosecution”.268 The safeguard is also reinforced in the same article when specifying 
what is considered humanitarian assistance in Amendment 12: “Legally recognized organizations and 
associations whose aims include defending, protecting and promoting aliens who are not nationals of an EU 
Member State shall not be held liable in respect of the aid referred to in Articles 1 and 2 when they act out of 
humanitarian reasons”.269 Again, it added to Article 3 more clarity to the exemption of civil society organisations 
with Amendment 7:270 “The legal persons referred to in this Article, and also their agents, representatives and 
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employees, shall not be held liable in cases involving legally recognized non-profit-making organizations and 
associations whose aims include defending, protecting and promoting aliens who are not nationals of an EU 
Member State and whose activities are motivated by humanitarian considerations”.  
Some other parliamentary propositions in the report would have been very important to tackle the negative 
unintended consequences of the Facilitators’ Package to smuggled migrants, as previously mentioned by the 
Carrera et al. (2016) study for the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee. Amendment 9 to Article 2 aimed at 
exempting smuggled migrants from criminalisation: “Aliens whose illegal entry is assisted by this offence shall 
not be prosecuted as parties to that offence.”271 The European Parliament explained in its report that “a clear 
distinction should be made between unauthorized entry and the act of aiding unauthorized entry”.272 
Furthermore, many irregular migrants “are refugees who are granted political asylum in the Union after entering 
it”.273 Therefore, the rectification would have created a safeguard for victims of smuggling and, as already 
explained in the relevant studies mentioned above, it would have removed one of the bases for criminalising 
humanitarian assistance. 
Amendment 6, for Article 3(3a) intended to protect service providers, specifically safeguarding carriers from 
sanctions when they are transporting persons who are seeking asylum within the EU:  
(3a) The legal persons referred to in this Article, and also their agents, representatives and employees, 
shall not be held liable for the commission of an offence defined by Directive 2000/…/EC in cases where 
aliens who are not nationals of an EU Member State and who have been transported to an EU Member 
State wish to seek the protection provided under the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Protection of 
Refugees.274 
This approach is different from everything proposed by the relevant studies analysed above. It has mainly focused 
on the exemption from criminalisation of landlords as service providers, in particular in situations relating to the 
right to seek asylum in the EU. This is an interesting approach, but it is one that appears to have been abandoned 
by the European Parliament. The amendment was in full compliance with the EU’s commitment to protect those 
fleeing persecution when holding the idea that no one, besides the state receiving an asylum demand, has the 
power to interfere with the movement of someone fleeing persecution: 
Carriers cannot in any way be held liable for transporting persons who request asylum immediately 
upon arrival within the territory of a Member State, since we would otherwise be requiring them to 
prevent asylum-seekers from travelling and from requesting the protection provided under the 1951 
Geneva Convention. Furthermore, carriers have neither the ability nor the authority to assess the 
admissibility of an application for asylum and hence under no circumstances can they be directly or 
indirectly persuaded to carry out an assessment of suitability. Sanctions must be proportionate and 
balanced and the punishment must be made to fit the crime.275 
Such a possibility for asylum seekers to arrive in the EU while using ordinary means of transport would eliminate 
or reduce the opportunities for migrant smugglers to profit from their situation. Such an article would have been 
a major contribution to stemming irregular arrivals, by simply allowing asylum seekers to reach EU regularly. 
However, as has been discussed in the European Parliament, in the context of Global Compacts on Refugees, 
besides resettlement and family reunification there are no viable legal pathways for genuine asylum seekers, as 
the proposal on Humanitarian Visas is still pending.276 Similarly legal migration channels for purposes of 
                                                                    
271 See in Article 2 “Each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that participation, as an accomplice or 
instigator, in the offence referred to in Article 1 shall be considered to be an offence, as shall also the attempt to commit such 
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employment and education remain very limited for sub-Saharan countries.277 This pushed them into irregularity, 
that in turn has further increased the restrictive trend in EU migration and border control policies. Such policies 
are increasingly assigning responsibility for assessing migrants’ papers to civil society and other third-party actors 
(e.g. landlords,278 lawyers, doctors, journalists, academia279 or service providers in general).  
The statement by Cecilia Malmström (ELDR) (SV) during a plenary debate on the topic summarises well the 
implications of the Facilitators’ Package initiative: the initiative proposed by France only deals with a small part 
of these incredibly complex issues concerning migration and refugees.280 Alima Boumediene-Thiery (FR) 
(Verts/ALE) also recalls “that the figures for overall immigration have remained stable in recent years, proving that 
restrictive policies on immigration and visas have succeeded only in increasing the number of illegal 
immigrants”.281 
Thus, in order to control irregular migration, the European Parliament previously proposed a more holistic 
approach together with a security logic.282 As further explained, policies in that vein are doomed to fail without a 
common immigration and asylum policy.283 The latter has major relevance as “[r]efugees and persons refused 
political asylum are an important group of ‘illegal immigrants’ in the Union. For this reason, a common asylum 
policy covering everything from asylum procedure to social security benefits is particularly important.”284  
Therefore, the European Parliament recommended amending recital 2: 
The Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty on European Union provide for the 
gradual creation of an area of freedom, security and justice, which means includes, inter alia, that illegal 
immigration must be combated. the implementation of a common immigration and asylum policy 
covering family reunion, the right of residence and an integration policy, as well as the combating of 
illegal immigration.  
Moreover, it creates Recital 2a:  
In this connection it is particularly important to lay the foundations of a common asylum and 
immigration policy, to settle a common asylum procedure and, in addition, to improve the legal status 
of refugees.285 
The deficiencies found in the legal framework were numerous, and despite proposing the above-mentioned 
amendments, the European Parliament rejected the French proposal on 15 February 2001. Regardless, the 
Facilitators’ Package was adopted by the Council on 28 November 2002.  
The Parliament has nonetheless kept its stance on the issue and insisted over the years on a revision of the EU 
acquis on smuggling. Notably, in its annual report on fundamental rights (2014), it reiterated the need to change 
the law to avoid penalising people for assisting migrants at sea, urging “the EU and the Member States to amend 
or review any legislation sanctioning people assisting migrants in distress at sea” and “the Commission to review 
Council Directive 2002/90/EC defining the sanctions in case of facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and 
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residence in order to clarify that providing humanitarian assistance to migrants at sea who are in distress is to be 
welcomed and not an action which should ever lead to any form of sanctions”.286 
Meanwhile, that same year (2014), the FRA published its report on the Facilitators’ Package. This also shed light 
on the problem of sanctioning rescuers at sea, more specifically drawing attention to the criminalisation of 
fishermen.287 In 2015, the LIBE Committee asked CEPS to conduct a study on the subject,288 as previously 
mentioned in section 2.1. In 2016, the petition from the lawyer Paula Schmid Porras was addressed to the PETI 
Committee reporting the same concerns. In April of the following year the European Parliament noted with 
respect to the forthcoming REFIT that the Commission was “considering a revision of Council Directive 
2002/90/EC defining the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence” and took “the view that anyone 
who provides different forms of humanitarian assistance to those in need should not be criminalized and that 
Union law should reflect that principle”.289 
Yet in spite of the wide array of evidence and long history of controversy surrounding the legislation, the REFIT 
concluded that “based on the findings of the studies supporting this evaluation as well as the opinions and 
information gathered through broader stakeholder consultations, there is no sufficient evidence to draw firm 
conclusions about the need for a revision of the Facilitators Package at this point in time”.290  
2.3.2 Calls from the European Parliament for the exemption of humanitarian assistance 
The European Parliament reaffirmed its commitment to humanitarian assistance in its resolution of 18 April 2018 
on progress on the UN Global Compacts for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and on Refugees, calling “for the 
non-criminalization of humanitarian assistance” and for “greater search and rescue capacities for people in 
distress, for greater capacities to be deployed by all states, and for the support provided by private actors and 
NGOs in carrying out rescue operations at sea and on land to be acknowledged”.291 
Given the unlikely reform of the Facilitators’ Package in the near future and the Commission’s very vague 
proposals in the REFIT for improving the implementation of the EU legislation, the European Parliament has 
decided to take action on this urgent matter. On 5 June 2018, MEPs from the LIBE Committee voted on a non-
legislative resolution with a number of demands for the Commission and Member States for preventing the 
criminalisation of humanitarian assistance. This was adopted by the LIBE committee with 30 votes to 16 and 2 
abstentions and confirmed by plenary on 2 July 2018.292 The main concern expressed in the resolution was “the 
unintended consequences of the Facilitators Package on citizens providing humanitarian assistance to migrants 
and on the social cohesion of the receiving society as a whole”.293 The resolution  
[u]rges the Commission to adopt guidelines for Member States specifying which forms of facilitation 
should not be criminalized, in order to ensure clarity and uniformity in the implementation of the 
current acquis, including Article 1(1)(b) and 1(2) of the Facilitation Directive, and stresses that clarity of 
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parameters will ensure greater consistency in the criminal regulation of facilitation across Member 
States and limit unwarranted criminalization.294  
In addition, MEPs also called for EU countries to transpose into their national legislation the clause to exempt 
humanitarian assistance from criminal liability.295 This decision is therefore in line with the recommendations 
made by the FRA and UNODC mentioned in section 2.1 of this study. Finally, in order to tackle the methodological 
challenges of finding information on the number of arrests, prosecutions and convictions of humanitarian actors 
encountered by the evaluations (namely the ICF, the Carrera et al. (2016) study and the REFIT), MEPs called for 
Member States  
to put in place adequate systems to monitor the enforcement and effective practical application of the 
Facilitators Package, by collecting and recording annually information about the number of people 
arrested for facilitation at the border and inland, the number of judicial proceedings initiated, the 
number of convictions, along with information on how sentences are determined, and reasons for 
discontinuing an investigation.296  
They also called for a definition of what is not criminal in humanitarian assistance and for a more holistic approach 
on migration and migrant smuggling, in cooperation with third countries.  
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3. POLICING CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS: LEGAL/POLICY CHANGES IN EU 
MEMBER STATES AND CASES OF CRIMINALISING HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
• As discussed in section 2, the deficiencies of the Facilitators’ Package remain critically important. In 
particular, the absence of clear guidance for national legislators within the EU legal framework on what 
should (or should not) be a base crime and regarding what the safeguard provisions should be results in 
complex and heterogenous implementation. While the EU has competence to enforce existing 
standards, the vagueness and wide margin of appreciation given to Member States makes it hard to 
implement in practice. For example, even in Member States where the humanitarian exemption is 
applied, humanitarian actors acting without profit motives have still been investigated and prosecuted, 
albeit eventually acquitted.  
• Legal and policy changes have enabled various modes of CSA policing through a range of different 
mechanisms that hamper and preclude assistance to refugees and other migrants. Two of the most 
dangerous examples come from Italy and Hungary.  
• In Hungary, the ‘Stop Soros’ package has outlawed certain activities of CSAs: sharing information and 
assistance in filing asylum claims have been criminalised as offences related to migrant smuggling. In 
addition, immense pressure has been exerted to prevent Hungarian CSAs from accessing funding from 
outside the country and citizens have been discouraged from supporting the CSAs assisting migrants on 
the grounds that they might also be incriminated for supporting migrant smuggling. Such possibilities 
for judicial and fiscal harassment have seriously compromised the independence and watchdog role of 
civil society.  
• In Italy, a range of accusations against SAR NGOs have stoked suspicion and led to disciplinary actions. 
Italian authorities have imposed a new binding code of conduct to discourage and preclude civil society 
from conducting SAR activities. Unprecedented policing and criminalisation of SAR NGOs have resulted 
in many organisations discontinuing their activities. In 2016, at least 10 NGOs were operational in the 
Mediterranean, including Jugend Rettet, Sea Watch, Sea-Eye, LifeBoat, SOS Méditerrannée and Mission 
Lifeline from Germany. At the end of November 2018, the Aquarius ship halted operations after being 
pushed around EU Member States without permission to disembark survivors.  
• Formal prosecutions on the grounds of ‘migrant smuggling’ have been started against CSAs that seek to 
uphold the rights of asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. In the majority of cases so far, the 
charges have subsequently been dropped, but damage has been done to both the reputations of such 
actors and to societal trust in the rule of law more broadly. 
 
3.1 Legal and policy changes targeting CSAs providing assistance to asylum seekers and 
undocumented migrants 
Section 3 explores the key legal and policy changes that have taken place since 2016 in three of five selected EU 
Member States that targeted CSAs assisting refugees and migrants and/or created or enabled an environment 
for their judicial harassment. These developments cover instances of policing that go beyond the criminal 
prosecutions on the grounds provided in the Facilitators’ Package but which still employ the argument of fighting 
migrant smuggling as their primary justification. The analysis looks in detail at the example from Hungary on Lex 
NGOs and the changes in the provisions of the Hungarian Criminal Code. It elaborates on the code of conduct 
passed in Italy, which has had impacts on the humanitarian NGOs involved in SAR activities in the Central 
Mediterranean. It also discusses proposals to conduct house searches in Belgium without a proper house search 
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order when the purpose is to find migrants in an irregular situation. On Greece and France, the analysis is more 
focused on the actual application of current laws and instances of the policing of CSAs.  
3.1.1 Hungary: Policing CSAs  
In Hungary, after the elections in 2010, the Fidesz-led government started to slowly undermine the rule of law 
checks and balances.297 The attacks on CSAs, and in particular on leading humanitarian and human rights NGOs, 
were part of this broader agenda.298 Thus, the policing of CSAs in Hungary started prior to the so-called European 
humanitarian refugee crisis. From 2013, civil society organisations started to face increasing policing by 
government campaigns and national authorities.299 The ruling party started spreading suspicion with various 
defamatory messages that targeted leading humanitarian and human rights NGOs.300 The suspicion was followed 
by intimidation and harassment – police raids were conducted on the offices of NGOs.301 These were unlawful.302 
Organisations that received funding from the EEA and Norway Grants NGO Fund were also subject to suspicion 
and disciplinary actions.303 Initially, these actions were justified by the danger of foreign political interference in 
the country due to NGOs’ foreign-based funds. Notably, the campaign against the Hungarian-American 
philanthropist, George Soros, illustrates the situation in Hungary. Soros was the personalisation of Western liberal 
values, which were seen as antagonistic to the Hungarian national government; as a result, Soros-related 
institutions and foundations, such as the Central European University, the Open Society Foundations and their 
grantees have been severely targeted in the ‘Stop Soros’ package.304  
In summer 2015, asylum seekers and refugees coming predominantly from civil war-torn Syria were prevented 
from boarding trains going to Austria and started to camp at Keleti station. This was met by a mix of compassion 
and public panic. The government started to exploit anti-migrant sentiments and xenophobia in the Hungarian 
media and in official speeches.305 Subsequently, CSAs acting in humanitarian relief to this population became an 
object of political persecution. Since then, the accusations against leading humanitarian and human rights 
organisations have gone from them colluding with smugglers to being an active ‘pull factor’ attracting illegal 
migrants and consequently a threat to national security.306 The government has been trying to hamper CSAs’ 
activities through new controversial laws and policies targeting asylum seekers and migrants, and those CSAs 
that assist or mobilise for their rights.  
Box 1 details the changes in the Hungarian Criminal Code where the definition of migrant smuggling and related 
crimes were broadened so as to enable more active policing of CSAs. Later on, a separate law (known as Lex NGO) 
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was passed in Hungary, which limits access to foreign funding. EU funding for CSAs working on migration was 
also made virtually inaccessible, putting them in a very vulnerable position. The attack against CSAs working with 
refugees and other migrants culminated in 2018 with the Stop Soros package. This law criminalises a range of 
activities deemed to be related to migrant smuggling; problematically for civil society, these include the 
monitoring of human rights violations at border zones, the distribution of information to asylum seekers or 
undocumented migrants, as well as assistance with filing an asylum application. The law also classifies individual 
donations to such organisations as the financing of migrant smuggling activities. Thus, the policing of CSAs takes 
many shapes in Hungary from suspicion and intimidation, to judicial and fiscal harassment, outlawing in 
substance the activities of humanitarian and human rights organisations operating in this field.  
 
Box 1. Hungary: Extending the definition of ‘migrant smuggling’ in the Criminal Code, 2015–17 
In 2015, new laws were introduced to Section 353 of the Hungarian Criminal Code on ‘Illegal Immigrant 
Smuggling’, which entered into force on 15 September 2015.307 These new measures focus mainly on fighting 
the facilitation of entry and the protection of the national borders. They operate in two main ways: 
First, through tougher penalties, in which there has been an increase in the time of imprisonment for the felony 
of facilitation of entry and border damage.308 In addition, the law foresees several ways to increase the penalty 
to 20 years with aggravations, such as for acting in an organised manner or using violence against migrants.309  
Second, new types of crimes have been introduced to the code to criminalise migrants310 and those mobilising 
for their rights.311 “Section 352/B criminalises anyone who ‘destroys and vandalises the barrier’ with one to five 
years’ imprisonment.”312 In addition, aggravations can increase the penalties for the offence, such as (c) by 
participating in civil disturbance.313 These new legislative amendments evidently have the intent to intimidate 
civil society and migrants, in order to discourage disobedience or protests against anti-migration policies. 
Another offence has been added related to protesting and obstructing the erection of fences to prevent asylum 
seekers and irregular migrants from entering the country. The new law has thus introduced a new misdemeanour 
“punishable with one year of imprisonment for those who ‘obstruct the construction or maintenance of the 
barrier’.”314 Such broad legislation could criminalise any CSA for contestation with police and border guards as 
well as with Hungarian ‘border hunters’.315  
The Hungarian Criminal Code provisions on migrant smuggling and related offences, have not only been 
changed, but also actively used by national authorities to prevent irregular migration.316 Notably, the police have 
begun to enforce more thoroughly the obligation to report irregular migrants staying and residing in Hungary.317 
The legal and policy changes in Hungarian immigration and asylum law have become a source of concern for 
CSAs.318 Such laws and policies have had a chilling effect and led to the withdrawal of activities in the border 
zones; possibilities for shelter for vulnerable migrants have also diminished due to great uncertainty regarding 
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what services CSAs can provide.319 CSAs assisting refugees and other migrants have also reported an increased 
hostility towards them from the state institutions and society at large. 
The Hungarian Criminal Code was once again extended as part of the Stop Soros package (see Box 4).  
 
Box 2. Hungary: Lex NGO and other measures targeting the financial independence of CSAs  
Lex NGO (Act LXXVI of 2017 on “Transparency of Organizations Receiving Foreign Funds”) entered into force in 
April 2017. It was created under the pretence of fighting other areas of crime – money laundering and 
terrorism.320 However, this law does not cover all types of civil society groups carrying the same legal status of 
‘association’ or NGO. This law exempts faith-based associations that are pursuing religious activities or which are 
founded by that date and other types, such as sports associations.321 Therefore, it indicates the government’s 
intentions to target, stigmatise, intimidate, silence and consequently hamper the activities of a certain segment 
of civil society that is active in a public debate and promotes liberal and European values, including fundamental 
rights.322  
The legislation requires that all civil society organisations receiving at least HUF 7.2 million per year have to 
register as foreign-funded organisations.323 Additionally, they must publish online detailed information about 
their donors, and note in all documents, press statements, websites and publications the following statement: 
“This organisation is funded by foreigners.”324 This has an extremely negative effect on their image, as 
conservative politicians inflame and spread within society the presumption that organisations receiving 
international funds lobby for foreign interests in Hungarian politics.325  
These measures are likely to dissuade domestic and international donations as well as affect civil society 
organisations’ credibility within Hungarian society. Such financial pressure hinders the continuation of their 
activities; meanwhile, non-compliance has even worse consequences. The law foresees very high fines and 
ultimately the revocation of the entity’s legal status and its dissolution.326 For instance, the Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, one of the leading human rights NGOs that provides humanitarian and legal assistance to asylum 
seekers, refugees, detainees and victims of law enforcement violence, refused to register as ‘foreign funded’. 
Subsequently, its cooperation agreements with the state were terminated in October 2017.327 
                                                                    
319 Ibid. 
320 F. La Bruyère (2017), « Les ONG hongroises sous étroite surveillance », RFI, 13 June (http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20170613-
ong-hongroises-sous-etroite-surveillance). 
321 Article 1 (4) (a) and (c), Act LXXVI of 2017 on the Transparency of Organisations Receiving Foreign Funds. Unofficial 
translation by The Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2017c) (https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/LexNGO-adopted-
text-unofficial-ENG-14June2017.pdf). 
322 Bárd (2017), op. cit. 
323 Act LXXVI of 2017, on the Transparency of Organisations Receiving Foreign Funds, Article (2): “amount specified in Article 
6 paragraph (1) (b) of the Act on Money Laundering”. Unofficial translation, by The Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2017c), op. 
cit. 
324 Article 2 (5), Act LXXVI of 2017, on the Transparency of Organisations Receiving Foreign Funds. Unofficial translation, by 
The Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2017c), op. cit. 
325 Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2017d), “What Is the Problem with the Hungarian Law On Foreign Funded NGOs?”, 10 
October (https://www.helsinki.hu/en/what-is-the-problem-with-the-hungarian-law-on-foreign-funded-ngos/). 
326 Article 3, Act LXXVI of 2017, on the Transparency of Organisations Receiving Foreign Funds. Unofficial translation, by The 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2017c), op. cit. 
327 The Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2017b), op. cit. 
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The Lex NGO was widely criticised by several international and regional human rights bodies, such as the Council 
of Europe (CoE) Commissioner for Human Rights,328 CoE Expert Council on NGO Law,329 UN Special Rapporteur 
on the situation of human rights defenders330 and the Venice Commission.331 The European Parliament also 
raised critical questions with the Hungarian prime minister in numerous debates on the rule of law situation in 
Hungary.332 In December 2017, seven months after the legislation had passed, the European Commission 
launched an infringement procedure against Hungary for violating the fundamental rights of freedom of 
expression and association, enshrined in the EU Charter, in addition to infringing national, regional and 
international law.333 Yet, when the Hungarian government revised this law in July 2018, it did so as part of the 
Stop Soros package334 (see Box 4). 
 
Box 3. Hungary: Obstacles to receiving funding from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 
for CSAs  
Another governmental tactic to pose financial constraints on the associations is to hamper their access to the 
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) from the EU. In Hungary, authorities have decided not to provide 
25% of AMIF co-financing for civil society, “meaning that civil society organisations must independently source 
financing for any proposed AMIF initiative”.335 The reluctance to provide AMIF co-funding should be seen in the 
light of Lex NGO, which is aimed at spreading suspicion about ‘foreign funding’. Thus, by default any potential 
civil society applicant willing to access AMIF funding needs to first secure a grant from outside.  
If a civil society organisation is successful in getting 25% co-financing, the Hungarian government exerts financial 
control over the successful AMIF grantee. The Hungarian government specified that NGOs can only receive AMIF 
funding if they give to the Ministry of Interior “a blanket authorisation to directly withdraw money from the 
organisation’s bank account at any point during and after the project implementation”.336 This makes financial, 
political and operational independence from the Ministry of Interior for any NGO receiving EU funding highly 
unlikely. 
 
                                                                    
328 Commissioner for Human Rights (2017), letter to Mr Lâszl6 KOVÉR, Speaker of the National Assembly of Hungary, 26 April 
(https://rm.coe.int/ref/CommDH(2017)14). 
329 Expert Council on NGO Law (2017), “Opinion on the Hungarian Draft act on the transparency of organisations supported 
from abroad”, 24 April (https://rm.coe.int/168070bfbb). 
330 United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders (2017), “Mandates of the Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to 
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333 European Commission (2017), “Infringements -European Commission refers Hungary to the Court of Justice for its NGO 
Law”, IP-17-5003, 7 December.  
334 The Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2018), unofficial translation of “Chapter X – On the Special Tax on Immigration” 
(https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Special-immigration-tax-as-adopted-20-July-2018.pdf). 
335 Ibid. 
336 R. Westerby (2018), “Follow the Money: Assessing the use of EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) funding at 
the national level”, Brussels: UNHCR and ECRE, January, p. 41 (https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/follow-the-
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Box 4. Hungary: The Stop Soros package changes in the Criminal Code & tax regulations 
The Stop Soros package of the same year is an outcome of the escalation from the initial changes in the 
Hungarian Criminal Code, Lex NGO and exertion of control over the NGOs through the EU’s AMIF funding 
mechanism. It presents an example of judicial and fiscal harassment and intimidation, as a form of policing 
targeting humanitarian and human rights CSAs. The Stop Soros package, together with Bill T/333 and the 
Seventh amendment to the Basic Law (Bill T/332) entered into force in July 2018.337  
The change in the Criminal Code – judicial harassment 
The amendment extended criminal liability to a wider range of CSAs, when providing relief or colluding with 
humanitarian NGOs. Bill T/333 amended Section 353/A to Section 353 under Act C of 2012 of the Penal Code, to 
fight the facilitation of illegal immigration.  
Section 11 of the bill criminalises any organisation in which its activities338 comprise the facilitation of a migrant’s 
irregular entry and residence with an aim to obtain a residence permit339 or to allow the initiation of an ill-founded 
asylum procedure.340 Anyone who provides financial means for these actions, or who regularly carries out such 
activities is more severely punished, as the penalty can go up to a year of imprisonment. The offence is also 
aggravated when the organised activities are committed for financial gain, providing support to more than one 
person or close to the borders. Moreover, paragraph 5(a) includes in the offence persons who organise border 
monitoring,341 prepare or distribute information materials or commission such activities,342 or who build or 
operate a network for doing so.343 Section 11 of the Seventh amendment to the Basic Law (Bill T/332) thus 
effectively criminalises as migrant smuggling-related crimes the ‘initiation of an asylum procedure’ or the 
“distribution of informational material to asylum seekers and irregular migrants and refugees”.344 
The change in tax law – fiscal harassment 
The Stop Soros legislation includes a provision that increases the fiscal pressure even more with an additional 
25% of the tax base for organisations financing, working with and/or promoting migration.  
The law foresees as activities supporting migration: 
a) carrying out media campaigns and media seminars and participating in such activities;  
b) organising education;  
c) building and operating networks; or  
d) propaganda activities that portray immigration in a positive light.345 
 
Potential impacts 
                                                                    
337 The Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2018b), op. cit. 
338 Section 353/A (1) Amending Act C of 2012 on the Penal Code. Unofficial translation by The Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
(2018c), op. cit. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Section 353/A (5) a) Amending Act C of 2012 on the Penal Code, op. cit. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Section 353/A (1) a) Amending Act C of 2012 on the Penal Code. Unofficial translation by The Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
(2018c) of Bill T/333 amending certain laws relating to measures to combat illegal immigration May 2018, Budapest 
(https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T333-ENG.pdf). 
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According to the section on the general reasoning of the Bill, the objective of these amendments is mainly to 
protect public order and public security, which are threatened since “immigration poses serious risks and is 
therefore a question of national security”. Moreover, it reinforces the idea that “they (the population) do not want 
Hungary to become an immigrant country”.346 However, these new provisions deeply affect more than just 
migrants. They are responsible for the shrinking of the space of Hungarian civil society. The new provisions aim 
at criminalising precisely the activities that are conducted by civil society organisations assisting migrants. In the 
same way, according to paragraph 2, the law attempts to outlaw people who collude with the NGOs’ ideas while 
also criminalising their donations to such organisations, thus once again closing the possibilities for CSAs in 
Hungary to get additional funding independent from government through individual donations.  
Following the announcement of the Stop Soros package, international and regional bodies expressed their 
concern over the legislation, as summarised in the report by Judith Sargentini, calling for the activation of Article 
7(1) TEU against Hungary:347 
On 14 February 2018, the president of the Conference of INGOs (international NGOs) of the Council of Europe 
and president of the Expert Council on NGO Law made a statement indicating that the package does not comply 
with the freedom of association, particularly for NGOs dealing with migrants. On 15 February 2018, the Council 
of Europe commissioner for human rights expressed similar concerns. In its concluding observations of 5 April 
2018, the UN Human Rights Committee expressed concerns that by alluding to the “survival of the nation” and 
protection of citizens and culture, and by linking the work of NGOs to an alleged international conspiracy, the 
legislative package would stigmatise NGOs and curb their ability to carry out their important activities in support of 
human rights and, in particular, the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. It was further concerned that 
imposing restrictions on foreign funding directed to NGOs might be used to apply illegitimate pressure on them 
and to unjustifiably interfere with their activities. 
In addition, the Venice Commission and the OSCE ODIHR (Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe, 
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) stated in June 2018 that such legislation violates the 
principle of legal certainty and constitutes an unlawful interference with the freedom of association, and in some 
cases also the freedom of expression. The Venice Commission furthermore highlighted that the Stop Soros 
package does not meet human rights or rule of law standards.348 
 
3.1.2 Belgium: Policies and laws stirring suspicion, intimidation and harassment 
Similar to the situation in Hungary and Italy, suspicions have been spread and exploited in Belgium about acts of 
solidarity by citizens and NGOs with refugees and other migrants. A new law allowing for searches of private 
homes in Belgium for persons in an irregular situation subject to expulsion orders was proposed as a consequence 
of these ‘suspicions’. 
Box 5. Belgium: Proposed bill for ‘house searches’ for migrants in an irregular situation 
In Belgium, the suspicion that people working in CSAs assisting refugees and other migrants ‘collude with 
smugglers’ or commit other crimes related to migrant smuggling – such as facilitation of transit, stay and 
residence – resulted in the government’s attempt to append a new article to the Immigration Act.349 The Belgian 
Minister of Justice, Koen Geens (Christian Democratic and Flemish Party (CD&V)), presented a bill for a vote in 
parliament with the support of Secretary of State for Asylum, Migration and Administrative Simplification Théo 
                                                                    
346 “General Reasoning” in Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2018c), op. cit.  
347 Sargentini (2018), op. cit. 
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Francken (New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)) and Deputy Prime Minister Jan Jambon (N-VA).350 This provision would 
enable the police, carrying a warrant issued by the juge d’instruction (investigative judge), without going through 
the magistrate or independent judge (which is the case now) to search residences for migrants in an irregular 
situation who have been given expulsion orders.351 
This bill has been extremely controversial. Francken and his party (N-VA) have been pressuring for its adoption: 
“We are allowed to do this with entrepreneurs, why not with people who offer a roof to ‘illegals’.”352 Judges, 
lawyers, CSAs assisting refugees or other migrants as well as other political parties have strongly criticised and 
opposed it. 
The main concerns expressed by the opposition have been the risks of lowering criminal justice safeguards and 
infringing the privacy and other fundamental rights of Belgium’s citizens and residents;353 the 
instrumentalisation of the law to stir suspicion about the activities of humanitarian NGOs and citizens who act 
out of compassion; and the opening of new possibilities for law enforcement agents to intimidate and harass 
those acting in solidarity with refugees and other migrants.354 The negative resonance led half of the communes 
(Belgium local authorities) to vote for a motion to prevent the advancement of this legislation.355 Eventually, the 
strong resistance of local authorities and other actors mentioned above succeeded in freezing negotiations over 
this bill. However, for CSAs assisting asylum seekers and migrants in an irregular situation, it is still a source of 
concern and uncertainty as a future government could attempt to reopen negotiations over the bill. 
 
3.1.3 France: Repressive policies towards migrants in transit that create a hostile environment for CSAs  
Box 6. France: A hostile environment for CSAs assisting asylum seekers and undocumented migrants  
The French government put great pressure on municipalities and law enforcement authorities to solve the issue 
of migrants living on the streets by the end of 2017.356 The only way to accomplish such an achievement in so 
little time would clearly lead to an intensification of the repressive approach already in place since 2015.357 This 
included the calculated dismantling of migrant camps in French cities, such as in the north of Paris,358 Calais and 
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prospectives/collectionregards-decales/visites-domiciliaires). 
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Dunkirk.359  
In addition, the police adopted a stricter position against migrants situated in visible parts of the city, which is 
often denounced as being unnecessarily violent.360 Consequently, such a policy has been responsible for creating 
a tense environment for humanitarian assistance in the above-mentioned cities. The dispersion tactic by the 
police is to prevent migrants from stopping to sleep or eat at the same site.361 By this logic, NGOs distributing 
material needs, food or medical help are often asked to move from their usual place of distribution362 or are even 
prohibited by the municipalities from providing any kind of aid at all.363 Moreover, most of the time the police 
monitor volunteers’ assistance for the same purpose.364 This policy creates tension: the relief provided by 
volunteers is perceived as a major impediment to police work as well as to the objective of politicians to fight 
irregular migration.  
The local authorities and judicial system also play an important role in the intimidation of NGOs. A report shows 
a case of an intent to exert financial pressure through the harassment of donors and supporters: “At the 
beginning of 2018, local companies which supported the associations in the Calais Warehouse, either through 
donations (wood pallets, barrels, etc.) or by taking orders, were victims of pressure by the Prefecture and the 
Calais town hall. These companies … were threatened [with being] exempted from public tendering if they 
continued supporting the associations in Calais Warehouse.”365 
The report shows another case of judicial harassment:  
The members of l’Auberge des Migrants were [on] several occasions summoned by the Direction 
Departmentale de la Sécurité Publique, which is part of the Police Nationale, to attend hearings on 
financial transactions made in the association’s bank account. … [T]he members of the organisation 
were called for a hearing four times since November 2017, where they were prompted to justify 
certain transactions.366 
 
3.1.4 Italy: Policing CSAs conducting SAR activities in Italy – suspicion, intimidation, disciplining and 
criminalisation  
Code of conduct on SAR NGOs and closure of Italian ports  
In 2016, Eugenio Cusumano mentioned that already at that time “some NGOs fear their objectives [to save more 
lives at sea] may become victims of their own success”.367 The presence of the NGOs near the Libyan waters has 
been key to preventing deaths at sea. In 2016, these organisations rescued 46,796 migrants (26% of the total), 
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while the majority of people were still being rescued by the Italian and European operations. The high numbers 
of refugees and migrants rescued by the NGO vessels nonetheless began to raise suspicion among EU agencies 
and national authorities from the end of 2016 onwards. 
Suspicion about the activities of SAR NGOs in Italy escalated and led to the government imposing a binding code 
of conduct in August 2017.368 This setting facilitated and encouraged the criminalisation of the remaining 
organisations operating in the Mediterranean. It subsequently became an additional means for ‘judicial 
harassment’ of various organisations regarding their flag states, intimidation and arrests of the staff and seizures 
of boats, so that life-saving humanitarian operations would not continue. Such operations are seen by some 
border police authorities and politicians as being at odds with their primary goal of stemming the flows of 
refugees and other migrants in the Mediterranean. Below we further analyse some emblematic cases of policing 
SAR NGOs as a consequence of the code of conduct, notably Proactiva Open Arms and Jugend Rettet as well as 
the Eritrean priest, Mussie Zerai.  
 
Box 7. Italy: A binding code of conduct for SAR NGOs saving lives in the Mediterranean 
The government’s binding code of conduct was a major attack on SAR NGOs in Italy; it institutionalised suspicion 
and introduced exceptional rules solely for civil society and not, for example, for merchant or government ships. 
In August 2017, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Save the Children and Sea-Eye suspended their operations, in 
disagreement with the proposed code of conduct and due to security threats arising from the Libyan coast guard 
after the country established its SAR area, forbidding entry to humanitarian organisations.369 At the beginning of 
September, MOAS (Migrant Offshore Aid Station) also announced that they would be suspending operations in 
the absence of guarantees of the possibility to access a safe harbour to disembark people rescued.370 Thus, 
among the NGOs having the capability to disembark people to the shore, SOS Méditerrannée, with its vessel 
Aquarius, remained the only big NGO rescue ship conducting fully-fledged rescue operations, with smaller 
vessels acting in a supporting role – Jugend Rettet’s ship Iuventa and Proactiva’s vessel Open Arms.371 In addition 
to the binding code of conduct in August 2017, the Iuventa was confiscated and criminal investigations were 
opened by the prosecutor of Trapani. The investigation also covered the Eritrean priest Mussie Zerai.372 By 18 
March 2018, Proactiva’s vessel Open Arms had been seized too.373  
 
3.1.5 Greece: Policing SAR CSAs and those working in hotspots  
In Greece, the Hellenic Coast Guard in cooperation with the International Maritime Rescue Federation introduced 
a vetting procedure for the CSAs engaged in SAR activities. As national border/coast guard authorities 
commented, NGOs had to become part of the Hellenic Coast Guard’s grid so as not “to duplicate the efforts in 
one area”.374 This has led to the departure of some SAR NGOs. However, more discouraging were the prosecutions 
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of Team Humanity and Proem-AID. These were also discussed in the context of a petition submitted to the PETI 
Committee.  
Another new type of policy in Greece requires the registration of all CSAs. The policing of CSAs in Greece is 
explicitly manifested as an obligation to register and implicitly as that of being ‘coordinated’. An interviewee 
representing a civil society organisation in Lesvos explained the need to register both individual volunteers and 
organisations.375 A survey respondent explained that “if these requirements of registration were not met, the NGO 
and volunteers would be acting in violation of the [Greek] law and policies requiring registration”. An interviewee 
from a civil society organisation reported the intimidation experienced by activists squatting in Lesvos who, 
though often known to be EU citizens, were frequently asked about their migration status by police.376 These 
bureaucratic measures and controlling tactics were perceived as an obstacle to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.  
3.2  Policing civil society conducting SAR activities 
3.2.1 Lack of a holistic approach to challenges in the Central Mediterranean: Why SAR NGOs entered the 
scene  
After the end of the Mare Nostrum operation in November 2014, an operational and territorial gap in SAR was 
left. This gap was not filled by proactive European SAR operations, despite the solemn intentions expressed in 
the European Agenda on Migration to replace Mare Nostrum.377 This gap continued throughout the ‘European 
refugee humanitarian crisis’ from 2015 onwards and was marked, as mentioned previously, by a sharp increase 
of people arriving irregularly in Europe, mainly fleeing violent conflicts and/or poverty (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Monthly sea arrivals via the Mediterranean Sea, 2015–18 
 
Note: The Mediterranean Sea in this figure includes the Western, Central and Eastern (Aegean) Mediterranean routes.  
Source: UNHCR, “Mediterranean situation”, as of 19 June 2018 (http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean). 
 
The first life-saving mission by CSAs was initiated by Malta-based MOAS. It started SAR activities along the Central 
Mediterranean route on 25 August 2014, as it describes below:  
Our flagship vessel, the Phoenix, left the Malta Grand Harbour that day as the first Mediterranean private 
search and rescue (SAR) initiative of its kind. Equipped with a specialist SAR crew, a fully-equipped clinic 
and two humanitarian drones, MOAS was out to demonstrate proof of concept and make a real impact 
                                                                    
375 Interview with a civil society organisation providing legal assistance, 8 of June, 2017, Lesvos island, Greece. 
376 Interview with a civil society organisation providing legal assistance, 8 of June, 2017, Lesvos island, Greece. 
377 European Commission (2015a), op. cit., p. 2. It states: ‘Search and rescue efforts will be stepped up to restore the level of 
intervention provided under the former Italian “Mare Nostrum” operation. To triple the budget for the Frontex joint-
operations Triton and Poseidon, the Commission has already presented an amending budget for 2015 and will present its 
proposal for 2016 by the end of May.’ 
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on the loss of life that had come to define the Central Mediterranean migration route. Over the next 60 
days, MOAS would save 3,104 children, women and men.378 
More organisations launched their SAR operations, likewise to fill the gap left in the Central Mediterranean after 
the end of Operation Mare Nostrum. From the end of summer 2014 to mid-summer 2017 civil society 
organisations were willingly conducting their humanitarian work there. Their preparedness and readiness to 
cooperate was praised and appreciated by the Italian coast guard on numerous occasions, including later, after 
accusations.379  
At the beginning of July 2017, in the Central Mediterranean there were nine organisations deploying their vessels 
for SAR operations.380 Some of them were branches of international humanitarian organisations, such as MSF and 
Save the Children, which conducted SAR activities as one of a wide spectrum of operations they are running 
across the globe. Others were small NGOs, established precisely for this purpose, such as MOAS, Sea Watch, Sea-
Eye, SOS-Mediterranée, Life Boat Foundation, Jugend Rettet and Proactiva Open Arms.  
The vessels deployed by these NGOs are of different sizes and capacities. NGOs deploying large vessels, such as 
Dignity I and Bourbon Argos, are run by MSF381 while Aquarius is run by SOS Mediterranée (in cooperation with 
MSF). The Vos Hestia of Save the Children382 and the Phoenix run by MOAS383 performed full SAR activities, 
meaning that they both rescued the migrants in distress and disembarked them in Italy. The remaining NGOs 
have smaller vessels – only rescuing migrants from boats in distress, hosting them on board their vessels and 
waiting for the arrival of a larger asset as appointed by the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Rome (MRCC 
Rome). The very success of SAR NGOs in rescuing refugees and other migrants soon became a point of 
controversy.  
3.2.2 Suspicion: A shift in approach towards SAR NGOs – from ‘helpers’ to potential ‘smugglers’ 
Prior to the NGOs arriving on the SAR scene, the Italian coast guard had to rely on merchant, cargo or cruise ships 
being deployed during SAR incidents. In the period between 2014 and 2015, over 1,000 merchant ships were 
involved in migrant rescue operations, assisting with the rescue of more than 50,000 people.384 They often did 
not have the capacity to respond to the urgent needs of rescued refugees and other migrants, starting from 
medical aid to even having enough food for them to eat:  
The [shipping] industry is faced with the increasingly frequent need to conduct large scale rescues, 
often involving very different challenges to conventional rescue operations. While merchant ships are 
not best suited to conduct large scale operations that may involve the rescue of hundreds of people at 
a time, it is likely that ships will continue to be called upon to assist by Rescue Co-ordination Centres 
(RCCs) for the foreseeable future. 385 
Thus, specialised SAR NGOs, in the beginning, were met as a relief service for the coast guards and shipping 
industry. However, European political and operational priorities turned towards the fight against smuggling and 
                                                                    
378 MOAS (2018), “Mediterranean Mission 2014-2017” (https://www.moas.eu/central-mediterranean/). 
379 D. Giovinazzo (2017), “La Guardia costiera: “Le Ong non sono un fattore di attrazione per i migranti”, 3 May 
(http://www.eunews.it/2017/05/03/migranti-guardia-costiera-ong-non-sono-un-fattore-di-attrazione-per-i-migranti/84403).  
380 Amnesty International, Report “A perfect storm: Failure of European Policies in Central Mediterranean”, 2017, p. 17 
(https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur03/6655/2017/en/). 
381 MSF Official Website (https://www.msf.org.uk/country/mediterranean-search-and-rescue). 
382 Save the Children (2017), “Rescue at Sea: the inside story of a high Stake Transfer”, 16 May 
(https://www.savethechildren.net/article/rescue-sea-inside-story-high-stakes-transfer). 
383 MOAS (2018), op. cit.  
384 International Chamber of Shipping (2015), “Large Scale Rescue Operations at Sea Guidance on Ensuring the Safety and 
Security of Seafarers and Rescued Persons”, second Edition 2015, London (http://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-
source/resources/safety-security-and-operations/large-scale-rescue-at-sea.pdf?sfvrsn=30).  
385 International Chamber of Shipping (2015), op. cit. 
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unresolved questions of responsibility sharing led to shifting the blame onto the rescuers.386 They were accused 
of being a pull factor for migrants.  
At the inception of conspiracies related to SAR NGOs was the Nijmegen-based Gefira foundation, with the 
publication of articles such as “NGOs are smuggling immigrants into Europe on an industrial scale”.387 A closer 
look at the Gefira foundation found unclear political motivations, though its owner rejected the claim that it has 
links with the Dutch right-wing party of Geert Wilders.388 The articles published by this foundation seem to have 
reached and influenced officials working at one of the EU justice and home affairs agencies. Gefira’s publications 
on several occasions were put forward as a proof of NGO collusion, also some national-level officials have 
reiterated similar arguments.389  
In February 2017, Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri said that “we face a kind of sad paradox that as the 
international community increases efforts to send more rescue ships close to Libya, smuggling rings pack ever 
more people onto unseaworthy boats and push them out toward the open sea”.390 With this statement, he was 
alluding to the idea that SAR operations actually contribute to the loss of life and increase smuggling. Although 
the destruction of the wooden boats by the EU Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAFOR MED) Operation Sophia 
has not been called to attention as one of the key factors contributing to the phenomenon, there is evidence that 
“an unintended consequence of Operation Sophia’s destruction of vessels has been that the smugglers have 
adapted, sending migrants to sea in unseaworthy vessels, leading to an increase in deaths”.391  
A similar conclusion was reached by the “Blaming the Rescuers” report.392 Subsequently, in March 2017 the 
Catanian prosecutor Carmelo Zuccaro raised widespread suspicion about the activities of civil society at sea.393 
He claimed in the media to have evidence of NGO collusion with smugglers;394 nevertheless, later on in a hearing 
before the Senate he admitted he had no such proof.395 In reaction to such accusations, the majority of NGOs 
signed a voluntary code of conduct, to show the public that they are organised,396 though the moods of societal 
distrust and suspicion continued.  
                                                                    
386 Forensic Oceanography (2017), Report “Blaming Rescuers” by Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani, was produced as part of 
the Forensic Architecture agency at Goldsmiths (University of London) (https://blamingtherescuers.org/). 
387 Gefira (2016), “NGOs are smuggling immigrants into Europe on an industrial scale” (https://gefira.org/en/2016/12/04/ngos-
are-smuggling-immigrants-into-europe-on-an-industrial-scale/). 
388 Open Migration (2017), “Getting to know Gefira and the “identitarians” of Defend Europe: our interviews”, 26 September 
(https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/getting-to-know-gefira-and-the-identitarians-of-defend-europe-our-interviews/). 
389 Authors’ own experience while conducting a research project titled “Anti-Smuggling Policies and their Intersection with 
Humanitarian Assistance and Social Trust”, supported by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council. Gefira Foundation 
articles and analysis were referred as ‘evidence’ by officials working at one of EU JHA agencies.  
390 Associated Press (2017), “EU: Migrant deaths in central Mediterranean rise despite aid”, Fox News, February 15, 
2017,(http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/02/15/eu-migrant-deaths-in-central-mediterranean-rise-despite-aid.html).  
391 UK House of Lords (2017), “European Union Committee, “Operation Sophia: a failed mission”, 2nd Report of Session 2017–
19 HL Paper 5, London, 12 July 2017, para. 45, p. 14. 
392 Forensic Oceanography (2017), op. cit.  
393 F. Flori and L. Bagnoli (2017) “Accusations against Ngos at sea: what is false or misleading in that smear campaign”, May 19, 
2017 (https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/accusations-against-ngos-at-sea-what-is-false-or-misleading-in-that-smear-
campaign/).  
394 K. Dambach (2017), “Italy prosecutor claims NGOs working with human smugglers”, 24 April (http://www.dw.com/en/italy-
prosecutor-claims-ngos-working-with-human-smugglers/a-38554753). 
395 Associated Press (2017), “Italian prosecutor: no NGOs-migrant smuggler links emerge”, Independent Malta, 3 May 
(http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2017-05-03/local-news/Italian-prosecutor-no-NGOs-migrant-smuggler-links-
emerge-6736173786). 
396 Human Rights at Sea (2017), “NGO Voluntary Code of Conduct”, March (https://www.humanrightsatsea.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/20170302-NGO-Code-of-Conduct-FINAL-SECURED.pdf). 
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Since 2017, Frontex has started to differentiate who saves how many migrants and refugees at sea. Frontex has 
put a specific focus on NGOs with the clear undertone that they save ‘too many’ or ‘too quickly’ – not waiting for 
the actual distress phone call, but conducting proactive SAR (see Figure 3).397 
 
Figure 3. Monthly comparison between the rescue operations performed by NGOs and those initiated via 
satellite phone calls by migrants in distress in the Central Mediterranean 
 
Source: Frontex (2017) Annual Risk Analysis (for 2016), 15 February 2017, p. 32. 
 
The increased numbers of persons rescued, as well as those missing or dead may also stem from better statistical 
data gathering, as “the ability to monitor the situation, to count the dead and the missing, has also improved”.398  
3.2.3 Formal criminalisation of SAR NGOs  
Since the end of 2016, private rescuers have suffered under heavy campaigns of de-legitimisation and 
criminalisation. Spurious accusations of colluding with and abetting smugglers have been spread by important 
media outlets,399 EU agencies like Frontex400 and high-level politicians. Events further led to the launch of several 
exploratory inquiries by prosecutors in Italy.401 Moreover, doubts raised over NGOs’ intentions with SAR activities 
opened the way for the Italian government to impose its code of conduct in August 2017.402 This setting 
facilitated the actual criminalisation of the remaining organisations operating in the Mediterranean.  
This section goes on to analyse the emblematic cases of persecution of SAR NGOs: Team Humanity and Proem-
AID in Greece, Proactiva Open Arms and Jugend Rettet in Italy and Sea-Eye in Malta. The last big rescue ship, the 
Aquarius, run by SOS Mediterranée (in cooperation with MSF), is being pushed around countries along the 
Mediterranean. It recently landed in Spain to disembark survivors, having been denied permission to offload in 
Italy.  
                                                                    
397 Frontex (2017), op. cit. 
398 Interview with E. Cossumano in Flori and Bagnoli (2017), op. cit.  
399 R. Duncan (2016), “EU border force flags concerns over charities interaction with migrant smugglers”, Financial Times, 15 
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400 Frontex (2017), “Annual Risk Analysis”, 15 February, p. 32.  
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402 Ibid. 
Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants: 2018 update 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 73 
Box 8. Greece: Prosecution of Team Humanity and Proem-AID volunteers 
The first precedent in the recent crisis was set by the Greek authorities, who in mid-January 2016 arrested 
rescuers, saving lives in the Aegean – Team Humanity and Proem-AID. Five rescuers faced trial in Lesvos on 7 May 
2018, which resulted in their acquittal.403 
Three Proem-AID fire-fighters and two Team Humanity volunteers were accused by Mytilene’s Prosecutor’s Office 
of facilitating human smuggling in January 2016. Proem-AID is a Spanish organisation of professional fire-fighters 
and lifeguards whereas Team Humanity is a Danish humanitarian organisation. Four of the five accused 
volunteers were made to pay a €5,000 fee to be released on bail. The bail of Salam Aldeen, a Team Humanity 
volunteer, was higher (€10,000) and he was required to stay in Greece for more than a year and to report to a 
police station weekly. 
The volunteers were accused by the Hellenic Coast Guard of attempting human smuggling. According to the 
public testimony of Aldeen, the volunteers were arrested when they were looking for persons in distress but had 
not rescued persons on board.404 Although the unofficial proceedings insinuated an attempt by Aldeen to cross 
into Turkish waters, the crew claimed to have proof of them being arrested in Greek territorial waters. That same 
day they had been conducting SAR operations under the coordination of Hellenic Coast Guard. Thus, Aldeen was 
puzzled as to how on the same day a person can be recognised as a rescuer and then arrested as a smuggler. The 
trial took place on 7 May 2018 and although it resulted in acquittal, subsequently other volunteers were charged 
for illegal activities. The trial also took an immense psychological toll.  
However, misguided prosecutions have not stopped with this acquittal. Ten other volunteers have been accused 
of migrant smuggling and two of them– Sarah Mardini and Sean Binder – were held in high-security preventive 
custody as of end of November.405 
 
Box 9. Italy: Prosecution of Jugend Rettet volunteers and Mussie Zerai 
The obstruction of activities by Mussie Zerai and Jugend Rettet is part of a broad political persecution of SAR 
NGOs that has been taking place in Italy. Prosecutor Carmelo Zuccaro, responsible for the seizure of Jugend 
Rettet’s ship Iuventa, was previously involved in spreading defamatory accusations against these private 
organisations and had to withdraw his statements in 2016.406  
Jugend Rettet was created by people committed to preventing deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and with their 
ship Iuventa they have saved 14,000 people from distress.407 However, their SAR activities were disrupted for 
more than a year due to the detention of their ship by Italian authorities on 2 August 2017.408 A few days 
afterwards,  the organisation refused to sign the government’s code of conduct, claiming it would affect its 
                                                                    
403 Team Humanity (2018) “Danish Lifeguard fighting a battle of injustice” a Crowdfunding Campaign 
(https://startsomegood.com/danish-lifeguard-fighting-a-battle-of-injustice).  
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406 See L. Vosyliūtė (2018), “‘Saving Lives at Sea’ still a Priority for the EU?”, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 19 April 
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between seizures of the rescue ships Open Arms and IUVENTA”, 21 March 
(https://jugendrettet.org/f/files/180321_PM_EN.pdf).  
407 Jugend Rettet official website (https://jugendrettet.org/en/). 
408 Forensic Architecture (2017), “The Iuventa”, 18 June (https://www.forensic-architecture.org/case/iuventa/). 
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capacity to rescue at sea.409 The chief prosecutor of Catania took the preventive measure owing to suspicions 
that the NGO had aided illegal migration and colluded with smugglers on three different occasions.410 The 
prosecutor firmly believes that on 10 September 2016 and 18 June 2017 Jugend Rettet arranged for the direct 
handover of migrants by smugglers, returned empty boats for re-use and took the motors of the vessels to 
resell.411  
Furthermore, days after the apprehension of the Iuventa, the prosecutors in Trapani started an investigation 
against Mussie Zerai.412 The Eritrean priest, who has lived in Italy, is responsible for saving thousands of lives by 
answering migrants’ calls and warning the competent Italian authorities and NGOs of vessels in distress. 413 After 
more than 10 years of providing assistance to rescuers, he was later nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 
2015.414 Yet, he is currently being investigated for acting as an intermediary with Jugend Rettet and other 
organisations.415 The priest helped to save the lives of thousands of migrants and refugees crossing the 
Mediterranean by transmitting their coordinates to MRCC Rome. He is now under investigation on suspicion of 
abetting illegal immigration.416 The priest has made a public statement in light of these accusations: 
Every time I informed the Italian Coast Guard operational center and the Maltese command. However, 
I have never had direct contact with the Jugend Rettet ship involved in the Trapani Prosecution 
investigation, nor have I ever been part of the alleged ‘secret chat’ of which some newspapers have 
alluded to: my communications have always been forwarded through a normal cell phone. All the 
reports are the result of requests for assistance that I have been directed not from boats leaving Libya, 
or at the time of sailing, but from offshore vessels off the coast of Africa, outside Libyan territorial 
waters.417  
The Jugend Rettet volunteers also believe this is retaliation for not signing the code of conduct imposed by the 
Italian government.418 Since the beginning of the investigation, several attempts have been made to tarnish their 
image with unscrupulous accusations of owning weapons419 and the leaking of photographs taken out of 
context to the media.420 In addition, no charges have been brought for almost a year, yet the processing of the 
case through the Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate enables the prosecutor to keep the ship without concrete 
evidence.  
Moreover, such a method has also made it very difficult for the NGO to bring legal action against the measure.421 
According to Philipp Külker, spokesperson for Jugend Rettet, the organisation submitted a complaint at the court 
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in Trapani in September 2017, which was denied as it was the same court that had allowed the seizure.422 Later 
on, they raised an objection to the previous decision in the Supreme Court of Cassation in Rome.423 
On 23 April 2018, the court rejected their request although the prosecutor lacked evidence while the NGO had 
presented clear evidence of its innocence with the help of forensic oceanographists and Forensic Architecture.424 
This London-based research collective conducted an analysis using materials from different sources to create a 
coherent spatio-temporal model to explain the events. They used photographs, videos and reports from various 
private organisations as well as from European and national institutions, made possible with the growing 
documentation of SAR activities.425 The results not only showed the innocence of Jugend Rettet, they also 
confirmed Amnesty International’s statements on the involvement of the Libyan coast guard in abetting 
smugglers.426 That notwithstanding, in July 2018 prosecutors from Trapani opened an investigation on 20 
volunteers involved in SAR for facilitating illegal immigration.427 
 
Some months after the seizure of the Iuventa, the same prosecutor from Catania, Carmelo Zuccaro, issued a 
preventive order against the Spanish organisation Proactiva Open Arms.428  
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Box 10. Italy: Prosecution of Proactiva Open Arms 
Proactiva Open Arms has rescued more than 5,000 people in the Mediterranean over the past three years, but 
their activities were interrupted for a month with the detention of their vessel on 19 March 2018.429 The measure 
was a response to a rescue operation that took place on 15 March, which had resulted in the saving and 
disembarkation of irregular migrants in Italy.430 The NGO faced accusations of criminal association and facilitating 
illegal immigration by disobeying the code of conduct.431 Moreover, authorities have launched an investigation 
against the director of the organisation, Gerard Canals, the captain Marc Reig and the mission’s coordinator, 
Anabel Montes, on suspicion of smuggling migrants.432 
According to the organisation, the crew rescued 218 migrants in SAR operations coordinated by MRCC Rome.433 
However, due to a mistake by MRCC Rome, both the NGO and Libyan coast guard were requested to pursue the 
same rescue operation.434 The first one to get to the vessel in distress was the organisation’s RHIB,435 which had 
lost contact with the main ship due to its distance. After the boarding had already started, the Libyan coast guard 
arrived demanding that the migrants be handed over to their responsibility according to the Italian authorities. 
The captain denied such a request as he would be violating the principle of non-refoulement due to the well-
known human rights violations in Libya. Furthermore, he could not transfer these people after the inappropriate 
behaviour of the Libyan coast guards, who threatened to open fire against them, almost resulting in the 
drowning of 10 scared migrants.436 Although complying with humanitarian international law, this was a breach 
of the code of conduct signed by the NGO. Thus, MRCC Rome denied the ship the right to dock in Italy, and 
ordered it to request permission to dock in Spain, the ship’s flag state, or Malta, which was the closest safe port.437 
Although in Malta the captain disembarked two of the migrants who were in a critical condition,438 the captain 
did not try to request evacuation for all of them as the unlikelihood of receiving permission to disembark rescued 
migrants in Malta was well known.439 Eventually, Italy allowed the ship to dock at the Sicilian port of Pozzallo, 
with the police waiting for it.  
The prosecution’s accusations of criminal association were founded on the belief that “the people under 
investigation operate professionally and structurally for the NGO Proactiva Open Arms, and they intended to 
knowingly and repeatedly disregard the Code of Conduct”.440  
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Several events were taken as a basis for the accusations of facilitation of illegal migration and breach of the code 
of conduct. First, the organisation was incriminated for conducting rescue operations in Libyan waters. 
According to Proactiva Open Arms, however, the operation took place 73 miles from Libya, thus in international 
waters.441 The Libyan extension of its territorial waters from a 12-mile zone to one of 74 miles was made without 
any authorisation from competent authorities like the International Maritime Organization, creating a legal grey 
area for NGOs to act in.442  
Second, Proactiva Open Arms refused to turn over the migrants to Libyan authorities, which was an act of civil 
disobedience of MRCC orders and a violation of the code of conduct signed by the NGO.443 At the same time, the 
act of refusal transpired in order to comply with the principle of non-refoulement within international 
humanitarian law.444 Third, according to the Italian authorities it failed to ask permission to dock in Malta, despite 
the country having “expressed [its] willingness to take charge of disembarking all the migrants”.445 This 
assumption is not based on any evidence to corroborate it. 
Finally, the prosecution believes that there was no indication of imminent danger to justify the duty of rescue as 
the captain did not report any critical cases on board while heading to Italy. In reality, the issued order even 
accused the NGO of having created a dangerous situation when pursuing with the rescue while there was 
another competent authority assigned to conduct it, and therefore making the point that the sole intention of 
Proactiva Open Arms was to facilitate the entrance of the migrants into Italy.446 The document completely 
ignored the miscommunication emanating from MRCC and the threats issued by the Libyan coast guard. 
In March, the judge of preliminary investigations (prosecutorial authority) of Catania, Nunzio Sarpietro, 
prolonged the seizure of the ship and the original charge of aiding illegal immigration, but he dropped the 
investigation of the director of the NGO.447 In May, the criminal court in Ragusa rejected the prosecutor’s appeal 
and confirmed the release of the ship.448 Meanwhile, the investigation against the captain and the coordinator is 
ongoing. The risks are between 5 and 15 years of imprisonment and fines of €15,000 for each of the 216 migrants 
who were on board.449 
 
 
The analysis of these and other cases against private rescuers shows a determination to prove a certain theory, 
no matter what it takes. Prosecutors and law enforcement authorities insist that SAR NGOs have obscure 
intentions besides the pure will to save lives. The policing of SAR NGOs has been vigorous; many times, authorities 
                                                                    
441 Reuters (2018), “Italy seizes rescue ship that stopped migrants’ return to Libya”, 19 March 
(https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL8N1R12KX). 
442 Petrilllo, Bagnoli and Torrisi (2018), op. cit. 
443 Code of Conduct: “- … in accordance with relevant international law, commitment not to enter Libyan territorial waters, 
except in situations of grave and imminent danger requiring immediate assistance and not to obstruct Search & Rescue by 
the Libyan Coast Guard: with a view not to hinder the possibility for the competent National Authorities to intervene in their 
territorial waters, in compliance with international obligations; – Commitment not to transfer those rescued on other vessels, 
except in case of a request of the competent MRCC and under its coordination also based on the information provided by the 
ship’s master: after the embarkation of survivors, NGO vessels should as a rule complete the operation by disembarking 
survivors in a safe port under the coordination of the responsible MRCC, except in situations recalled above.” See in Euronews 
(2017), “Italy’s code of conduct for NGOs involved in migrant rescue: text”, 3 August 
(https://www.euronews.com/2017/08/03/text-of-italys-code-of-conduct-for-ngos-involved-in-migrant-rescue\). 
444 Petrilllo, Bagnoli and Torrisi (2018), op. cit. 
445 Statewatch (2018), “The seizure of the Open Arms boat as a paradigm of the European Union’s war against human rights”, 
April (http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-327-open-arms-seizure.pdf). 
446 Ibid. 
447 Petrilllo, Bagnoli and Torrisi (2018), op. cit. 
448 FRA (2018), “Fundamental rights considerations: NGO ships involved in search and rescue in the Mediterranean and criminal 
investigations” (http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-ngos-sar-mediterranean_en.pdf). 
449 Ibid. 
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have lacked sufficient evidence to corroborate such action. It leads to the conclusion that the underlying rationale 
for these prosecutions has been to fight irregular migration by creating obstacles for SAR NGOs in Italy and 
Greece.  
 
Box 11. Harassment of Sea-Eye volunteers by the Libyan coast guard  
The 2017 Malta Declaration by EU government leaders and the Libyan government made official the policy 
intention to deter refugees. This came along with other concerning developments, such as the recognition of 
the Libyan Joint Rescue Coordination Center by the International Maritime Organization at the end of June 2017, 
the closure of the nearest European ports to SAR NGOs, the incoherent conclusions of the last European Council 
summit and the absence of concrete plans at a European level. The NGO SOS Mediterranée claims that all of the 
above measures have “left NGO ships with uncertainty”.450  
The Libyan coast guard has been trained, equipped and supported so that it is able to stop crossings towards 
Europe organised by smugglers. Reception camps have also been established for refugees and migrants in Libya. 
NGOs have responded with widespread concern about the conditions in Libya – they rightly foresaw increased 
hostility to their activities at sea as part of this new mission.  
The NGO Sea-Eye claims, for example, that “last year members of the [Libyan] coast guard participated in attacks 
against NGO boats. In one documented case, they even attacked a refugee boat causing it to capsize – about 30 
people drowned consequently.”451 It was also the Libyan coast guard, they stress, that seized their speed boat 
‘Speedy’ outside Libyan territorial waters in July 2017. The rescue boat has since been impounded on what they 
claim to be illegal grounds. 
The motto of the NGO is the following: “To let people drown means moral failure and can be justified by nothing.” 
A representative of Sea-Eye has put it thus: “The loss of this boat is not only a harsh financial set-back (about 
€110,000) for Sea-Eye, but it also means a massive restriction of our rescue missions. Ultimately the seizure is 
harming the refugees, who are being deprived of this urgently needed sea rescue help.”452 
 
 
The controversy surrounding the Aquarius arrived on the back of this highly politicised, cumulative policing 
context; ‘saving lives’ was no longer a policy priority for the EU and both EU and Italian citizens were already 
mistrustful of civil society conducting SAR operations. The Aquarius case would have been harder to imagine in 
2016 – when saving lives at sea was still seen as a legal and moral obligation. 
  
Box 12. Central Mediterranean: Aquarius trapped in a political game between Italy, Malta and France 
Sea-Eye is not the only rescue boat in the Mediterranean to face obstacles. In June 2018, the Italian government 
barred the French charity-run Aquarius rescue ship (which was carrying 630 migrants) from docking in Italy. Malta 
also refused to take it in and the ship was later welcomed by Spain. The boat, operated by SOS Mediterranée, 
                                                                    
450 SOS Mediterranee (2018), “The Aquarius returns to sea, ready to save lives after technical and strategic upgrades in 
Marseille”, 31 July (https://sosmediterranee.com/press/the-aquarius-returns-to-sea-ready-to-save-lives-after-technical-and-
strategic-upgrades-in-marseille/). 
451 Sea-Eye (2018), “What does the Malta declaration mean for Sea-Eye’s rescue activities?” (https://sea-eye.org/en/malta-
beschluesse-und-sea-eye-wie-gehts-weiter/). 
452 Sea-Eye (2018), “What happened to the “Speedy”?” (https://sea-eye.org/en/was-geschah-mit-der-speedy/). 
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was carrying especially vulnerable individuals, including 123 unaccompanied minors and 7 pregnant women.453 
Since it first became operational in February 2016, the Aquarius claims to have rescued 29,318 men, women and 
children from drowning, 2,979 of whom were rescued in 2018.454 The attitude of the NGO SOS Mediterannée in 
the face of this threat has been defiant.  
On 1 August 2018, the Aquarius returned to sea. A statement on the SOS Mediterranée website claims that “the 
Aquarius returns as one of the last humanitarian ships left in the Central Mediterranean to rescue and testify, with 
strong support from the European civil society”. Here, the support of civil society is wielded as a protective tool 
to uphold the ship’s humanitarian mission in the face of government hostility. The ship is operating in 
collaboration with MSF. This strategy of pooling resources and mandates can be seen as a response to the 
growing hostility, i.e. NGOs are seeking to align themselves to better respond to threats of policing, disciplining 
and criminalising. As part of its renovation, the Aquarius has installed freezers to hold dead bodies to preserve 
the dignity of those who die at sea.  
 
All of the developments mentioned above targeting SAR NGOs have led to a sharp increase of the mortality rate 
among the refugees and other migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean, even though the absolute 
numbers of sea crossings have been stemmed. This shows a human cost of preventing and discouraging SAR 
NGOs from conducting their live-saving activities (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4. Mortality rate per thousand sea crossings in the Mediterranean, March 2014–18  
 
* 2018 data from UNHCR, “Mediterranean situation”, as of 23 March 2018 
(http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean).  
Source: L. Vosyliute (2018), “Is ‘Saving Lives at Sea’ Still a Priority for the EU?”, op. cit.  
 
                                                                    
453 MSF (2018), “Migrants and refugees on the margins of society”, 8 February (https://www.msf.org/italy-migrants-and-
refugees-margins-society); Aljazeera (2018), “Italy shuts ports to Aquarius ship carrying over 600 refugees”, 11 June 
(https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/italy-shuts-ports-aquarius-ship-carrying-600-refugees-180611053555053.html). 
454 SOS Méditerranée (2018), op. cit. 
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3.3 Policing CSAs in the areas of first arrival, transit, stay and residence 
3.3.1 France: Prosecuting and disciplining individuals, volunteers and activists  
In France, the famous case of the farmer Cédric Herrou ended up in the French Constitutional Court after he was 
suspected of smuggling more than 200 persons when he claimed to be providing humanitarian assistance to 
refugees and other migrants (see Box 13). This is not the first case in France. For example, that of teacher Pierre-
Alain Mannoni was another délit de solidarité (crime of solidarity)455 as well as that of retiree Martine Landry, who 
was prosecuted for the offence of solidarity, but eventually had her case dropped in July 2018 for lack of evidence 
that she could have helped people to cross the border. Yet another Amnesty International activist faces another 
five years in prison.456 Unlike in other Member States, such as Hungary,457 where the issue is relatively new, the 
history of the ‘crime of solidarity’ debate in France is longstanding.458  
 
Box 13. France: Prosecution of Cedric Herrou for hosting asylum seekers and undocumented migrants  
The French farmer, Cedric Herrou, was arrested and handed a four-month suspended sentence in summer 2017 
for helping asylum seekers to enter France as they fled from war-torn countries such as Syria and Afghanistan. 
Herrou sheltered refugees in his farmhouse in southern France after he encountered them destitute at the Italian 
border along a disused railway track. Herrou became a symbol of resistance to anti-refugee politics in Europe; his 
face appeared in the form of graffiti in Greece and in cartoons in Italian newspapers. To some, he became the 
‘new Schindler’: a symbol of plain old goodwill or hospitality for some and, to others, of Europe’s anti-
immigration regime. 
French law dictates that anyone who facilitates the unlawful entry, movement or stay of a foreigner in France is 
liable to face up to five years in prison and a fine of up to €30,000. Following a long debate in France’s recent 
history (which echoes wider debates occurring now all over Europe), however, immunity is granted in France to 
anyone who offers such help to a foreigner without receiving anything, such as money, in return. National 
constitutional provisions were successfully invoked in July 2018 by the French Constitutional Court to challenge 
the overreach of smuggling prohibitions in the case concerning Herrou. The counsel found that the French 
legislation was incompatible with the French constitutional principle of fraternité.459 The counsel acknowledged 
that the state is entitled to take measures to suppress irregular migration, but it ruled that it had to balance those 
measures against freedoms to act in solidarity with irregular migrants and refugees. With this new judgement, 
the French court conceded that in addition to this humanitarian safety net, the words ‘unlawful stay’ should be 
removed to ensure that the principle of fraternité extends to those in France both legally and illegally.  
This important verdict has a much wider resonance for European civil society, which the court itself recognised. 
In the ‘hostile environment’ that has come to characterise a large part of the EU countries’ responses to 
vulnerable migrants and refugees, the enlightenment principles of fraternité and solidarity on which the EU was 
founded are in danger and civil society is their guardian. The case of Herrou found that such freedoms among 
                                                                    
455 See case L. Leroux (2017), « Marseille : Aide aux migrants : prison avec sursis en appel pour un enseignant-chercheur », 11 
September. Le Monde (https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2017/09/11/aide-aux-migrants-prison-avec-sursis-en-
appel-pour-un-enseignant-chercheur_5184134_1653578.html). 
456 Le Monde (2018), « Relaxe pour Martine Landry, la bénévole d’Amnesty poursuivie pour « délit de solidarité », 14 July 2018 
(https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2018/07/14/relaxe-pour-martine-landry-la-benevole-d-amnesty-poursuivie-
pour-delit-de-solidarite_5331246_1653578.html). 
457 J. Allsopp (2012), “Contesting Fraternité: Vulnerable Migrants and the Politics of Protection in ContemporaryFrance”, RSC 
Working Paper no. 82, Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre (https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/contesting-fraternite-
vulnerable-migrants-and-the-politics-of-protection-in-contemporary-france). 
458 Ibid. 
459 This argument was anticipated and advanced by scholars including Jennifer Allsopp. See J. Allsopp (2012), “Contesting 
Fraternité: Vulnerable Migrants and the Politics of Protection in ContemporaryFrance”, RSC Working Paper no. 82, Oxford: 
Refugee Studies Centre (https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/contesting-fraternite-vulnerable-migrants-and-the-politics-
of-protection-in-contemporary-france). 
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civil society are central to the maintenance of social trust in French society. Interestingly, in 2015, the Supreme 
Court of Canada arrived at a similar conclusion, finding that national constitutional provisions were successfully 
invoked to challenge the overreach of smuggling prohibitions. These cases are currently the subject of legal 
analysis by Cathryn Costello and Jennifer Allsopp. 
 
 
Box 14. France: Journalists arrested while doing a story on undocumented migrant children 
Caroline Christinaz, a journalist from the Swiss newspaper Le Temps and Raphaël Krafft, also a journalist from the 
French newspaper Culture, were arrested on the night of 11 November 2017, close to Briançon (High Alps) in 
France.460  
They were in two different cars with other locals who had decided to stop to provide humanitarian assistance to 
four migrant minors who were freezing cold from crossing the dangerous border with Italy, the so-called Le col 
de l’Echelle, 1,762 meters high and partially covered with snow.461 
Christinaz was released on the spot. Yet unlike Raphaël Krafft, who was released for being considered just a 
witness, Christinaz was accused of facilitating the entry, transit and the residence of irregular migrants in French 
territory.462 According to the Code Pénal, the offence might amount to high fines and imprisonment for up to 
five years.463 Therefore, she was asked to report for questioning at an “audition libre”,464 meaning it was not 
mandatory, the following day at the Briançon’s police station, where she was interrogated for two hours.465 
Despite showing her press card to the police and explaining that she was working on a report on the irregular 
entry of migrant children, the authorities did not accept her justification.466 Moreover, the journalist stated that 
the agents and the prosecutor used intimidation and treated her as a suspect during the interrogation.467  
The NGO Reporters Without Borders has condemned the authorities’ accusations for violating freedom of the 
press, safeguarded by French law, arguing that a journalist cannot be considered a suspect of such a crime while 
she is acting in her profession. 468 Finally, on 13 February 2018 the prosecutor did not press charges against 
Christinaz or Krafft, nor against the other two members of the association “Tous migrants”, due to insufficient 
evidence.469 But once again, the psychological toll was significant on those involved from start to end, serving as 
a deterrent to the wider media community. 
                                                                    
460 M. Caleb (2017), “Briançon : deux journalistes arrêtés par la gendarmerie lors d’un reportage sur des réfugiés.” Politis, 17 
Novembre (http://www.politis.fr/articles/2017/11/briancon-deux-journalistes-arretes-par-la-gendarmerie-lors-dun-
reportage-sur-des-refugies-37954/). 
461 O. Perrin (2017), “La polémique enfle après l’interrogatoire de la journaliste du «Temps» à Briançon.” Le Temps, 15 Novembre 
(https://www.letemps.ch/opinions/polemique-enfle-apres-linterrogatoire-journaliste-temps-briancon). 
462 Caleb (2017), op. cit. 
463 L’express (2017), “Une journaliste suisse enquêtant sur les migrants arrêtée par la gendarmerie.” LExpress.fr, 14 Novembre 
(https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/une-journaliste-suisse-enquetant-sur-les-migrants-arretee-par-la-
gendarmerie_1960649.html). 
464 Article 61-1 du Code de Procédure Pénale Français. 
(https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000028991696&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071154). 
465 Caleb (2017), op. cit. 
466 Council of Europe (2017), “Journalist Caroline Christinaz from “Le Temps” of Geneva Questioned by the Police While on a 
Reporting Assignment in France”, 21 Novembre (https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/detail-
alert?p_p_id=sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_col_id=column-
1&p_p_col_count=1&_sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet_alertId=30827836). 
467 Council of Europe (2017), op. cit. 
468 L’express (2017), op. cit. 
469 Council of Europe (2017), op. cit. 
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3.3.2 Belgium: From suspicion to prosecution of individual volunteers 
 
Box 15. Belgium: Escalation from suspicion to arrests and charges  
The case study in Belgium also shows how within two years a story escalated from suspicion towards volunteers 
in Maximillian Park to actual arrests and criminal charges on the basis of human smuggling.  
Suspicion  
After 2015, the park became a meeting point for migrants and consequently a place where they could access 
assistance by volunteers. The associations working there generally distribute food and material needs such as 
sleeping bags. Still, their work was not always perceived as positive; some high-level politicians in Belgium 
actually accused them of pulling irregular migrants to Belgium: “[Secretary of State for Asylum, Migration and 
Administrative Simplification] Theo Francken insisted people who come to the park are ‘purely economic 
migrants,’ not refugees, and accused rights groups of creating a ‘hub’ for migrants trying to reach the United 
Kingdom, saying most people do not want to seek asylum in Belgium.”470 
Also, the widespread idea that people working in these associations collude with smugglers or facilitate ‘illegal’ 
migrants’ stay or transit resulted in an attempt to append a new article to the Immigration Act.471 This provision 
would ease police powers to obtain a warrant to search private homes for rejected asylum seekers and other 
migrants whose expulsion has been ordered.472 Yet the argument was taken in a different direction by judges, 
lawyers and local authorities (see Box 5 above). 
Intimidation and disciplining  
Moreover, the situation in the park and in other areas of the city triggered several actions by the government to 
hamper the associations’ access to places where asylum seekers and migrants gather. At times, they were 
prohibited from distributing food,473 or were obliged to change the time and/or place of food distributions for 
hygiene reasons.474 For similar reasons, sleeping bags were confiscated by the police.475 
Prosecutions 
The situation escalated and on 6 September 2018 a trial was held of 11 people who had been arrested and 
charged with human smuggling in October 2017.476 This was considered by human rights defenders as “a trial 
that is eminently political. [Deputy Prime Minister, N-VA] Jan Jambon declared that the situation at Maximilian 
                                                                    
470 M. Schlee (2018), “Theo Francken: Brussels ‘pampering’ NGOs and asylum seekers”, 8 October 
(https://www.politico.eu/article/theo-francken-brussels-park-maximilien-pampering-ngos-and-asylum-seekers/). 
471 Law of 15 December 1980, on access to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of aliens. 
472 RTL Info (2018), “L’Office des étrangers demande que la loi autorise la police à entrer dans une habitation pour arrêter une 
personne qui fait l’objet d’une mesure d’éloignement” 23 January (https://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/l-office-des-
etrangers-demande-que-la-police-puisse-entrer-dans-une-habitation-pour-arreter-une-personne-qui-fait-l-objet-d-une-
mesure-d-eloignement-989184.aspx). 
473 L’Echo (2018), “Le projet de loi sur les visites domiciliaires mis au frigo”, 21 August (https://www.lecho.be/economie-
politique/belgique/federal/le-projet-de-loi-sur-les-visites-domiciliaires-mis-au-frigo/10041620.html). 
474 Belga Bruzz (2018), “Stad Brussel: ‘Deel maaltijden in Maximiliaanpark uit aan het einde van de dag’”, 10 September 
(https://www.bruzz.be/samenleving/stad-brussel-deel-maaltijden-maximiliaanpark-uit-aan-het-einde-van-de-dag-2018-09-
10). 
475 BX1 Medias de Bruxelles (2017), “Parc Maximilien: 31 personnes interpellées, des bénévoles affirment que les sacs de 
couchage ont été jetés” 21 August (https://bx1.be/news/parc-maximilien-31-personnes-interpellees-des-benevoles-
affirment-que-les-sacs-de-couchage-ont-ete-jetes/). 
476 Global Voices (2018), “‘Crimes of solidarity’ in Europe multiply as 11 stand trial in Belgium for helping migrants”, 17 
September (https://globalvoices.org/2018/09/17/crimes-of-solidarity-in-europe-multiply-as-11-stand-trial-in-belgium-for-
helping-migrants/). 
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Park was the responsibility of the [migrants’] hosts. We first hear these very provocative declarations and 
afterwards we notice that there are real lawsuits that are filed.”477 
Moreover, Jambon has publicly expressed his interest in ‘dismantling’ the camps of migrants at Maximilian 
Park.478 
Zakia is one of the 11 suspects on trial. She worked as a volunteer providing humanitarian assistance to irregular 
migrants at Maximillian Park during the summer of 2017. In the position of volunteer, she decided to help a 
migrant by buying him a SIM card; however, when in another situation she was asked if she knew about any truck 
that was going to the UK, she did not reply. In any case, the defendant was accused of indirectly helping the 
irregular migrant to cross the channel.479 She was later arrested for two months before the trial, while still 
breastfeeding her baby. She was charged with facilitating irregular migrants to stay and transit in order to receive 
profit, and in the preparation or execution of unlawful activities of a criminal organisation.480 
Another two suspects in the trial were Myriam Berghe, a journalist at Femmes d’Aujourd’hui and Anouk Van Gestel, 
editor-in-chief of the women’s magazine Marie Claire.481 Neither of the journalists were arrested, but they are 
accused of human smuggling for accommodating migrants in transit,482 with the aggravation of ‘being part of a 
criminal organisation’. In addition, Berghe is also incriminated for committing the crime for financial benefit, as 
she has helped migrants to transfer money through Western Union.483 Such charges seem extremely 
disproportionate and could lead to a sentence of 10 years of imprisonment.484  
Deswaef speaks of a ‘political process’ and finds it incomprehensible that the public prosecutor of 
Dendermonde has not made a distinction between volunteers and human smugglers. ‘This is a very 
bad signal. Now that the language change has been granted Monday morning, it can hopefully be 
rectified by the Brussels Criminal Court’, he says to BRUZZ. After all, solidarity is not punishable in 
Belgium.485 
 
3.3.3 Intimidation and harassment of CSAs in places of transit and residence 
There are numerous cases of intimidation and harassment. This area encompasses the overuse of police and other 
law enforcement powers against CSAs. As several case studies show, journalists who are attempting to shed the 
light on ongoing degrading conditions of irregular migrants and those who help them, become targeted too. The 
function of intimidation and harassment is to silence civil society criticism, to stop or discourage their operations, 
or to increase individual and organisational costs for continuing them. Yet, this behaviour is not limited to the 
police: volunteers have also reported the involvement of municipalities, private security actors and the judicial 
system in these practices. In fact, it is important to note that such actions are in part consequences of a chain of 
command coming from the government, and thus embody the actual policy towards irregular migration. 
                                                                    
477 Ibid. 
478 Belga Bruzz (2018), “Jambon praat met Close over ‘ontmanteling’ Maximiliaanpark”, 10 September 
(https://www.bruzz.be/samenleving/jambon-praat-met-close-over-ontmanteling-maximiliaanpark-2018-09-10). 
479 Global Voices (2018), op. cit. 
480 Panhuyzen, Kevin Van den (2017), “‘I helped in the Maximilian Park and went into the cell for two months’”, Belga Bruzz, 20 
October (https://www.bruzz.be/samenleving/ik-hielp-het-maximiliaanpark-en-ging-twee-maanden-de-cel-2018-09-05). 
481 Ibid. 
482 Belga Bruzz (2018), “Journalisten die transitmigranten herbergden beticht van mensensmokkel”, 4 June 
 (https://www.bruzz.be/samenleving/journalisten-die-transitmigranten-herbergden-beticht-van-mensensmokkel-2018-06-
04). 
483 Ibid. 
484 Ibid. 
485 Ibid. 
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The case study in Box 16 illustrates the scale of intimidation of CSAs in the Calais camp by police forces. Similar 
stories from activists and volunteers in Rome and Ventimiglia in Italy and Thessaloniki in Greece have been 
described in detail by the authors of this study elsewhere.486  
 
Box 16. France: Report on “Calais: The police harassment of volunteers” 
Four associations – namely, L’Auberge des Migrants, Utopia 56, Help Refugees (British) and Refugee Info Bus, 
which provide humanitarian assistance to migrants on the northern French coast – published a report on the 
systematic harassment and intimidation practices by the police to France’s human rights ombudsman.487 It is 
important to note that their main activities are the distribution of food and material needs, legal assistance, 
medical care and child protection, which do not constitute a criminal offence under French law.  
However, 646 incidents, related to police intimidation against volunteers, were collected from 1 November 2017 
to 1 July 2018, by the “Human Rights Observers” project,488 through testimonies and official complaints. The 
actions of intimidation are set out below. 
1) There were 214 identified reports of surveillance of volunteers, entailing 136 cases of observation, 21 of police 
following volunteers, as well as 57 of photographing and recording of volunteers by police officers’ private 
devices, which occurred as a reaction to volunteers recording abuses of power by the police.489 Eléonore Vigny, 
an intern at l’Auberge des Migrants, reported an ostensive observation case:  
Nearly twenty police officers were on top of a hill, equipped with shields and helmets, and watched 
us while we were installing our generator to allow our beneficiaries to charge their mobile phones. 
The beneficiaries were very scared and many came to ask me what was happening and if the police 
would come over. It lasted more than an hour. ... This constant surveillance of volunteers has a direct 
impact on their ability to provide humanitarian aid to displaced people in Calais. Many beneficiaries 
prefer not go to food or clothing distributions if there is a strong police presence, thus depriving 
them of access to basic services such as food.490 
2) In addition, there were 205 identified cases involving identity checks – systematic identity checks are carried 
out purposively because they are volunteers.491 
3) Cases of searches include 4 body searches, 12 vehicle searches, 6 searches of personal belongings and 16 pat-
downs. Moreover, females are more exposed to pat-downs (normally made by male police officers) than male 
volunteers. Of the 16 pat-downs documented, 14 were carried out on female volunteers, compared with only 2 
on men. “This data raises the question of the impartiality of the officers whilst carrying out these controls”,492 a 
requirement for this type of search.493 
                                                                    
486 Carrera et al. (2018), op. cit. 
487 A. Chrisafis (2018), “French police accused of harassing aid workers at Calais”, The Guardian, 8 August.  
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/08/french-police-accused-of-harassing-aid-workers-at-calais). 
488 “Collaboration between the organisations working in the Calais warehouse which began in November 2017”, In Vigny, op. 
cit., p. 4. 
489 “The circular n° 2008-8433 of 23rd December 2008 clearly states in bold that “the police do not profit from particular 
protection regarding the right to one’s image” and that “police officers cannot therefore oppose the recording of their image 
while carrying out a mission”. Nevertheless, most officers order volunteers to turn off their mobile phones during a police 
operation.” Cited in Vigny, op. cit., p. 9. 
490 Vigny, op. cit., p. 7. 
491 National Police code of ethics, which stipulates, “When the law allows a police officer to carry out an identity check, the 
police officer does not rely on any characteristic to determine the person to control.” Cited in Vigny, op. cit., p. 16. 
492 Ibid. 
493 Article R. 434-11 of the Code of Ethics of the Police Nationale and the Gendarmerie. Cited in Vigny, op. cit., p. 16. 
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4) There were 39 cases of obstruction of humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring faced by 
associations. These were commonly conducted through abusive car ticketing, fines, immobilisation of vehicles, 
summoning and prosecuting volunteers to the police station, confiscation of personal belongings and bans on 
distributing (by the municipal authorities), especially to British organisations. For example, “volunteers with the 
Refugee Women’s Centre, … were arrested during a distribution and interviewed by the police. They were not 
given access to a lawyer, and were forced to give their fingerprints under the threat of prosecution if they did 
not oblige, despite no charges being made against them. No procès-verbal was given, and they were not 
informed of the ramifications of this incident.”494  
The obstruction of work by civil society organisations is also denounced by the above-mentioned Calais report:495  
One technique deployed in Calais, to obstruct distributions carried out by organisations, is the 
construction of blockades by the municipal authorities. On several occasions, distribution points 
were blocked with large rocks and/or earth to prevent the associations from reaching the regular 
distribution points. These actions seem to be more frequently carried out at distribution points 
that are deemed ‘too public’ by the local authorities, who wish to continually move displaced 
people further and further from the town centre and confine them to areas that are deemed less 
‘visible’. Distributions organised by associations near the Stade de l’Epopée in winter were blocked 
by the instalment of large rocks that blocked the access to the site that was deemed by the Town 
Hall to be too ‘residential’. 
5) Intimidation of volunteers, local companies funding the associations and the organisations themselves are 
often carried out through administrative restrictions or judicial harassment and sanctions. For instance, the 
members of l’Auberge des Migrants were on several occasions summoned to attend hearings on financial 
transactions made through the association’s bank account.496 Furthermore, there were 141 identified cases of 
police violence, 68 cases of abuse of power, 21 threats and 12 insults. “Intimidation of volunteers in Calais is 
therefore based both on legal measures, which are implemented repeatedly, and in a discriminatory manner, 
but also on illegal measures that intrinsically violate the obligations of the police.”497 
Source: Authors, based on E. Vigny, Calais: The police harassment of volunteers, Report, 2018. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to recall that some of these actions taken by the police are actually part of a broader 
policy approach towards migration (see above on France). In addition, CSAs working in Paris are facing similar 
experiences. For example, doctors from the Médecins du Monde (Doctors of the World) stated by the end of 2017 
that “[w]e were settled in the usual place, when the police ordered us to move immediately. This is the first time 
Doctors of the World has been asked to interrupt a consultation to leave the premises. We had never seen that in 
France”.498  
 
Box 17. Italy: Intimidation and harassment of volunteers in Rome and Ventimiglia 
Since the previous report, the situation in Rome for civil society and activist groups aiding irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers has deteriorated significantly, replicating in some ways the hostile dynamic at the Italian sea 
border (see above). The atmosphere for migrant support groups meanwhile has also continued to be 
characterised by a hostile media and political discourse. Interior minister Matteo Salvini (Lega Nord), appointed 
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495 Vigny, op. cit., p. 22. 
496 Vigny, op. cit., p. 26. 
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on 1 June 2018 following the election of the coalition government, has articulated a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach 
to irregular migration. Earlier, in June 2017, Rome’s mayor Virginia Raggi (of the populist Five Star Movement) 
had declared a ‘moratorium on new arrivals’. In Rome, informal camps where migrants seek shelter continue to 
be routinely disbanded and destroyed by the authorities, and CSAs continue to face administrative sanctions 
and intimidation by police. The Via Cupa camp, which was shelter to approximately 60,000 migrants between 
September 2015 and 2016 (as noted in the previous report for the LIBE Committee) remains off bounds. Beds are 
empty while individuals languish on the streets.  
The destruction of migrant camps in Rome is usually coupled with document checks and migrants being taken 
in by police. In July 2018, for example, close to 400 migrants residing in the Baobab camp in Rome had their 
documents checked by police and 35, all said to be without documents, were detained.  
Crackdowns on migrant transit camps have also been coupled by an increase in raids and closure of other camps 
housing regular migrants, such as those housing Roma communities or squats occupied by long-term refugees. 
In July 2016, a Roma camp was evicted despite an EU ruling requesting a delay and in clear breach of international 
standards.499 In late 2017, police evicted 800 Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees from an office block on Via 
Curtatone in central Rome, where they had had been living for four years. This is evidence of how the crackdown 
on migrant groups affects social trust and heightens the insecurity of ethnic minority groups more widely (see 
section 4.2 of this study on societal mistrust).  
Following the eviction and destruction of migrant camps, no alternative has been provided by authorities. A 
2018 report by MSF on informal settlements in Europe found that “around 10,000 migrants and refugees are 
living in inhumane conditions in Italy because of inadequate reception policies”.500 
In response to this increasingly hostile political climate in the capital, several civil society groups that previously 
expressed their position as ‘deliberately non-political’ as a means of avoiding targeting by authorities (noted in 
the previous report) have changed their position. “In the current situation we can no longer afford to be silent”, 
commented one volunteer from an informal civil society group in Rome who was interviewed for this report. 
Increasingly unable to provide services to migrants, some civil society groups are concentrating efforts on 
awareness raising and drawing attention to the impacts of new criminalisation policies on societal mistrust. The 
recent arrest of the mayor of Riace, Mimmo Lucano, for example, on the charge of facilitating smuggling in the 
south of Italy was met with widespread solidarity protests across Rome and other major cities. 
“In attacking him, they are attacking the idea of a common life; the idea of a peaceful society”, reads a comment 
on the website of the informal civil society aid group, Baobab.501 This comment draws a clear line between the 
climate of mistrust, policing and criminalisation faced by volunteers and the well-being and democratic 
legitimacy of society as a whole.  
In Ventimiglia, meanwhile, tensions also remain high. French and Italian riot police are collaborating on 
operations, such as searching trains and forcibly returning migrants to the Italian border, and greater resources 
have been concentrated by both sides at the border. Between January and May 2018, French authorities claim 
to have sent back 10,524 people who tried to cross either by train, taking the motorway or across the 
mountains.502 In April 2018, a migrants’ ‘March of solidarity’ set out from Ventimiglia to Calais to draw attention 
to the closure and violence at the border. 
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(https://baobabexperience.org/2018/10/02/iostoconmimmolucano/). 
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As noted previously at other borders like Calais and Szeged, protests by migrant solidarity groups have been met 
by protests of far-right groups. This is indicative of an increasingly politicised and tense environment in Italy and 
in France in relation to the migrant issue. In April 2018, for example, activists from a small French far-right group, 
“Generation Identitaire” (Identity Generation) clashed with migrant rights activists when they sought to block 
migrants’ passage across the border.503  
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4. ‘CRISIS’ IN THE MAKING: UNINTENDED IMPACTS AND UNRESOLVED 
CHALLENGES  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Civil society actors constitute a cornerstone of functioning democracies, acting as the fundamental 
rights and rule of law defenders at a national level. Various experiences of policing of civil society, 
including suspicion, intimidation and harassment, disciplining and, in particular, formal prosecutions, 
negatively impact on their capacity to uphold the right to human dignity of refugees, asylum seekers 
and undocumented migrants. By definition, ‘policing of civil society actors’ is infringing on the 
enjoyment of rights by EU citizens, as enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, such as the 
freedom of assembly and freedom of speech. Therefore, the CoE, OSCE, as well as various UN bodies have 
been warning EU institutions and Member States about the negative impacts on the EU’s founding 
values. 
• The policing and criminalisation of CSAs has wider implications for societal trust and social cohesion. The 
vagueness of EU law and the policies of Member States enable and/or request law enforcement 
authorities to police contact between civil society and irregular migrants even where it is without 
criminal intent. This leads to widespread feelings of subjective insecurity as well as stigma, mistrust and 
prejudice towards migrants. Such measures negatively affect the image of civil society organisations and 
their activities. They also dissuade CSAs from turning to law enforcement or public authorities when 
issues arise, as they no longer believe in the impartiality of the criminal justice function. 
• The activities of key EU justice and home affairs agencies involved in addressing migrant smuggling are 
based on widespread, however, unsubstantiated assumptions about this phenomenon. There is a 
paradox in the narrative found in the key reports about the highly organised, hierarchical, transnational 
criminal groups of migrant smugglers that are violent and driven by greed and involved in other criminal 
activities (such as human trafficking, arms trafficking, terrorism, etc.), and the local community members 
or people providing services via peer-to-peer platforms (such as BlaBlaCar or AirBnB), who can 
‘inadvertently’ become migrant smugglers.  
• Moreover, beyond the statistics of prosecutions on migrant smuggling, qualitative analysis on the 
ground shows that in many cases those affected are family members, friends who acted out of 
compassion or asylum seekers who had no other legal alternative to access the EU, but to come under 
forged documents and become criminalised. Women and children who get involved in migrant 
smuggling are in a particularly vulnerable and precarious situation, for example, migrant children 
collaborating with smugglers for a discount on their journey. The prosecutions in these cases raise 
concerns of secondary victimisation rather than dismantling ‘organised criminal groups’.  
• Lastly, measures taken in cooperation with countries of origin and destination indicate that the fight 
against migrant smuggling leads to the involvement and consolidation of more professional criminals. 
This happens when anti-smuggling measures are promoted by the EU or its Member States in third 
countries for migration management concerns, disregarding the general rule of law, corruption and 
potential impact on human rights. 
4.1 Impacts on the rule of law and fundamental rights  
4.1.1 Rule of law and democracy 
The policing by states and their authorities of CSAs providing humanitarian assistance to irregular immigrants 
and asylum seekers raises profound challenges to international, regional, national and EU human rights and rule 
of law standards. Civil society, and the freedoms of association and expression that enable its very existence, 
constitutes a central component of the rule of law, which is a founding principle of both the EU and Member 
Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants: 2018 update 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 89 
States’ constitutional systems.504 The rule of law is a condition sine qua non for social trust. The role of CSAs and 
citizens’ movements in exposing the risks of abuse and actual breaches of fundamental human rights, and in 
mobilising to secure effective redress and access to justice, has remained central in upholding the democratic 
rule of law within the EU. 
The construction of the European Communities, and the subsequent European Union, has taken place with a 
deep understanding and commitment that CSAs constitute a key component of accountability of governments’ 
lawfulness and of potential abuses of individuals’ rights and liberties. 505 The participation of civil society in 
promoting ‘good governance’ in the EU is acknowledged in Article 15 TFEU. Particularly in the context of external 
relations policies, the European Commission has stated the following:  
An empowered civil society is a crucial component of any democratic system and is an asset in itself. It 
represents and fosters pluralism and can contribute to more effective policies, equitable and 
sustainable development and inclusive growth. It is an important player in fostering peace and in 
conflict resolution. By articulating citizens’ concerns, civil society organisations are active in the public 
arena, engaging in initiatives to further participatory democracy. They embody a growing demand for 
transparent and accountable governance.506 
4.1.2 Fundamental rights: Freedom of assembly and freedom of speech 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights stipulates in Article 12 the right to freedom of assembly and association at 
all levels, in particular on civic matters. This provision needs to be read in conjunction with the right of freedom 
of expression in Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Neither of these fundamental rights are 
limited to citizens of the Union, but are recognised for everyone. International and regional human rights 
standards underline the fundamental importance of freedom of association for civil society organisations and 
actors in liberal democratic and rule of law regimes. The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) establishes in Article 22.1 that everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others”. 
Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states in Article 11 that “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others”.  
The Council of Europe Venice Commission has underlined in several opinions that the freedom of association is 
an “essential prerequisite for other fundamental freedoms”.507 The Council of Europe Committee of Ministers has 
highlighted the central contribution played by non-governmental actors in “the realization of democracy and 
human rights” as well as “security accountability and social well-being of democratic societies”, as well as their 
“invaluable contribution also made by NGOs to the achievement of the aims and principles of the United Nations 
Charter and of the Statute of the Council of Europe”.508 
Central to the very nature of the human right of freedom of association is the principle of independence of CSAs 
work. Independence is especially crucial for CSAs promoting human rights protection and documenting human 
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rights violations by states. CSAs must be free from undue or unlawful interference from state actors. The 2015 
CoE Venice Commission and OSCE (ODIHR) Guidelines on Freedom of Association emphasise the importance of the 
freedom of founders and members of civil society to determine their objectives and reach of activities.509 When 
it comes to issues related to “private or other forms of non-state funding” the same guidelines state: 
State practices that raise the deepest concerns in this area are: outright prohibitions on access to foreign 
funding; requiring associations to obtain government approval prior to receiving such funding; undue 
delay in receiving approval for implementing foreign-funded projects; requiring the transfer of funds 
from foreign sources through a centralized government fund; imposing excessive reporting 
requirements, banning or restricting foreign-funded associations from engaging in human rights, 
advocacy or other activities; stigmatizing or delegitimizing the work of foreign-funded associations by 
requiring them to be labelled in a pejorative manner; initiating audit or inspection campaigns to harass 
such associations; and imposing criminal penalties on associations for failure to comply with any above-
mentioned constraints on funding.510 
The notion of CSAs comprises not only NGOs themselves and the individuals forming part of them, but also ‘dis-
organised’ or non-associated civil society movements, including human rights defenders and activists. This is, for 
instance, underlined in the 1999 UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs 
of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Declaration on 
Human Rights Defenders).511 Article 1 of the Declaration states: “Everyone has the right, individually and in 
association with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realization of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels.”512 The right of freedom of association is 
recognised not only for ‘organisations’, but also for individuals. This means, for instance, that in light of the above-
mentioned Guidelines on Freedom of Association that “the individual wrongdoing of founders or members of an 
association, when not acting on behalf of the association, should lead only to their personal liability for such acts, 
and not to the prohibition or dissolution of the whole association”.513 
Any restrictions to the freedom of association applicable to states must pursue a legitimate aim, be necessary in 
a democratic society and comply with the general principle of legality.514 Any restrictions should not be used as 
a pretext to control civil society or obstruct their role in monitoring human rights. 
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Box 18. Hungary: Impacts on the rule of law and fundamental rights  
The Joint Opinion by the CoE Venice Commission and OSCE ODIHR dealing with Hungary and entitled “On 
the Provisions of the So-Called ‘Stop Soros’ Draft Legislative Package which Directly affect NGOs” of 25 June 
2018,515 examines the extent to which the criminalisation of certain activities of persons working for NGOs in 
Hungary – in the scope of the Stop Soros draft legislative package – constituted an unlawful interference with 
their freedoms of association, and in some cases, expression. The assessment focused on whether the extent 
of the restrictions by the Hungarian government to the right of freedom of association and expression were 
in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and were necessary in a democratic society. Despite 
reiterated concerns and criticism from international and regional human rights organisations, 516 it is worth 
noting that the draft legislation examined by this Joint Opinion was actually adopted on 20 June 2018. 
The Venice Commission and ODIHR highlighted in this same Joint Opinion that while in principle a legal 
provision concerning the criminalisation of facilitation of irregular migration may pursue a legitimate aim, it 
“must not be used as a pretext to control NGOs or to restrict their ability to carry out their legitimate work 
nor as a means to hinder persons from applying for asylum”.517 On these grounds, the Joint Opinion raised 
serious doubts about the legitimacy of the aim behind Hungarian Stop Soros legislative package. 
Furthermore, they raised similar doubts concerning the necessity of the legal restrictions in a democratic 
society. Quoting the European Court of Human Rights ruling Mallah v France,518 the Opinion emphasised that 
Hungarian national law stands in difficult relationship with the necessity test when it does not include an 
express exception concerning humanitarian assistance, nor does it clearly differentiate financial gain as the 
strict counterpart of an illegal activity. They also highlighted that in the absence of a humanitarian exemption 
clause in the current Hungarian criminal law, “the authorities willingly accept the risk of stigmatization”.519 
The Joint Opinion stated that “there may be circumstances in which providing ‘assistance’ is a moral 
imperative or at least a moral right. As such, the provision may result in further arbitrary restrictions to and 
prohibition through heavy sanctions of the indispensable work of human rights NGOs and leave migrants 
without essential services provided by such NGOs”. 
On the basis of the above, the Venice Commission and ODIHR concluded that the Hungarian Lex NGO failed 
to meet human rights and rule of law standards, and infringed upon the right to freedom of association and 
expression and should be repealed. In fact, the plenary of the European Parliament considered this Hungarian 
legislation and its negative impact on the freedom of association for non-governmental actors in the country 
one of the main concerns for voting favourably on the start of Article 7 TEU procedure on 12 September 
2018.520 
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4.2 Impacts on societal trust  
It has been argued that the increasing involvement of the EU and its actors in irregular immigration is likely to 
displace mistrust on the effectiveness of irregular immigration policies from domestic actors towards the EU.521 
As with mistrust on the effectiveness of policies to control irregular migration, mistrust for policies’ fairness or 
democratic legitimacy has also emerged from across the political spectrum over the course of the refugee crisis 
and this has intensified in the two years since our last report, during which we have seen unprecedented pan-
European mobilisation.522  
Indeed, the unprecedented new concentration of powers to deter migrants and control the actions of CSAs at 
the level of the EU, coupled with a lack of clear protection for citizens to provide humanitarian assistance to 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers at the same level, has made the Union for one of the first times an arena of 
democratic deliberation. Parts of civil society have awoken across borders to contest policies and laws that they 
believe to be contrary to the ‘core principles’ of both the EU and its Member States, as well as contrary to broader 
humanitarian or political principles.  
As well as an operational humanitarian mission, the Aquarius rescue boat mentioned above has become for some 
“the concrete symbol for those in Europe who place the universal values of respect for human life, dignity and 
solidarity before any other consideration”.523 Once again, it is important to note that the issue of SAR and 
humanitarian assistance has wider implications for European social values, social trust and social cohesion. 
Policies that criminalise migration have broader impacts on the population, including making life more difficult 
for other minority groups in society and negatively impacting social trust in society as a whole. 
Policies that criminalise contact with irregular migrants may lead to widespread feelings of subjective insecurity 
as well as stigma, ill trust and prejudice towards migrants. For example, speaking of the recent deployment of 
3,000 new ‘border hunters’, enhanced policing and reports of violence at the external Schengen border between 
Hungary and Serbia, one civil society representative interviewed for the ESRC study noted earlier524 commented: 
I wonder what is going to happen in a few years’ time, when those officers who have taken part in these 
acts of violence will go back to their original postings and community …, if it will normalize that 
violence? … [I]t’s a very serious issue, not to do with migrants and asylum seekers. These police officers 
will be the ones who stop me on the road or anyone else so that’s very problematic. 
His words echo those of a French civil society activist who commented to Allsopp in 2010 that “crimes of 
solidarity” do not just concern the rights of migrants but are also “about the rights of citizens”. They are, she 
stressed, about something bigger that binds us: that is, the value of fraternité.525  
As the European refugee crisis unfolded, the position of NGOs and civil society groups aiding irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers became more and more controversial with some important developments emerging since 
out first report on the effects of the Facilitation Directive for the LIBE Committee in 2016. 
In our previous report, civil society groups highlighted a series of ‘unintended consequences’ of the anti-
smuggling apparatus on their work. The results of a questionnaire of 69 civil society organisations and 13 cities 
across approximately 20 Member States gave an indication of the range of material, direct and perceived effects 
of the Facilitators’ Package on irregular migrants and on individuals and organisations providing humanitarian 
assistance to them. Almost all of those surveyed considered their work to be humanitarian in nature; claiming to 
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provide services that help migrants to access their fundamental rights (including to heath care, shelter, hygiene 
and legal assistance) and to live with dignity. Just a handful of survey respondents reported direct experience of 
proceedings, prosecution or sanction for their work supporting asylum seekers and irregular migrants. Criminal 
acts included fundraising for the medical bill of a migrant domestic worker without license, protesting and 
misusing public funds. Yet a fifth of respondents from a range of Member States reported that their organisation 
or a member of their organisation had feared sanction for their work assisting an irregular migrant – related to 
both the transit of migrants and support during their stay in a Member State.  
Although it has not been possible to reconduct the survey, other qualitative evidence confirms that these 
dynamics have continued and indeed aggravated since the time of fieldwork in 2015.  
CSAs continue to report the ‘chilling effect’ of anti-human smuggling laws. There also remains widespread 
confusion among CSAs around how the Facilitation Directive should be implemented in their Member State, 
leading to misinformation and ‘erring on the side of caution’. This dynamic continues to compromise migrants’ 
access to vital services. This is especially true in the context of the significant increase in the number of people 
migrating to Europe and seeking asylum, where everyday citizens are obliged to volunteer vital services without 
full training in the absence of sufficient state provision. In Rome, for example, as mentioned above, the absence 
of decent housing for migrants continues to be met by a sustained response from civil society, at the helm of 
which remains a collective group of volunteers called Baobab Experience. Despite being lauded for their efforts 
internationally, the actions of this group have been met locally with an iron fist, with multiple evictions making 
asylum seekers – among them women and children – homeless. The most recent eviction took place on 13 
November 2018. 526 Other reported incidents of criminalisation in Italy and France include administrative fines for 
distributing food and for the erection of temporary shelters to distribute food. Meanwhile, policing measures 
include intimidating acts like the parking of police vans outside service provision spots and disciplining measures 
like repeated ID checks on volunteers. Some NGOs report an increase in attacks from far-right groups and an 
absence of police protection.527  
Previous analysis has framed both the real and normative tensions between anti-smuggling laws in Europe on 
the one hand, and the safeguarding of the independence of humanitarian actors on the other, in terms of 
‘unintended’ or ‘indirect’ policy consequences. Another body of work has seen this tension as reflective of a more 
fundamental tension in liberal democracy between communitarianism and universalism, and as evidence of the 
important role of civil society in protecting society’s ‘core principles’.528 These effects can be mitigated but never 
fully resolved. Indeed, an element of social mistrust or respectful conflict between civil society and statutory 
actors is a fundamental feature of a healthy democracy.  
During 2016 and 2017, in some parts of the EU, attacks on civil society organisations under the guise of anti-
smuggling measures nevertheless became more confrontational, leading some actors to consider that the 
counter effects of anti-smuggling measures on their work were intentional after all: intended to reduce the 
monitoring role of civil society and reduce scrutiny of statutory actors as well as create a hostile environment for 
migrants by reducing access to services.  
In another development with parallels across the EU in countries including the Netherlands and Belgium, civil 
society organisations in the UK have complained that the work of border control is increasingly becoming co-
opted into their everyday activities, threatening, on a practical level, the bonds of trust between service providers 
and the migrants, but also the independence of civil society. The effect of dissuading migrants from accessing 
services also has broader consequences for society. A representative from an international medical NGO based in 
the UK put it as follows: 
                                                                    
526 Y. Gostoli (2018) “As Rome Camp Eviction Makes Refugees Homeless, Salvini Celebrates”, Aljazeera, 13 November. 
(https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/rome-camp-eviction-refugees-homeless-salvini-celebrates-
181113184605224.html).  
 
527 S. Carrera, Allsopp, J. and Vosyliūte ̇, L (2018), ‘The Effects of Anti-migrant Smuggling Policies on Humanitarian Assistance in 
the EU’. International Journal of Border and Migration Studies (IJBMS): 3(4), 236-276. 
528 Allsopp (2012), op. cit. 
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[W]hat we’re seeing is a normalization of civil society being expected to play a role in immigration. Even 
if it’s not explicit that it’s a policing event, it’s your responsibility to be concerned as well about 
someone’s immigration status. Whereas the doctors we speak to would say it’s not, I’m not interested 
in the person’s immigration status, I want to treat the patient. And … that’s been replicated … with 
landlords, in schools to a certain extent as well … [A]though what you might hear from a politician is 
that the intended impact is to dissuade, about making it a hostile environment, from our perspective 
the hostile environment isn’t persuading people from staying in the UK or from not coming to the UK, 
what it’s doing is making sure you have greater health inequalities because people are getting more 
sick and not accessing any care … it increases the risk of exploitation … criminals taking advantage of 
marginalized people and thriving off this niche area which has been created.529 
As well as serving to deter exploitation, previous studies have shown that a degree of trust is important for 
compliance with enforcement on the part of irregular migrants and those who assist them. In the Netherlands, it 
is reported that local authorities’ obligation to report irregular migrants who make use of the new special night 
shelters has dissuaded them from accessing the service and left them sleeping rough. In a recent report, a 
representative of an NGO that provides health and social care in London reported that concerns about potential 
obligations to share data with government officials regarding clients meant they were less likely to collect the 
data in the first place, which has consequences for funding and for monitoring their work.530 Again, this has 
important wider implications for social trust.  
Research suggests that the main concerns of practitioners continues to be how to deliver their assistance tasks 
and responsibilities without being penalised, and how to avoid social exclusion, maintain social cohesion and 
cater for the needs of all these populations. Meanwhile, organisations that used to provide shelter and food have 
leaned into new areas such as legal assistance in recognition of shortcomings in avenues for justice. The space 
for civil society groups supporting migrants and refugees in Europe has also expanded to include more informal 
and loose networks and activist groups that are increasingly connected across borders. Many such groups are 
working with migrants and refugees for the first time.  
In this emerging arena of pan-European civil society activism, caution must be taken to recognise the specificity 
of each national context. One Hungarian civil society volunteer highlighted the problems that arose in this regard 
when activists came to show solidarity with migrants in Szeged at the external Schengen border in 2015: 
There’s EU and German money involved so I get they felt they had a stake in it and it was cool that they 
came to show solidarity and were helpful, but some had a political mission … the other ones would 
come to Eastern Europe and the Balkans with a very certain type of rhetoric going on nationality. They 
had their own idea of what political organization means, not understanding what it looks like here. No 
Borders struggles in the West have a strong anti-capitalist focus, but you don’t say that here because of 
the past traumas of communism. So, this new European solidarity is great, we were calling people ahead 
in different countries and coordinating between service providers and activist groups. … [B]ut there’s 
also a problem in this idea of facilitating only the transit of migrants from East to West, not challenging 
ideas of East and West within the Union.531 
CSAs have responded in numerous ways to the increased monitoring and attacks on their operations and 
reputations. Some – especially pursuant to the introduction of the EU–Turkey deal – chose to leave the arena of 
humanitarian assistance in the EU, not wishing to be complicit or ‘instrumentalised’ in the anti-smuggling 
agenda. Others continue to operate but ‘with our heads down’, avoiding unnecessary scrutiny and attention so 
as to continue to receive statutory funding to provide their crucial services and/or – in the context of the UK, 
Hungary, Greece and Italy – to maintain government-controlled access to hotspots, transit zones and detention 
centres where migrants are held. New scrutiny of their work is thus reportedly having a disconcerting ‘silencing 
effect’ on some NGOs.  
                                                                    
529 Cited in Allsopp (2017), op. cit. 
530 Allsopp (2017), op. cit. 
531 Allsopp (2017), op. cit. 
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Other civil society groups are taking a more vocal stance and framing their work as an immanent critique of 
national or European values or, in extreme cases, as civil disobedience against unjust laws.  
Some civil society groups have been careful to specifically frame their work as existing in opposition to 
smuggling. A respondent from Italy interviewed for ongoing research, for example, stressed that the intimidation 
they undergo from police to stop their provision of food and services to migrants serves to encourage, not 
discourage smuggling networks: “[W]here the collective is prevented from providing these services, the migrants 
either end up in the street or are forced to turn back to smugglers for assistance. … [B]ringing it into the public 
sphere is a form of protection.”532  
Their work is thus framed as serving to uphold the value of social trust and the rule of law. A respondent from the 
Netherlands similarly commented in our previous 2016 study that the difficulties in accessing assistance 
generated by criminalisation caused vulnerable migrants to ‘stay in isolation, vulnerable to exploitation’. Among 
these migrants are the ‘most vulnerable’ a Belgium respondent stressed, including pregnant women, trafficking 
victims and sex workers in need of psychological and health support (see the previous report). 533 
Some civil society groups have suggested that in increasing their scrutiny of NGOs, certain government and EU 
actors are trying to distract attention away from policy failures and find a common ‘scapegoat’. Common critiques 
levelled in this regard include (i) EU and statutory actors lack standards for effective policy delivery; (ii) statutory 
actors have no standardised frameworks for measuring the effectiveness of their policies; and (iii) there is 
therefore a lack of evidence regarding the impacts of policies and standards being met. All of these impact on 
social trust more broadly.  
Several civil society groups have appropriated the frame of European values to justify their actions in solidarity 
with migrants and refugees, appealing – as with the WeMove.eu petition – (see above) to a common sense of EU 
citizenship. CSAs have argued that the EU community’s ‘basic principles’ include assisting vulnerable migrants on 
the basis of its common history of receiving refugees (and a common shame regarding the episodes in European 
history where states have not ‘done their bit’). In the UK-based campaign “It’s Our Turn”,534 parallels are made 
with the historic Kindertransport movement that saved the lives of thousands of child refugees fleeing Nazi 
Germany in World War II. Calling for refugee resettlement and safe and legal routes to the UK, Safe Passage 
proposes to take children away from smuggling networks. Lord Alf Dubs, himself a Kindertransport survivor, lent 
his own name to the Bill seeking to facilitate safe passage for more unaccompanied minors from Europe to Britain. 
As Heidi Allen, the Conservative MP who tabled the amendment stressed in Parliament, the amendment was not 
just about helping child refugees, but also about the principle of ‘European solidarity’. Here social trust and 
solidarity appear synonymous. A fund was recently set up by Lord Alf Dubs.535 He framed efforts to resettle 
children from Calais to the UK as a modern-day following of the Kindertransport, which seeks to honour Europe’s 
past tradition and learn from mistakes.   
Significantly, thousands and thousands of EU citizens voted with their feet, travelling freely across EU Member 
States to volunteer at the height of the crisis. In some areas of civil society – and in particular among the newer 
and more informal civil society groups – EU citizens have thus replicated and sought to transform the solidarity 
dynamics at the EU institutional level through activism and volunteering: just as EU institutions have positioned 
themselves in regional solidarity, such as posting Frontex officers pooled from EU Member States at certain EU 
external borders, EU CSAs and activists are also present at these borders serving a protective, safeguarding and 
monitoring function. 
                                                                    
532 Cited in Carrera, S., V. Mitsilegas, J. Allsopp and L. Vosyliute (2018), “Policing Humanitarianism: EU Policies Against Human 
Smuggling and their Impact on Civil Society”. London: Hart Publishing 
(https://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/policing-humanitarianism-9781509923014/). 
533 Carrera, S., E. Guild, A. Aliverti, J. Allsopp, M. Manieri and M. Levoy (2016), “Fit for Purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the 
Criminalization of Humanitarian Assistance to Irregular Migrants”, Study for the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee, 
Brussels. 
534 http://safepassage.org.uk/resource/its-our-turn-campaign-pack/ 
535 http://safepassage.org.uk/what-we-do/alf-dubs-fund/ 
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Some EU citizen activists and volunteers have stated that being an EU citizen helped them in their work, meaning 
that they could mobilise their own ‘citizen privilege’ to assist less fortunate migrants. Other civil society volunteers 
(such as one of a group of Spanish fire-fighters currently on trial for migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea 
for their work with the SAR charity Proem-AID, and some European activists in Ventimiglia who were issued 
cautions banning them from the border territory) claim that they were targeted regardless of, or specifically 
because of their EU citizenship by way of ‘being made an example’ to dissuade others.536  
A new book by three of the authors of this study, Policing Humanitarianism: EU Policies Against Human Smuggling 
and their Impact on Civil Society explores the effects of EU policies, laws and agencies’ operations in anti-smuggling 
actions, and their implementation across EU Member States in more detail.  
4.3 Other unintended societal and individual impacts of migrant smuggling  
4.3.1 EU policy-making in ‘crisis’ mode and unchallenged assumptions about the migrant smuggling 
phenomenon  
Within Europe, migrant smuggling has been conceptualised primarily from migration management, security and 
criminological perspectives. Four key assumptions of the EU’s approach on ‘migrant smuggling’ are the following:  
1) ‘Migrant smugglers’ are violent criminal professionals. 
2) They work in highly organised criminal groups.  
3) The ‘business model’ is aimed at increasing financial benefit and is highly profitable.  
4) Therefore, criminal investigations and prosecutions will increase the risks for an organised criminal 
group to get caught and will lower the profits from migrant smuggling.  
The first assumption provides that the ‘persona’ of a smuggler or ‘smugglers profile’ is construed as an 
exploitative, violent and foreign male criminal. Often it is profiled by occupation, as done by both Frontex (see 
Figure 5) and Europol’s Migrant Smuggling Centre on the basis of suspects, and provides other ‘profiling’ 
characteristics, such as nationality and age.537  
 
                                                                    
536 Allsopp (2017). 
537 Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre (2017), “First Year Activity Report: Jan 2016 – Jan 2017”, Europol, The Hague.  
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Figure 5. Profiles of migrant smugglers in Agadez, Nigeria 
 
Source: Frontex, Risk Analysis Unit, Africa-Frontex 2016 Intelligence Community Joint Report, Warsaw, April 2017, p. 11.  
 
The second assumption provides that the smuggling network constitutes an ‘organised crime group’ – 
transnational and hierarchical in nature and driven solely by profit and greed, and also often linked with ‘poly-
criminality’ – with involvement in other criminal activities, such as document fraud, human trafficking, arms 
and/or drugs trafficking and terrorism538 (see Figure 6).  
 
                                                                    
538 Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre (2017), “First Year Activity Report: Jan 2016 – Jan 2017”, Europol, The Hague, 
p. 11.  
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Figure 6. Migrant smuggling network as an organised crime group 
 
Source: Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre, First Year Activity Report: Jan 2016–Jan 2017, Europol, The Hague, 
2017. 
 
For example, Europol describes the ‘Facilitation of Illegal Immigration” area of crime as follows:  
A complex, ruthless and multinational migrant-smuggling network has developed around Europe’s 
unprecedented migration crisis, thus generating billions of euros for the criminal groups involved. … 
In 2015, criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling are estimated to have had a turnover of 
between EUR 3–6 billion. … The turnover from this highly attractive business could double or triple if 
the scale of the current migration crisis persists. A knock-on effect could be an increase in the 
exploitation of labour, where migrants may be forced to work to pay off their large debts with the 
smugglers.539 
Therefore, on 27 March 2017, the Council decided to continue the EU policy cycle for organised and serious 
international crime for the period 2018–21 and once again selected the ‘facilitation of illegal immigration’ as one 
of the European Multi-Disciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) priorities, “particularly focusing 
on those whose methods endanger people’s lives, those offering their services online and making use of 
document fraud as part of their business model”. 540  
Together these concepts are part of the largely unchallenged narrative of smuggling, which singlehandedly 
attributes the presence of assistance and basic services available irregular migrants, the travels and the tragedies 
that often afflict migrants to the actions of heinous smuggling facilitators. The academic evidence, in particular 
empiric research based on ethnographic observations in the EU and in developing countries, challenges these 
assumptions.541  
                                                                    
539 Europol (2017), “Crime Areas and Trends: Facilitation of Illegal Immigration.”, Europol Official Website 
(https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-trends/crime-areas/facilitation-of-illegal-immigration).  
540 Interestingly new EMPACT distinguishes not only Trafficking in Human Beings, as a separate area of priority crime but also 
Document fraud as a separate category. Europol (2017), “EU Policy Cycle – EMPACT.” Europol 
(https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-trends/eu-policy-cycle-empact). Accessed 11 Oct. 2018. 
541 G. Sanchez (2018), “Five Misconceptions Concerning Smuggling”, Policy Brief Series, Migration Policy Centre, European 
University Institute, 2018 (http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/54964); L. Achilli (2018), “The “Good” Smuggler: The Ethics and 
Morals of Human Smuggling among Syrians.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 676, no. 1, 
pp. 77-96; M. Micallef and T. Reitano (2017), “The anti-human smuggling business and Libya’s political endgame”, Institute for 
Security Studies and The Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime: Geneva 
(https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/nar2.pdf);, J. Brachet (2018), “Manufacturing Smugglers: From Irregular to 
Clandestine Mobility in the Sahara.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 676, no. 1, pp. 16-35. 
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While these assumptions hold and are suitable in certain cases, closer to the continuum of human trafficking, or 
related to production of forged documents, they seem not to fit description of other types of activities that are 
criminalised as ‘migrant smuggling’ or ‘migrant facilitation’, such as housing, transportation and information 
sharing. The latter are more likely to be ‘community based’ and provided by citizens or humanitarian actors out 
of compassion, and without criminal intent, and thus their criminalisation raises concerns.  
As illustrated above, the discourse surrounding smugglers and their networks has proven to be quite resilient, 
especially considering the research gaps in the field. The scholarship available to this day has found limited 
evidence of hierarchically organised criminality, transnational structures or significant structural complexity.542 
Furthermore, scholars have shown that while clandestine journeys are indeed dangerous, most often the risks 
associated with them emerge from the deployment of immigration and border enforcement and controls, along 
with exposure to treacherous landscapes and environments, rather than from smugglers’ actions alone. In other 
words, it is in fact the inability to secure legal paths for mobility that lies at the core of migrants’ decisions to 
contract smugglers.543 Seeking to avoid law enforcement and/or detection, smugglers opt for more remote 
routes and riskier travel methods, the safety and lives of those who travel with them becoming increasingly 
compromised.   
None of these statements seeks to exempt smuggling facilitators from their responsibility in the tragic 
experiences faced by migrants. They do, however, seek to jumpstart a conversation concerning the definition and 
the scope of the smuggling legislation and its reach. While the larger discourse on smuggling portrays it as a 
phenomenon taking place outside of the EU’s borders, NGOs, volunteers and ordinary citizens within the EU face 
criminal charges for the work they carry out on behalf of migrants and refugees.544 The emphasis on organised 
crime models, the gaps in official data and the absence of empirical work on smuggling limit our understandings 
of the dynamics of irregular migration facilitation on the one hand, while on the other, obscure the ways in which 
smuggling legislation impacts on the lives of EU citizens. The following sections provide examples concerning 
criminalisation of migration facilitation and its implications.  
For example, Europol’s SOCTA (Serious Organised Crime Threat Assessment) in 2017 once again stressed that 
“OCGs [organised criminal groups] involved in migrant smuggling display an unprecedented level of 
organisation and coordination” (emphasis added).545 However, in the same report Europol concluded that any EU 
citizen advertising a ride on BlaBlaCar or providing accommodation on AirBnB could potentially become 
facilitators: “Migrant smuggling networks heavily rely on social media to advertise smuggling services. Migrant 
smugglers make use of ride-sharing applications and P2P [peer-to-peer] accommodation platforms to provide a 
cover for their smuggling activities. This leaves regular users [of these platforms] at the risk of inadvertently 
becoming facilitators by unknowingly transporting or hosting irregular migrants.”546  
The very premises of criminal law would be to deter people from doing a morally and socially bad thing, but in 
the area of facilitation one can be unknowingly doing a bad thing, while doing a good thing. Thus, it seems that 
criminal justice approach is over-stretched and not fit for migration management. This may explain why after all 
the emphasis on poly-criminality and organised criminal groups, law enforcement agencies continue to police, 
arrest and prosecute service providers without ‘unjust benefit’, civil society doing non-profit activities, family 
members, friends and even migrant communities.  
Similarly, leading academic experts in the area of criminology, selected to act as an Academic Advisory Group on 
Europol’s SOCTA for 2017, briefly summarised their concerns on the current approach to address migrant 
smuggling predominantly via criminalisation and prosecution:  
                                                                    
542 Sanchez (2018), op. cit. 
543 Achilli (2018), op. cit. 
544 L. Vosyliute and C. Conte (2018), “Migration: Crackdown on NGOs assisting refugees and other migrants, Discussion Brief 
July 2018, Research Social Platform on Migration and Asylum – ReSOMA, Brussels. 
545 Europol (2017), “European Union serious and organized crime threat assessment: Crime in the age of technology” (SOCTA 
2017), Europol, The Hague. 
546 Ibid. 
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In our view, policy-makers need to ensure that they track possible counterproductive effects of policies. 
The thousands of deaths of aspirant refugees and economic migrants in the Mediterranean Sea well 
illustrates this point – and the dilemmas faced by European policy-makers. Having pledged to protect 
and foster human rights, the EU and its Member States thus have the responsibility to monitor and 
minimise the harmful unintended consequences of their policy choices, keeping also in mind that 
criminalisation and prosecution are not the only or necessarily the best strategy for dealing with the harms 
of organised crime groups and their activities.547 
4.3.2 Impacts of criminalisation on refugees, other migrants and family members 
Across the EU there is a widespread absence of statistical and official data concerning those who are being 
accused, charged or convicted for the offence. As outlined in the initial study in 2016, EU Member States do not 
maintain statistics concerning smuggling and/or related offences; only Germany was found to provide specific 
statistics on the number of persons arrested on suspicion of facilitating irregular migration.548 Specifically, there 
are gaps concerning the demographics of those being charged with the offence, the grounds for the charges, 
and at a more general level, the overall numbers concerning smuggling offences. Furthermore, smuggling data 
is not disaggregated in terms of gender or age, and family links, which limits the ability to map the links between 
the hardship in family reunification, narrow sponsorship schemes and increased criminalisation of family 
members and friends. 549 
Cases submitted for prosecution under national smuggling statutes, implementing and even preceding the 
Facilitators’ Directive across Europe, systematically involve practices that according to the language of the UN 
Smuggling Protocol would have fallen out of criminalisation as discussed in section 2, as they do not involve 
material/financial benefit and concern cases of assistance or support to immediate family members, friends or 
people in distress. As discussed in section 3 and showcased in Annex 1, we continue to find that smuggling 
prosecutions often involve the provision of assistance to friends, family members and people in distress in the 
context of their journeys. 
Table 7 further indicates how mothers and fathers can be charged with smuggling for using false or forged 
documents to facilitate the illegal entry of their own children into the country; girlfriends and wives prosecuted 
on the grounds of having provided room and board for their boyfriends and husbands; and men and women 
who used their own children’s birth certificates and passports to facilitate the family reunion of children with their 
parents, which otherwise would not be likely.550 As for the developments after the emergence of the so-called 
European humanitarian refugee crisis, the researchers also gathered empiric evidence of desperate parents trying 
to reunify with their family members by trying to use documents of other family members or to conceal and 
smuggle them from hotspots. For example, CEPS researchers within the frame of a research project titled “Anti-
smuggling policies and their intersection with humanitarian assistance and social trust”551 conducted interviews 
in Greece on a field research trip.552 Interviewees representing civil society and national authorities mentioned 
several illustrative cases. National officials mentioned a case of a desperate mother trying to smuggle her 18-year-
old son from Lesvos island (which applies geographical restrictions for asylum seekers) by putting him in a 
suitcase and trying to board a ferry, in order to reach mainland Greece. A civil society respondent relayed several 
cases where parents residing in other EU Member States were trying to reunify with their minor children aged 3 
                                                                    
547 Taylor, M., X. Raufer, M. Den Boer, A. Sinn, M. Levi, L. Paoli and E. Savona (SOCTA Academic Advisory Group) (2017), 
Comments by Academic Advisors, Europol 
(https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/comment_by_academic_advisors.pdf). 
548 Carrera et al. (2016), op. cit., p. 40. 
549 See also, C. Conte (2018), “Impossibility and hardship of family reunion for beneficiaries of international protection”, 
Research Social Platform on Migration and Asylum – ReSOMA Discussion Brief, July.  
550 Ibid.  
551 The project was coordinated by the School of Law of Queen Mary University London (QMUL) in cooperation with CEPS and 
Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants – PICUM and it was funded by the UK’s Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC).  
552 The field research trip took place on 6–12 June, 2017 in Athens and Lesvos island. 
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and 5 who were held by authorities in Greece.553 After experiencing how slow and burdensome the process was 
the parents were getting desperate. After a few weeks contacts with other organisations gave the impression that 
the parents had reunited with their children, so it looked like they had resorted to smugglers to facilitate the 
family reunification.554  
 
Table 7. Exemplary cases: Prosecuting family members in the UK and France 
Case  Brief description Source 
Mother of three prosecuted for 
‘smuggling’ her own children 
In 2001, a woman was accused of 
migrant smuggling when she 
attempted to smuggle her three 
children into France by forging her 
own passport. She admitted not 
having initiated a family-reunification 
process as applicable under French law 
as her own immigration status had yet 
to be approved, in addition to lacking 
the financial means outlined by French 
law to provide for the children. The 
children were denied entry into France 
and returned to Cameroon while the 
mother faced criminal proceedings. 
The woman was convicted of “assisting 
the irregular entry, transit and stay of a 
foreigner in France” although the Court 
of Appeals of Paris eventually reversed 
the decision 16 months from the time 
of the woman’s initial arrest. 
See Madame [Name Redacted], Cour 
D’Appel de Paris, Dossier no. 0100550, 
21 June 2001.555 
Girlfriend prosecuted for hosting 
her boyfriend in an irregular 
situation 
In 2007, a French woman was accused 
of migrant smuggling for providing 
accommodation for several months to 
a man with whom she had a romantic 
relationship. Her boyfriend was an 
irregular migrant of Moroccan origin. 
He abandoned the household as he 
was afraid that his girlfriend could be 
prosecuted as a result of allowing him 
to live with her.  
See Madame [Name redacted] 
Tribunal de Grande Instance d’Aurillac, 
No. de parquet 07003283, No. de 
Jugement 448.556 
A wife prosecuted for allowing her 
husband to live with her 
In this case the prosecution in France, 
in 2008, argued that the woman had 
committed a crime by allowing her 
Turkish-born legal husband to remain 
at the residence they shared despite 
knowing he had entered the country 
See Madame [name redacted], 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Lyon, 
No. De Parquet 0744606, No. 
                                                                    
553 CEPS interview with national border/coast guard authorities on 9 of June 2017, Lesvos island, Greece.  
554 CEPS Interview with a civil society organisation providing social assistance to refugees, 7 of June 2017, Athens, Greece.  
555 Available in: https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/case-law-
doc/migrantsmugglingcrimetype/fra/2001/case_0100550_html/FR2_jur_ca-paris_2001-06-25.pdf 
556 Available in: https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/case-law-
doc/migrantsmugglingcrimetype/fra/2007/jugement_n_443_de_2007_html/FR1_jur_2007-08-30_tgi-aurillac.pdf 
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irregularly. The court eventually 
acquitted the woman. In her case it was 
determined that she was protected “by 
the familiar immunity clause enshrined 
in the Code of Entry and Stay of 
Foreigners and Right of Asylum 
(CESEDA) which exempts spouses from 
criminal prosecution if they facilitate 
the irregular stay of their spouses into 
France. 
Jugement 2394.6EME C, 18 March 
2008557 
A friend prosecuted for using her 
own children’s documents to 
facilitate 
In 2005, this case concerned a British 
woman who sought to smuggle the 6-
year-old daughter of a friend from 
Nigeria to the United States where the 
minor was to join her father. The case 
was detected at London’s Heathrow 
airport when the accused used her 
own daughter’s British passport to 
facilitate the travel of the smuggled 
minor. The accused was later charged 
and convicted. Her sentence was 
reduced on appeal. The smuggled 
child had travelled by air from Nigeria 
to London’s Heathrow airport,  
accompanied by the accused, who 
presented herself as the mother of the 
child. There was no indication 
suggesting that the woman accused in 
this case sought to obtain or obtained 
a financial or other material benefit for 
her involvement.  
See R v Olulode [2006] EWCA Crim 538 
(23 February 2006)558 
Source: Authors, based on UNODC Sherloc Database (https://sherloc.unodc.org/).  
 
Another category of persons accused of migrant smuggling are asylum seekers who facilitate their own journeys. 
International law and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights in Article 18, as well as the Schengen Borders 
Code Articles 3, 5(4) and 13 indicate that persons should not be penalised for irregular entry if they are seeking 
international protection. Research identified that nevertheless, persons who eventually were granted asylum had 
been charged upon arrival with use of migrant smugglers or for using forged or false documents. Such 
prosecutions are in contravention not only with the above-mentioned international and European human rights 
obligations, but also with the UN Protocol against Migrant Smuggling and the EU Facilitators’ Package, both of 
which have provisions in place to prevent the criminalisation of migrants who facilitate their own journeys. For 
example, an asylum seeker who entered the UK with a forged document was charged with migrant smuggling in 
the UK.559 In this last category of cases, all of the accused were also placed in deportation proceedings as they 
had been apprehended ‘while in the commission of a criminal offence’. Other examples of cases identified 
involve, for example, that of a French woman – she welcomed into her home an Afghan child who had entered 
France irregularly. The woman was eventually acquitted, as it was determined that she never benefited financially 
                                                                    
557 Available in: https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/case-law-
doc/migrantsmugglingcrimetype/fra/2008/jugement_n_2394_html/FR_2394_2008.pdf 
558 Available in: https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/case-law-
doc/migrantsmugglingcrimetype/gbr/2006/r_v_olulode.html?lng=en&tmpl=sherloc 
559 Carrera et al. (2016), op. cit., p. 29. 
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from the child’s presence in her home and that she had indeed filed the asylum claim and other legal documents 
for the child to remain in France.560 Yet another case involved the prosecution of a French woman on the charge 
of “assisting the legal entry, transit or stay of a foreigner in France”. 
Combined, these cases reveal the lack of criminal ties or financial intentions among many of those charged with 
smuggling or irregular migration facilitation. They also stand as powerful examples of how ordinary people across 
Europe are being impacted by subjective interpretations of what constitutes migrant smuggling. But they are 
also examples of how the growing restrictions to legal channels of mobility play a role in people’s decisions to 
engage in acts regarded/labelled as smuggling and irregular migration facilitation. It is also important to highlight 
how many of these cases involve women, which in turn merits an examination into the gendered consequences 
of criminalisation of migrant smuggling without financial or other material benefit.  
However, such cases involving family members, friends and asylum seekers as well as those discussed above 
involving humanitarian actors are behind the statistics on cases that are said to target highly organised criminal 
groups that are driven by greed and cruelty. The following section takes a closer look at women’s experiences, 
and also at those of children, whose roles in smuggling (most often tied to their own attempts to migrate) have 
hardly been the focus of policy or research. 
4.3.3 Impacts of combating migrant smuggling on women and children 
While the criminalisation of the humanitarian assistance provided by civil society across Europe has generated 
significant attention, there are other forms of criminalisation processes taking place that may impact on often 
forgotten or marginalised populations. In the organised crime rhetoric that dominates the treatment of 
smuggling facilitation, the participation of women and children in smuggling processes has remained ignored.  
Women are important actors in the facilitation of irregular migration. Within organised smuggling efforts, the 
legal record shows women often recruit migrants, collect their fees and drive them across checkpoints and 
cities.561 In other smuggling contexts researchers have also identified that women perform other tasks often 
perceived as less relevant to smuggling facilitation, yet ensure the well-being and safety of migrants in transit. 
Women clean and prepare the facilities where migrants arrive and stay; they provide care for sick, injured, elderly, 
pregnant or child migrants; and they are also known to cook and feed those in transit.562  
Much has been written about the vast earnings generated by smuggling. According to official reports, smuggling 
commands profits that rival those in sex trafficking or the drug trade.563 The legal record, however, reveals scant 
data on the income of the men and women prosecuted for smuggling. And in fact, when available, the amounts 
reported suggest smuggling facilitation earnings are quite limited, and only to supplement earnings from other 
low-paying jobs. Earnings also have a tendency to be gendered – with women earning less than men. Cases 
examined for this study indicate migrant women in transit, those lacking immigration status or experiencing 
serious financial challenges are most often among those who accept to perform tasks in smuggling and 
ultimately face prosecution.  
 
                                                                    
560 Available in: https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/case-law-doc/migrantsmugglingcrimetype/fra/2009/jugement_nr_ 
7132009__html/Jugement_713_2009.pdf. 
561 Three women believed to be Austrian were convicted for working as drivers transporting migrants, handling a wire transfer 
account to handle funds received from smuggling transactions, and for acting as translators to recruit drivers in Hungary 
(https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/ 
case-law-doc/criminalgroupcrimetype/aut/2010/14os13510z_14os13610x_ogh_16_november_2010.html?lng=en). 
562 W. Vogt (2016), “Stuck in the middle with you: The intimate labours of mobility and smuggling along Mexico’s migrant 
route.” Geopolitics 21, no. 2, 366-386; Y. G. González (2018). “Navigating with Coyotes: Pathways of Central American Migrants 
in Mexico’s Southern Borders.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 676, no. 1, p. 174-193; G. 
Sánchez (2016), “Women’s Participation in the Facilitation of Human Smuggling: The Case of the US Southwest.” Geopolitics, 
21, no. 2, 387-406.  
563 Europol-INTERPOL (2016), “Migrant Smuggling Networks: Joint Europol-INTERPOL Report”, Executive Summary, May 
(https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/ep-ip_report_executive_summary.pdf). 
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Table 6: Exemplary cases of prosecuting persons in situations of precarity 
Case  Brief description Source 
A woman in a 
precarious situation 
prosecuted for 
‘profiting’ from use 
of her legal 
documents 
A much-publicised case in the UK, for example, involved a Dutch 
woman who was paid £3,000 for allowing a Nigerian woman use 
her legal documents, which allowed the latter in turn to legalise 
the stay of her husband (who was about to be deported) in the 
UK. The Dutch woman accused was employed as a hospital 
cleaner, and as the mother of a child was experiencing serious 
financial difficulties. She had decided to participate in the 
fraudulent scheme to temporarily alleviate her situation. She 
was sentenced to 16 months in prison for her role in the crime. 
The Nigerian couple – who also worked low-paying jobs 
cleaning offices and as caregivers to support their four children 
(who were UK nationals) – were also given prison sentences.564 
See Olunsanya & 
Sabina v The Queen 
(2012) EWCA Crim 
900 (4 May 2012)565 
Source: Authors.  
 
As mentioned previously, legal cases examined in preparation for this study reveal the incidence of women 
among those charged with smuggling and smuggling-related offences as a result of sharing their home with their 
spouses, who were determined to be irregular migrants, or of attempting to smuggle their children. While several 
of these cases were eventually dismissed, they had real consequences on the lives of the women. Some were 
separated from their children while others were sent to prison, their children having to be cared for by family 
members. Incarceration also prolongs the financial precarity faced by families, as often the arrested person is the 
head of household and main provider of the family. At least one of the women reported that her boyfriend, in an 
attempt to prevent her from being convicted, had abandoned the household.  
Children tend to find themselves implicated in smuggling-related crimes, often as a result of working for 
smuggling facilitators to pay off their own journeys. According to the UNODC Trafficking Protocol, children 
should not be criminalised as a result of participating – even if consensually – in activities deemed illicit. Instead, 
they should be recognised as victims of trafficking and efforts to restore their rights must be put in place. Yet 
there is also evidence suggesting children (defined as people under the age of 18) often find themselves being 
charged with the commission of smuggling offences as a result of having travelled in the company of a smuggling 
facilitator, or for having provided services in exchange for the opportunity to migrate.566  
In most cases, children are unaware of the legal implications concerning their participation in smuggling. A report 
from the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants described an encounter with a 15-year-old who 
had been charged with smuggling in Lesvos. Unaware of the fact he was facing charges, the child was instead 
concerned about the whereabouts of his older brother, with whom he had been travelling. The older brother had 
been charged with smuggling and was therefore unable to care for his younger sibling.567 The IOM also 
                                                                    
564 R. Alleyne (2013), “Nigerian Couple set up ‘‘ingenious’’ sham wedding to avoid deportation.” The Telegraph, 27 January 
(https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8938123/Nigerian-couple-set-up-ingenious-sham-wedding-to-avoid-
deportation.html). 
565 Available in: https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/case-law-
doc/migrantsmugglingcrimetype/gbr/2012/olunsanya_sabina_v_the_queen_2012_ewca_crim_900_4_may_2012.html?lng
=en 
566 L. Achilli, H. Leach, M. Matarazzo, M. Tondo, A. Cauchi and T. Karanika (2017), “On my own: protection challenges for 
unaccompanied and separated children in Jordan, Lebanon and Greece”. INTERSOS, Migration Policy Centre: Rome 
(http://mixedmigrationplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/UASC_Online_Version.pdf). 
567 United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council (2013), “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
migrants, Francois Crépeau”, A/HRC/23/46/Add.4, Addendum Mission to Greece, 17 April 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/16add_greece_/16add_greece_en.pdf). 
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documented as part of a study on irregular migrant children from Egypt multiple cases of children who had 
negotiated to work for smuggling crews in order to finance their own journeys to Europe. While not all of the 
interviewed children faced smuggling charges, they reported being perceived as criminal and dangerous at the 
shelters where they were placed upon arrival, and being mistreated by locals.568 
4.3.4 Impacts on third countries: Criminalisation dynamics creating more criminals  
The EU’s smuggling criminalisation processes and their impacts are not contained to Europe. Efforts to curtail 
smuggling beyond the EU’s borders have not only been the subject of much criticism, as the case of Libya has 
shown. Other countries in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods have been impacted by agreements signed 
with the EU. These agreements seek to prevent irregular migrants from reaching Europe. In the case of Libya 
agreements involving direct collaboration with the Libyan Government of National Accord to curtail migrant 
departures has led to a reconfiguration of the smuggling market.569 People who once were involved in smuggling 
facilitation have now, attracted by concessions and the potential for earnings, become engaged in the 
interception of boats carrying migrants attempting to leave Libya, returning these to the inland to detention 
facilities not regulated by the state where widespread abuses are known to take place.570  
In Niger, attempts to contain migrant flows through the injection of EU development and border enforcement 
capital has also had severe repercussions in the longstanding, community-based mechanisms that allowed for 
the mobility of migrants through the desert.571 This has primarily done primarily through the designation of these 
mechanisms as smuggling of migrants under the direction of international organisations, the auspice of UNODC 
and the EU’s security goals.572 Researchers have warned that these changes have increased the vulnerability of 
people who across the region relied on the facilitation of migrants’ journeys for their livelihood, and can increase 
the levels of inequality and instability in communities with high levels of precarity. 
 
 
                                                                    
568 IOM (2016), “Egyptian unaccompanied children: a case study on irregular migration”. Cairo: IOM 
(https://publications.iom.int/books/egyptian-unaccompanied-migrant-children-case-study-irregular-migration). 
569 Micallef and Reitano (2017), op. cit.  
570 A. Al-Arabi (2018), “Local specificities of migration in Libya: challenges and solutions.” Middle Eastern Directions Program. 
Florence: European University Institute (http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/ 52585). 
571 J. Brachet (2018), “Manufacturing Smugglers: From Irregular to Clandestine Mobility in the Sahara.” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 676, no. 1, pp. 16-35. 
572 H. Lucht (2016), “Death of a Gin Salesman: Hope and Despair among Ghanaian Migrants and Deportees Stranded in Niger.” 
In Hope and Uncertainty in Contemporary African Migration, Routledge, pp. 168-186.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1 Conclusions 
This study has captured the policing dynamics of suspicion, intimidation and disciplining across the EU and shows 
their systemic nature in five selected Member States from 2016 to the present (October 2018). It should be read 
as an update of the original study, “Fit for Purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of 
humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants”, which was written for the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee 
in 2015 and published in 2016. Like its predecessor, this report has highlighted that criminalising acts of solidarity 
with refugees and other migrants is made possible due to the vagueness of the EU legal framework on migrant 
smuggling. This factor is coupled with the increased political salience of the fight against smuggling and irregular 
migration. However, criminal justice-like measures targeting civil society should not be seen and justified as a 
migration management tool among others, this study has argued. As we have demonstrated, they have specific 
and nefarious impacts on the rights of EU citizens, smuggled migrants and also on the founding values of the EU. 
These include fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
5.1.1 The Facilitators’ Package is a bad law  
This updated study concludes that the Facilitators’ Package is essentially a bad law that is not fit for purpose in 
the evolving political and legal context of the EU; nor does it provide an adequate response to the challenges 
posed by recent changes in the trends of migrant and refugee arrivals, which have largely been met by an 
increasingly transnational European civil society that has come to the aid of Member States that have been 
unprepared or unwilling to offer a sufficient welcome that respects human dignity and human rights. As it stands, 
the Facilitators’ Package gives Member States permission to stretch the definition of smuggling as far as to 
criminalise acts without any criminal intent, including those conducted by civil society actors to whom thousands 
owe their lives. We have noted two main deficiencies in the EU’s definition on facilitation of entry and transit and 
how these affect the lives and activities of humanitarian actors: (i) the fact that it does not insist on a requirement 
of ‘financial or other material benefit’; and also that (ii) it does not oblige Member States to exempt ‘humanitarian 
assistance’, but on the contrary leaves wide discretion to Member States to decide if they want to criminalise such 
actors.  
We have also seen again, as identified in our previous report, that the EU’s definition is not in line with the 
standards set by the UN Protocol against Migrant Smuggling in its Article 6, and nor is it in line with the overall 
purpose and intention of its drafters. The current definition and its application do not give legal certainty to CSAs, 
bona fide service providers or smuggled migrants and their family and friends who act out of compassion about 
‘what is (not) a crime of facilitation of entry/transit and residence/stay in the EU’. As it stands, the EU’s legislation 
encourages Member States to depart from a main definition through a derogatory clause of Article 6(4). If the 
Facilitators’ Package is a criminal justice tool, it needs to bring about more legal certainty across the EU on what 
is criminal and what is to be exempted from criminalisation. Therefore, the current law, which is not fit for purpose 
in this regard, needs to be changed and clarified.  
5.1.2 Current application of the Facilitators’ Package in some Member States infringes civil society’s free 
space and other rights of EU citizens  
In addition to problems with legal framing, this study has argued once again that the operational activities of the 
EU and national agencies involved in the fight against migrant smuggling need to be carefully assessed; their 
impacts on fundamental rights and interference with civil society space need to be vigilantly monitored and 
protected. Repeated concerns have been expressed in the studies prior to and after the European Commission 
embarked on the REFIT of the Facilitators’ Package. This study finds that the REFIT was concluded while 
disregarding the prior and emerging evidence of the negative effects on CSAs assisting refugees and other 
migrants, including those in an irregular situation.  
After 2016, Paula Porras Schmidt submitted a petition to the European Parliament’s PETI Committee showing 
how the bad law has enabled the criminalisation of two SAR NGOs in Greece. In 2017, a European Citizens’ 
Initiative was launched with the aim of preventing the further criminalisation of CSAs providing humanitarian 
assistance and upholding the human rights of refugees and other migrants across the EU. Various other citizen 
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and civil society initiatives have been taken at the national and European levels; moreover, European Parliament 
resolutions have been drafted with the goal of preventing Member States from infringing on civil society’s free 
space and undermining its watchdog function in a democratic society. Interestingly, such developments appear 
to have brought CSAs across the EU closer (but not, as we have seen, without tensions or consequences). The 
developments identified in this study since 2016 have also sparked rising interest among international and 
regional human rights bodies. This mobilisation is reassuring as a function of democracy, but it equally shows the 
growing concern with the state of fundamental rights and rule of law in the EU.  
5.1.3 The policing of CSAs challenges EU founding values 
A closer look at the irregular entry, transit and residence of migrants and refugees in Belgium, Greece, France, 
Hungary and Italy has revealed a reported increase in the policing of humanitarian activities carried out by CSAs 
across the EU. These cases show wider policing dynamics at play. These dynamics of policing are most visible in 
relation to measures taken against those CSAs engaging in SAR in the Mediterranean Sea, and in new legislative 
and policy changes (as in Hungary) explicitly targeting CSAs assisting refugees and other migrants in accessing 
fundamental rights, such as shelter and food or advocating that their rights are upheld.  
Anti-smuggling laws have been extended in Hungary via a number of targeted defamation campaigns seeking 
to hamper the legitimate activities of humanitarian and human rights CSAs. The last attack on civil society in the 
‘Stop Soros’ package not only stirs suspicion related to the activities of civil society, but it also uses methods of 
judicial and fiscal harassment. We have seen that new changes in the Hungarian Criminal Code since our last 
report make it a crime related to migrant smuggling to ‘distribute informational materials’ and to ‘file an asylum 
application’ for asylum seekers and persons in an irregular situation. The new laws impose a disproportionate tax 
burden on CSAs assisting refugees and other migrants; the laws also raise suspicion of foreign funding and even 
the accessing of EU AMIF funds. Finally, the laws stir fear among the Hungarian population that giving individual 
donations to such civil society organisations can be seen as acts of financing migrant smuggling.  
Another major example of the growing policing of humanitarianism and civil society related to anti-smuggling is 
the vigorous campaigns to de-legitimise and criminalise SAR NGOS since the end of 2016 in Italy and also Greece. 
Spurious accusations of colluding with and abetting smugglers have been spread by important media outlets,573 
EU agencies like Frontex,574 and high-level politicians. These accusations have led to the opening of several 
exploratory inquiries by prosecutors in Italy.575 Such doubts raised against NGOs’ intentions with SAR activities 
furthermore opened the way for the Italian government to impose its binding code of conduct in August 2017.576 
This code has prevented CSAs from conducting SAR activities in the Mediterranean and encouraged the formal 
criminalisation of the remaining ones wanting to save lives at sea. It is indeed striking that at the time of writing 
(October 2018), only one ship, the Aquarius, remains to conduct proactive SAR operations, navigating the waters 
of legal uncertainty, political intimidation and harassment. This in-depth assessment has demonstrated that the 
policing of CSAs has quickly escalated from suspicion to actual prosecutions. We have seen that policing 
dynamics also have a cumulative effect of fostering mistrust, not only in how society perceives SAR NGOs, but 
also in civil society, public institutions and criminal justice tools more broadly. As it stands, the future rests 
uncertain.  
5.1.4 SAR NGOs are scapegoated for the lack of a holistic approach and solidarity among Member States 
The Aquarius controversy in July 2018 (discussed at length herein) became a symbol of the lack of European 
solidarity related to the dignified reception of migrants and refugees; it showed the limits of current migration 
and asylum policies, which simply cannot be replaced or remedied via criminal measures targeting migrant 
                                                                    
573 R. Duncan (2016), “EU border force flags concerns over charities interaction with migrant smugglers”, Financial Times, 15 
December. 
574 Frontex (2017), “Annual Risk Analysis”, 15 February, p. 32 
(http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2017.pdf). 
575 C. Heller and L. Pezzani (2017), “Blaming the Rescuers”, Forensic Oceanography, Forensic Architecture, Goldsmiths, London 
University (https://blamingtherescuers.org/report/). 
576 Ibid. 
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smuggling. Approaches aimed at putting a temporary patch on cracking European solidarity in the area of 
migration and asylum do not address the core issue, but rather produce new and long-term challenges.  
Although one of the priorities of the EU Agenda on Migration is to prevent more deaths at sea, the EU and its 
Member States left the Mediterranean without any rescue capacity with the termination of operation Mare 
Nostrum in 2014.577 Thus, NGOs stepped in to fill the gap in SAR in the Mediterranean in order to prevent more 
tragedy. In the beginning, public opinion was rather favourable to civil society organisations providing 
humanitarian assistance in light of the suffering of those fleeing war and conflict. However, the narrative, from 
praising humanitarian assistance, has shifted in subsequent years to a change of heart in public opinion.578 Many 
CSAs, acting as first responders to a crisis were portrayed as a ‘pull factor’; yet, this is not a definition related to 
the crime of migrant smuggling. CSAs, including individual volunteers, citizens and organised civil society 
organisations that provide assistance, are unidimensionally seen as a block to the deterrence strategy and the 
‘hostile environment’ pursued by the EU and many of its Member States. Often, this appears to be the main and 
only reason to accuse SAR NGOs of the crime of smuggling migrants; often such accusations lack any evidence.579 
The objective to stop irregular migration has led to policy measures that put a great emphasis on closing the 
Mediterranean route through combatting the smuggling of migrants and outsourcing border protection to North 
African countries. This has resulted in a very hostile environment for NGO activities. Some report facing threats of 
violence and militarism by the Libyan coast guard and others, like the Aquarius, have been left for days in 
European waters, denied the right to disembark survivors to safety on land from the sea.580  
5.1.5 Anti-smuggling policies and actions have counterproductive effects in the EU and third countries 
Whereas the Facilitators’ Package is intended to prosecute organised criminal groups, realities on the ground 
show that the targets of anti-smuggling operations have often been the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of visible 
humanitarian organisations, solidarity groups and various loose civic mobilisations that clearly act without 
criminal intent.  
This study confirms that quite paradoxically, removing humanitarian and human rights CSAs and preventing 
them from providing basic services and assistance to irregular migrants in the name of combatting human 
smuggling leads to increased opportunities for various criminal groups, in the EU and in third countries.581 Indeed, 
when criminal justice measures are used for migration management purposes (often disregarding 
socioeconomic and political contexts, as well as the levels of corruption and the relative maturity of the rule of 
law system), this can actually lead to more professional criminals entering the scene and a deeper consolidation 
of their networks.  
As it stands, this study has demonstrated that criminal law is not functioning well in this domain. A recent book 
co-authored by three of the authors of this study582 found that within the EU, just three joint investigations were 
reported to have borne fruit in terms of prosecuting criminal smuggling. Meanwhile, many others have failed 
because of various challenges including a lack of resources. On 27 August 2015, a lorry was found on an Austrian 
motorway containing the decomposing bodies of 71 individuals, including a baby, who had been smuggled 
through Hungary. Both Eurojust and Europol provided speedy operational support and the joint investigation 
                                                                    
577 The European Patrol Network Operations, Poseidon in the Aegean, Triton in the Central Mediterranean, and EUNAVFOR 
MED Operation Sophia do not have search and rescue as primary goal. See in L. Vosyliūtė (2018), “‘Saving Lives at Sea’ still a 
Priority for the EU?”, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 19 April (https://eu.boell.org/en/2018/04/19/saving-lives-sea-still-priority-eu). 
578 Are You Serious?, “AYS Interview with Jugend Rettet: ‘The accusations are just empty claims’”, 22 April 
(https://medium.com/are-you-syrious/ays-interview-with-jugend-rettet-the-accusations-are-just-empty-claims-
ba873e0f53f4). 
579 C. Heller and L. Pezzani (2017), op. cit. 
580 Forensic Architecture (2017), op. cit. 
581  S. Carrera and  E. Guild (eds) (2016), op. cit.; V. Mitsilegas, & Y.S. Holiday (2018), “The criminalisation of irregular migrants”. 
In E. Guild, & T. Basaran (eds) (2019), “Global Labour and the Migrant Premium the Cost of working abroad”, London: Routledge; 
Zhang, Sanchez and Achilli (2018), op. cit., pp. 6-15. 
582 S. Carrera et al. (forthcoming) Policing Humanitarianism: EU Policies Against Human Smuggling and their Impact on Civil 
Society?. 
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that followed led to multiple arrests and later, prosecutions.583 While this case can be seen as a ‘success’ in terms 
of the criminalising of nefarious and harmful migrant smuggling within the EU, such success is marred by the 
reality of those who died unnecessarily.  
Fieldwork by the authors, backed up by other research in the public domain, revealed that the smuggling network 
involved in this case was being tracked by several national authorities, none of which were able to act to interpret 
the distress call intercepted in time: 
All of those conversations were recorded but no one was there. Not the Austrians, not the Slovakians, 
not the Hungarians. No one was there to understand what they were talking about. In retrospect, it took 
place before the nose of the authorities but no one was there to listen to it … there’s poor cooperation. 
Why were we intercepting the same phone three times into three different systems anyway?584 
Anti-smuggling is now big business in the EU. This therefore raises the question: Where are the EU’s resources 
being diverted? To pulling down food distribution gazebos and searching humanitarian volunteers? As it stands, 
the police are fulfilling their operational mandates and numbers are ticked, but rarely is someone caught; money 
is wasted, good people suffer and often the real nefarious actors who profit from smuggling migrants in inhuman 
conditions rest unscathed.  
In this context, CSAs often fill in the gap left by poor statutory humanitarian provisions and hold governments 
accountable for their disregard of the human rights of refugees and other migrants; moreover, they serve an 
important function in opposing mainstream ideas and approaches in EU or national migration and anti-
smuggling discourse, on how policies and operations should be directed. Their work lays the ground for the 
important discussion of what is not ‘purely’ or ‘genuinely’ humanitarian action within EU policy circles as it relates 
to the facilitation of entry, transit and residence. At the time of writing, this is a question that is far from resolved 
and all across the EU CSAs continue to operate in acute legal uncertainty, facing stigma and misinformation.  
5.2 Recommendations 
5.2.1 What should be investigated and prosecuted?  
● EU law should be brought in line with UN standards. The criteria of ‘financial gain or other material 
benefit’ and ‘unjust enrichment’ should be requirements to establish a base crime in terms of 
facilitation of entry and transit across the EU. The definition of a base crime needs to clearly capture the 
criminal intent of a migrant smuggler. The definition should therefore be changed to insist on financial 
and other material benefit and on unjust enrichment requirements for the facilitation of entry and 
transit, and for stay and residence. This change, by default, would exclude activities conducted by civil 
society, family members, friends and bona fide service providers without the intention to profit or abuse 
migrants. In all cases, sanctions including fines and imprisonment, need to be proportional to the harm 
incurred by the crime and its circumstances. In addition, facilitation of transit and stay should be 
regarded as administrative rather than criminal offences. This is because the facilitation of stay targets 
basic human needs such as shelter, food, medical and psycho-social services.  
● In addition, the EU Handbook on Investigating and Prosecuting Migrant Smuggling should be 
elaborated. It could further define what kinds of crimes the EU needs to focus on (for example on the 
production of forged documents) and the limits set by criminal justice checks and balances. The 
handbook could contain tests on whether to start and pursue a prosecution by encouraging prosecutors 
to ask questions, such as what the impacts are on fundamental rights and criminality.  
● The work of EU agencies should be focused on a criminal justice-led approach to countering ‘migrant 
smuggling’ instead of a ‘preventative policing’ approach. Priority should be given to developing Eurojust 
and Europol Joint Investigation Teams when organised criminal groups are detected. Joint Investigation 
                                                                    
583 Europol (2016) “Hungary Concludes Investigation into the Death of 71 Migrants”, Europol, Press Release, 12 October. 
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Teams should be compatible with the criminal justice standards laid down in the European Investigation 
Order. 
5.2.2 What should not be criminalised?  
● The EU Facilitators’ Package should include an obligatory prohibition on the criminalisation of CSAs 
acting with humanitarian intent to assist migrants and refugees. Civil society actors providing 
humanitarian assistance and/or upholding human rights of refugees and other migrants should be 
exempted from criminalisation. The EU Facilitators’ Package therefore needs to be changed accordingly 
and ‘Lisbonised’.  The EU human trafficking directive has been ‘Lisbonised’. It sets a precedent for 
‘decriminalisation’ as where victims of human trafficking are explicitly exempted from criminalisation. 
This provision should apply not only to smuggled migrants, but also to acts of compassion and solidarity 
by civil society actors, family members and friends acting without profit or unjust enrichment motive.  
● ‘Humanitarian assistance’ should be defined broadly, in line with the EU Fundamental Rights Charter, 
and the existing definition of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and states obligations under 
the UN Declaration on human rights defenders. Such a definition should protect not-for-profit actions 
undertaken by formally registered civil society organisations as well as citizen movements, and 
individual volunteers and activists who are protecting and upholding human dignity and related 
fundamental rights refugees and other migrants. The EU and national level discussions should refrain 
from deliberation on what is ‘genuine humanitarian assistance’ as it can narrow the definition to ‘life-
saving’ activities, but disregard the responsibility to uphold human dignity, prevent suffering and other 
situations where inaction could lead to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. Instead, EU should 
focus on ‘genuine prosecutions’ of criminals profiting from migrant smuggling.  
● Finally, the EU, its Member States and local authorities should be encouraged to erect a firewall for 
vulnerable irregular migrants and asylum seekers who seek to access basic services, including shelter, 
sanitation and food. Such individuals would also benefit from protections when reporting crimes, 
including those related to migrant smuggling. The protection of such a ‘firewall’ should also extend to 
respecting CSAs’ mandates in order to bring about trust-based cooperation with law enforcement and 
other governmental authorities. For example, the European Parliament could request the European 
Commission to develop such guidelines for implementing firewalls between civil society and law 
enforcement agencies, which guarantee humanitarian assistance and access to justice for migrants. 
However, such ‘soft-law’ measures cannot substitute or compensate for the necessary changes to the EU 
Facilitators’ Package.  
5.2.3 How should it be monitored?  
● The European Parliament’s PETI Committee could set up a parliamentary inquiry to hear the testimonies 
of CSAs that have been criminalised and to investigate whether the cases were politicised.  
● The EU should establish a direct funding scheme for a civil society watchdog to monitor the human rights 
of migrants, refugees and their treatment by relevant national and EU agencies, in the context of border 
controls/surveillance and expulsions. 
● Civil society, through the newly proposed EU values fund, could be supported to collect evidence 
showing non-compliance with the EU’s legal framework and submit it to the European Commission, so 
as to enable it to start infringement procedures against a Member State or EU institution/agency.  
● In countries where EU funding is instrumentalised to silence and hamper the watchdog activities of CSAs, 
the European Commission should no longer channel relevant migration and border-related funds via 
the Member State, such as the AMIF, but directly disburse it to civil society organisations from the 
Commission’s special call targeting that country.  
● Civil society could also be supported by establishing and expanding an EU strategic litigation fund. This 
could be used to protect CSAs, migrants and refugees, their family members and friends as well as bona 
fide service providers from unjust criminalisation.  
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● Besides enabling CSAs to defend their space, the study also proposes to set up an independent 
observatory to monitor the policing of CSAs across the EU. This could be composed of representatives 
from academia and civil society. Such an independent body could conduct media monitoring and 
contain a possibility for civil society to submit individual and collective complaints and testimonies about 
interference with their mandate by the national or EU agencies. The observatory could communicate the 
emerging signs of systemic and institutional cases to the European Commission, DG HOME and DG JUST, 
the European Parliament LIBE & PETI Committees and EU Fundamental Rights Agency. The observatory 
could also collect evidence of risk or threat of serious and/or systemic breach of the EU’s founding values 
and submit it before the rule of law mechanism that was earlier proposed by the European Parliament.  
5.2.4 How should the status quo be assessed and sanctioned?  
• The European Commission should invoke infringements against the Member States that are abusing 
criminalisation provisions to prosecute humanitarian actors.  
• The European Ombudsperson should assess the fundamental rights impacts on migrants and EU citizens 
of the EU’s anti-smuggling operations in the EU and third countries, and in particular activities led by the 
EU justice and home affairs agencies, namely Frontex and Europol, as well as the EU’s External Action 
Service, Operation Sophia. 
• The European Court of Auditors should assess the EU support and funding to EU Member States as well 
as to third countries, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, taking into account the impacts on the 
fundamental rights of migrants and EU citizens, societal changes in the countries of origin, transit and 
residence, and changes in the ‘migrant smuggling business model’.  
• The European Parliament Budgets and Budgetary Control Committees could also undergo critical 
assessment prior to approving the budgets for the EU justice and home affairs agencies’ operations and 
missions that are supporting Member States or third countries in addressing migrant smuggling.  
• EUNAVFOR MED Sophia and other EU-led operations should be the subject of a report by the European 
Court of Auditors and European Ombudsperson so as to evaluate for the European Parliament’s 
committees their added value, efficiency and effectiveness in addressing ‘migrant smuggling’, as well as 
to assess if they are in line with the EU’s fundamental rights. 
• Similarly, the use of the AMIF and ISF should be subject to such reports. Their disbursements for Member 
States should be conditional on the absence of political prosecutions against civil society.  
5.2.5 What should be the alternatives to prevent migrant smuggling?  
● EU justice and home affairs agencies are not adequately addressing the underlying reasons why 
migrants choose to use smuggler’s services. More safe and legal alternatives to come to the EU have 
been proposed by the European Parliament in its Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the 
Mediterranean. It has also highlighted the need for a holistic EU approach to migration, which was 
proposed by the European Parliament.585  
● This study reiterates the importance of humanitarian visas to expand legal migration channels, and the 
need for the EU to better monitor and end discriminatory visa rejections for Blue Card applicants as well 
as for seasonal workers, students and researchers. 
● There is a need to increase possibilities for third-country workers (regardless of their first admission 
category), refugees and persons with humanitarian protection status to reunify with family members.586 
The Dublin III mechanism should also be rendered more operational so that unaccompanied minors 
                                                                    
585 European Parliament (2016), Resolution on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to 
migration (2015/2095(INI), P8_TA(2016)0102, Strasbourg, 12.4.2016. 
586 Conti (2018), op. cit.  
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seeking asylum in the EU are able to transfer to live with relatives in other Member States via safe and 
legal routes.  
● The European Parliament has suggested an EU search and rescue mission. The CEPS Taskforce Report 
on a European Border and Coast Guard earlier reflected that the national coast guards are well trained 
and equipped to conduct such a mission.587 The main question to be resolved is political: How to share 
the responsibility among all the EU Member States over the rescued persons and who should do it?588  
  
                                                                    
587 Carrera et al. (2017), op. cit. 
588 Cortinovis (2018), op. cit.  
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ANNEX 1. MEDIA MONITORING COMPILATION 
 
This media monitoring compilation covers a two-year period, from September 2016 until September 2018. It was 
conducted by PICUM and CEPS during the project entitled “Anti-Smuggling Policies and their Intersection with 
Humanitarian Assistance and Social Trust”, funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council, and 
resulted in an academic research paper and a monograph. 
The compilation includes cases of actual and indirect criminalisation of humanitarian assistance in 10 Member 
States. The methodology consisted of monitoring all European media, including well-known newspapers and the 
social media of relevant organisations. Annex 1 organises the cases country-by-country. A section at the end is 
dedicated to the phenomenon at the European Union level. The cases and their updates are categorised 
according the modalities of policing: 1. Suspicion; 2. Harassment/ Intimidation; 3. Disciplining and 4. Formal 
criminalisation/prosecutions. The articles are displayed in a chronological order – from the oldest to the most 
recent. Numbering refers to articles found in media and often cover the same or similar cases, their follow-up and 
updates. In total there are 92 entries/ articles. 
The compilation provides evidence of the scale of criminalisation of humanitarian assistance: it is not confined to 
some countries but is rather a trend across the EU. Media monitoring illustrates the escalation and the systemic 
nature of the phenomenon of policing civil society actors. Moreover, it shows that almost anyone coming into 
contact with irregular migrants and asylum seekers is vulnerable to criminalisation, including civil society actors, 
such as NGOs, volunteers, lawyers, journalists, doctors, social workers, firemen, etc. This media monitoring 
compilation provides the example of how the EU-level observatory on “non-criminalisation of humanitarian 
assistance” could be proactive and intervene prior to escalation to criminal prosecution.  
 
 
BELGIUM 
 
 
Modality 1: Suspicion  
 
### No.1 ###  
 
Le mea culpa de Theo Francken à propos de Médecins sans Frontières: “Je retire ce que j'ai dit” 
(Theo Francken’s mea culpa about Doctors Without Borders: “I retract what I said”) 
 
Staff writer 
RTL Infor 
24 March 2017 
 
After exchanging a few tweets with Doctors Without Borders, Francken (Secretary of State for Asylum and 
Migration) urged the organisation to leave the Mediterranean Sea, accusing it of contributing to human 
trafficking and causing “indirectly more deaths”. His declarations were condemned by Belgian Prime Minister 
Charles Michel, who called on his minister to use more “nuance” in his communication. Without completely 
changing his words, Francken withdrew his comment qualifying Doctors Without Borders as a human trafficking 
organisation. “Rescue operations create an aspiration effect that leads to more drowning”, he said. “It's a huge 
paradox naturally, a huge dilemma. You have to save people, but by saving people, you indirectly cause more 
people to take the road to departure.” 
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https://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/politique/theo-francken-retire-ses-propos-sur-medecins-sans-frontieres-
902347.aspx  
This was also reported by Reuters UK, LeVif, RTBF, RTBF, LeSoir. 
 
 
### No.2 ### 
 
No. 2: Theo Francken: Brussels ‘pampering’ NGOs and asylum seekers 
 
Maxime Schlee 
Politico 
8 October 2018 
 
Francken insisted people who come to the park are “purely economic migrants”, not refugees, and accused rights 
groups of creating a “hub” for migrants trying to reach the United Kingdom, saying most people do not want to 
seek asylum in Belgium. 
 
https://www.politico.eu/article/theo-francken-brussels-park-maximilien-pampering-ngos-and-asylum-seekers/ 
 
 
Modality 2: Intimidation and Harassment 
 
### No. 3 ### 
 
Parc Maximilien: 31 personnes interpellées, des bénévoles affirment que les sacs de couchage ont été jetés 
(Maximilian Park: 31 people arrested, volunteers say sleeping bags were thrown away) 
 
BX1 Medias de Bruxelles  
21 August 2017 
 
The police conducted a raid Monday morning in Maximilian Park, where dozens of refugees have settled while 
awaiting a solution to their situation. Thirty-one people were arrested, and according to local volunteers, 
sleeping bags that had been donated last weekend to the refugees were confiscated. The police deny the 
allegation. 
 
https://bx1.be/news/parc-maximilien-31-personnes-interpellees-des-benevoles-affirment-que-les-sacs-de-couchage-
ont-ete-jetes/ 
 
 
Modality 3: Disciplining 
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### No.4 ### 
 
Stad Brussel: ‘Deel maaltijden in Maximiliaanpark uit aan het einde van de dag’ 
(City of Brussels: “Hand out meals in Maximiliaanpark at the end of the day”) 
 
Belga Bruzz 
10 September 2018 
 
The City of Brussels asks the volunteers in the Maximilian Park to distribute meals for migrants only at the end of 
the day for reasons of hygiene. 
 
https://www.bruzz.be/samenleving/stad-brussel-deel-maaltijden-maximiliaanpark-uit-aan-het-einde-van-de-dag-
2018-09-10 
 
Modality 4: Formal Prosecution 
 
### No. 5 ### 
 
“Journalisten die transitmigranten herbergden beticht van mensensmokkel” 
(“Journalists who accommodated transit migrants accused of human smuggling”) 
 
Staff Writer 
Belga Bruzz 
4 June 2018 
 
The article concerns a case of human smuggling involving 95 migrants and 12 persons charged with smuggling. 
Two of the charged are journalists: Myriam Berghe of Femmes d'Aujourd'hui, and Anouk Van Gestel, editor-in-chief 
of the women's magazine Marie Claire. The journalists have not been arrested, but in the event of a conviction for 
human smuggling offenses they risk up to ten years in prison. 
 
https://www.bruzz.be/samenleving/journalisten-die-transitmigranten-herbergden-beticht-van-mensensmokkel-
2018-06-04 
 
### No. 6 ### 
 
“Ne pénalisez pas notre humanité !”: la lettre ouverte des deux journalistes inculpées de trafic d'êtres 
humains à Charles Michel 
(“Don’t penalise our humanity!”: Open letter of two journalists charged with human trafficking to Charles Michel) 
 
Le Vif/l'Express 
4 September 2018 
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Two Belgian journalists, Anouk Van Gestel and Myriam Berghe, are charged with criminal association and 
trafficking of human beings. They risk going to prison for helping migrants in transit. Their trial starts on 6 
September in Brussels. 
 
https://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/ne-penalisez-pas-notre-humanite-la-lettre-ouverte-des-deux-journalistes-
inculpees-de-trafic-d-etres-humains-a-charles-michel/article-normal-886471.html 
 
### No. 7 ### 
 
‘Ik hielp in het Maximiliaanpark en ging twee maanden de cel in'  
(“I helped in Maximilian Park and went to jail for two months”) 
 
Kevin Van den Panhuyzen 
BRUZZ 
5 September 2018 
 
The article concerns the impending Brussels trial of 12 defendants, including two journalists, accused of human 
trafficking. One of the suspects is Zakia, a 30-year-old Maximilian Park volunteer, who spent two months in prison, 
away from her two-year-old son. Throughout the summer, she worked in Maximilian Park, where as a volunteer 
she tried to help migrants in transit. She helped with food distribution, finding places to sleep and translating 
from Arabic. 
 
She concluded, “It’s about intimidating emergency workers.” 
 
https://www.bruzz.be/samenleving/ik-hielp-het-maximiliaanpark-en-ging-twee-maanden-de-cel-2018-09-05 
 
 
### No. 8 ### 
 
 ‘Crimes of solidarity’ in Europe multiply as 11 stand trial in Belgium for helping migrants 
 
Melissa Vida 
Global Voices 
17 September 2018 
 
Eleven people who had been arrested and charged with human trafficking in October 2017 appeared in court in 
Brussels on 6 September, the first hearing of a trial that activists say is yet another case of ‘criminalisation of 
solidarity’ in Europe. The defendants are two Belgian journalists, one Belgian-Moroccan social worker, a Tunisian 
man who is a legal Belgian resident and seven people who are undocumented migrants. Eight of the defendants 
have been in jail since the arrest. 
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https://globalvoices.org/2018/09/17/crimes-of-solidarity-in-europe-multiply-as-11-stand-trial-in-belgium-for-
helping-migrants/ 
 
### No. 9 ### 
 
Procès des hébergeurs: la journaliste Myriam Berghe confirme avoir hébergé des migrants chassés de 
Calais 
(Host trial: the journalist Myriam Berghe confirms having hosted migrants expelled from Calais) 
 
Le Soir 
7 November 2018 
 
Myriam Berghe, a journalist, confirmed Wednesday that she had hosted migrants expelled from Calais in 2017. 
“They were psychologically weak, they didn’t know where to go”, she explained to the Criminal Court of Brussels. 
“In my home, I gave them time to recover”. 
 
https://www.lesoir.be/188712/article/2018-11-07/proces-des-hebergeurs-la-journaliste-myriam-berghe-confirme-
avoir-heberge-des 
 
### No. 10 ### 
 
Un procès dans le procès «des hébergeurs»: Myria accusé de «racisme» 
(A trial within the “host trial”: Myria accused of “racism”) 
 
Louis Colart 
Le Soir 
8 November 2018 
 
The Federal Migration Centre filed a civil claim for trafficking in human beings against nine of the 12 defendants 
tried before the Brussels court. Selma Benkhelifa, the lawyer for Walid C., a Tunisian migrant, believes that Myria 
(of the Belgian Federal Migration Centre) was “racist” toward her client. 
 
https://plus.lesoir.be/188882/article/2018-11-08/un-proces-dans-le-proces-des-hebergeurs-myria-accuse-de-
racisme?fbclid=IwAR1U6WJFIO_KkUojJqlyil5taiIK8G4tkfpg3JCHl2dZHaTzveC3q6ag-4k 
 
### No. 11 ### 
 
Le procès des hébergeurs, un «procès politique» pour la journaliste Anouk Van Gestel 
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(The host trial: a “political trial” according to journalist Anouk Van Gestel) 
 
Louis Colart 
Le Soir 
9 November 2018 
 
The prosecutor's office demanded her acquittal in the so-called ‘procès des hébergeurs’ (‘the host trial’). But 
journalist Anouk Van Gestel rues a gruelling, unfair legal battle that provided no clear answers to those who 
welcome migrants to their homes. 
https://plus.lesoir.be/189188/article/2018-11-09/le-proces-des-hebergeurs-un-proces-politique-pour-la-journaliste-
anouk-van 
 
### No. 12 ### 
 
"Moi, Dounia, hébergeuse de migrants, arrêtée, menottée, emprisonnée…" 
(“Me, Dounia, host of migrants, arrested, handcuffed, imprisoned…”) 
 
Gauthier De Bock 
Moustique 
9 November 2018 
 
 
Solidarity is not a crime. This moral principle was reaffirmed this week by the justice system, yet some individuals 
still suffered the wrath of the state apparatus. The prosecutor did not criminalise Anouk Van Gestel, Myriam 
Berghe and other hosts, though they received light penalties. 
 
https://www.moustique.be/22244/moi-dounia-hebergeuse-de-migrants-arretee-menottee-emprisonnee 
 
### No. 13 ### 
 
Procès dit “des hébergeurs de migrants”: la défense de présumés trafiquants d’êtres humains salue un 
parquet “plus humain” 
(“Migrant host trial”: the defense for alleged human traffickers welcomes a “more humane” prosecutor) 
 
Medias de Bruxelles 
9 November 2018 
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The trial of 12 people prosecuted for human trafficking came to a close. The verdict will be delivered on 12 
December. Both hosts should be acquitted, while alleged smugglers face more than three years in prison. 
 
https://bx1.be/bruxelles-ville/proces-dit-hebergeurs-de-migrants-defense-de-presumes-trafiquants-detres-humains-
salue-parquet-plus-humain/?fbclid=IwAR26C4v82l3YQxCdLq16l3pWIRVe0rorEJv4S0WAh4lhjDJfPCzsHoJ-J4s 
 
 
BULGARIA 
 
Modality 2: Intimidation and Harassment 
 
### No. 14 ### 
 
Priest Is Withdrawn from Bulgaria after Threats for Hosting Migrants 
 
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee  
Liberties 
20 March 2017 
 
A Syrian refugee family was accommodated at the Catholic church in Belene (Bulgaria) by an Italian priest, Father 
Paolo Cortese. Following protests by locals, the Syrian family decided to leave the town, and the priest was 
recalled from Bulgaria after receiving death threats.   
 
https://www.liberties.eu/en/short-news/18123/18123  
This was also reported by Dnevnik, The Sofia Globe, The Sofia Globe, BalkanInsight, Novinite, The Sofia Globe.       
 
 
CROATIA 
 
Modality 4: Formal Prosecution 
 
### No. 15 ### 
 
Criminalising solidarity: Are You Syrious? Statement on politically motivated, unjust guilty verdict for our 
volunteer 
 
Statement originally published by Are You Syrious? 
25 September 2018 
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This past March, Are You Serious? volunteer Dragan Umicevic approached a police control near the Croatian 
border to alert police to a family of asylum seekers huddled in a field near Strošinci, on Croatian soil. A few days 
later, he was shocked to find himself facing charges of aiding and abetting the asylum seekers’ “illegal crossing” 
of the Croatian border despite the fact that he had never laid eyes on the family nor ever communicated with 
them directly. 
 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/croatia-ays-case.htm 
 
DENMARK 
 
Modality 4: Formal Prosecution 
 
### No. 16 ### 
 
When Denmark criminalised kindness (essay) 
 
Lisbeth Zornig Andersen 
Granta 
December 2016  
 
This is an essay in which the author, the Chair of Denmark’s Children’s Council, talks about her experience in 
helping asylum seekers (giving them a ride). The footage of the migrants entering the car made the news. After 
being called a traitor, Muslim-lover and receiving hate mails, she was investigated by the police, charged with 
people smuggling and convicted.  
 
https://granta.com/denmark-criminalised-kindness/ 
This was also reported by The Guardian, The Guardian, BuzzFeed. 
 
 
FRANCE 
 
Modality 2: Intimidation and Harassment 
 
### No. 17 ### 
 
France: criminalisation of solidarity in Hayange: interview with local Secours Populaire 
 
Civic Space Watch  
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7 March 2018 
 
While France has a lively, free civil society, tougher policies on and narratives about migration have contributed 
to shrinking the space for associative movements to provide help not only to migrants but also to other 
vulnerable people. The article is based on an interview with Secours Populaire Hayange President Anne Duflot-
Allievi, who describes how the working environment has evolved. 
 
http://civicspacewatch.eu/france-criminalisation-of-solidarity-in-hayange-interview-to-the-local-secours-populaire/ 
(MEGA Campaign: MEGA reports how Secours Populaire shelter in Hayange was left without electricity and 
discredited by local authorities due to Secours Populaire’s disagreement with a measure that would have 
discriminated against asylum-seekers.) 
 
### No. 18 ### 
 
French police accused of harassing aid workers at Calais 
 
Angelique Chrisafis  
The Guardian 
8 August 2018  
 
Volunteers distributing food and water to homeless refugees and migrants in Calais are systematically being 
harassed and intimidated by French police, according to a report submitted to France’s human rights 
ombudsman. 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/08/french-police-accused-of-harassing-aid-workers-at-calais 
 
 
Modality 3: Disciplining 
 
### No. 19 ### 
 
Calais mayor bans distribution of food to migrants  
 
Amelia Gentleman 
Flipboard 
2 March 2017 
 
The article is about the mayor of Calais, Natacha Bouchart, who, citing security reasons, has banned the 
distribution of food to migrants in an attempt to prevent a new refugee camp from forming, just three months 
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after the Jungle was demolished. Police are making it harder for activists to provide meals to migrants, including 
children and teenagers.  
 
https://flipboard.com/@flipboard/flip.it%2FPa0tg9-calais-mayor-bans-distribution-of-food-/f-
4101851ae8%2Ftheguardian.com  
This was also reported by TheGardian, Independent, RefliefWeb, France24, CNN, TheTelegraph, Time, Business 
Standard, Aljazeera, Express, Express, International Business Times, TheJournal.ie, AhmedabadMirror, DW, RFI, 
ABNA24, Reuters, The Migrant Observer, Cyprus Mail, TheStar, France24, LeParisien, Libération, L’Express, 
HuffingtonPost, FranceSoir, l’OBS.          
 
 
Modality 4: Formal Prosecution 
 
### No. 20 ### 
 
 
Monique, 62 ans : "Un matin, on frappe à la porte, c'est la police aux frontières" 
(Monique, 62 years old: “One morning, someone knocks on my door, it’s the border police” (from 2009)) 
 
Elise Vincent 
Le Monde 
28 September 2012 
 
In 2009 (before the exceptions on aid to migrants were added to French law), Ms. Monique Pouille, a volunteer 
close to Calais, was arrested and interrogated for bringing food to migrants and charging their phones. The case 
was closed and no further action was taken.  
 
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2012/09/28/un-matin-on-frappe-a-la-porte-c-est-la-police-aux-
frontieres_1767178_3224.html   
### No. 21 ### 
 
Perché chi aiuta i migranti rischia di essere processato  
(Because helpers of migrants are likely to be prosecuted) 
 
Staff writer 
Internazionale 
10 January 2017 
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This article is about Cédric Herrou, a 37-year-old French farmer in the Rolla Valley (close to the Italian border), who 
is on trial in France for helping 200 migrants cross the border and providing food to 57 of them. It draws a 
comparison with Pierre-Alain Mannoni, a French teacher who was also tried on and acquitted of similar charges. 
It also discusses the criminalisation of solidarity in Europe and the 2002 Facilitation Directive (2002/90/EC).     
 
https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/2017/01/10/migranti-solidarieta-cedric-herrou  
This was also reported by The New York Times, The News York Times, EuroNews, RFI, TheGardian, RFI, BBC, CNN, 
TheTelegraph, TheGuardian, Aljazeera, VOX, HuffingtonPost, FranceInfo. 
 
### No. 22 ### 
 
Pour en finir avec le délit de solidarité  
(“Ending the crime of solidarity”) 
 
Communiqué de presse – Press release 
Délinquants solidaires 
12 January 2017 
 
This is a press release concerning the collective action taken by 100 signatory organisations (NGOs, charities, and 
labour unions). They rue the increase in recent months in France of cases in which solidarity is considered a crime, 
and have signed a statement calling for an end to the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance. 
 
http://snpespjj-fsu.org/IMG/pdf/delinquants_solidaires_manifeste.pdf  
This was also reported by Libération, GISTI, l’Humanité, LesEchos, SeneWeb. 
 
 
### No. 23 ### 
 
France prosecuting citizens for ‘crimes of solidarity’ 
 
Kyle G. Brown 
Aljazeera 
25 January 2017 
 
This article is about several cases of activists being brought to court for providing help to migrants (Houssam El 
Assimi, Pierre Mannoni, Cédric Herrou), under Article L.622-1 of France’s immigration law, which states that 
anyone who “facilitates or attempts to facilitate the illegal entry, movement or residence of a foreigner in France 
shall be punished by imprisonment for five years and a fine of €30,000 [over $32,000]”. It also discusses the 
harassment of individuals and the criminalisation of humanitarian activities in order to intimidate, discourage, 
and prevent citizens from expressing solidarity with migrants, and describes the overall situation in France 
regarding the humanitarian crisis and its divisiveness in public opinion.   
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http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/01/france-prosecuting-citizens-crimes-solidarity-
170122064151841.html  
This was also reported by BoingBoing, AladdinsMiracleLamp, Reddit, Google News, RFI, Arielis, EqualTimes, 
LeMonde, Reforme, Liberation, LeParisien, Huffingtonpost, LeMonde, Humanité, Humanité, Europe1, TheStar, 
Libération, l’OBS, LeParisien.  
  
 
### No. 24 ### 
 
Valley Rebels  
(Six-part video) 
 
Staff writer 
The Guardian 
28 April 2017 
 
This six-part video explores the case of Cédric Herrou, a French farmer on trial for supporting and housing African 
asylum seekers. He faced up to five years in prison and a €30,000 fine. The video also shows how the French public 
opinion is divided between those that see him as a hero while others, including the government, as a criminal.  
     
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/apr/28/the-valley-rebels-the-french-farmer-helping-
refugees-cross-europe-video  
 
### No. 25 ### 
 
Affaire Cédric Herrou : l'aide aux migrants est-elle légale en France ?  
(Cédric Herrou case: Is aid to migrants legal in France?) 
 
Stéphane Pair 
France Info 
8 August 2017 
 
The Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence sentenced Cédric Hérrou on Tuesday 8 August to four conditional 
months in prison for helping migrants. The French farmer is one of the most prominent figures of the Roya 
Citoyenne Association, which provides help to migrants at the French-Italy border. He was already sentenced to 
a €3,000 fine by the Court of First Instance. The French law from December 2012 differentiates smuggling for 
payment and selfless help to migrants. The latter is thus not a crime in France, but the article notes that in the 
eyes of public authorities, it seems to depend on the migration context, and they seem to be trying to stop similar 
solidarity actions from spreading. 
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http://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/europe/migrants/affaire-cedric-herrou-l-aide-aux-migrants-est-elle-legale-en-
france_2318307.html  
This was also reported by France24, New York Times, Aljazeera, PRI, Newsweek, BBC, TheLocal, Kobini, LeMonde. 
  
### No. 26 ### 
 
Aide aux migrants: le « délit de solidarité » dénoncé après la condamnation de Cédric Herrou  
(Aid to migrants: ‘crime of solidarity’ denounced after Cedric Herrou’s conviction) 
 
Florian Reynaud 
Le Monde 
8 August 2017 
 
This article focuses on the criminalisation of solidarity following the sentencing of Cédric Herrou, and explains 
Article L.622-1 of France’s immigration law and its December 2012 modification, Article L.622-4 of 2012, which 
specifies that helping migrants stay cannot lead to prosecution if there is no direct or indirect compensation and 
the help ensured decent living conditions or preserved the dignity and physical integrity of migrants (through 
legal aid, food, housing or health care services). It remains illegal to aid in the entry and circulation of irregular 
migrants. However, the Court considers Cedric Herrou received compensation because the aid he provided 
supported his activism. This sends a clear message to other migrant rights activists and also blurs the exceptions 
added to the law in 2012. 
 
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2017/08/08/aide-aux-migrants-le-delit-de-solidarite-denonce-apres-la-
condamnation-de-cedric-herrou_5170166_3224.html#xtor=AL-32280270  
This was also reported by France24, New York Times, Aljazeera, PRI, Newsweek, BBC, TheLocal, Kobini. 
 
### No. 27 ### 
 
Two journalists arrested in France while doing story on migrants 
 
Staff member 
Soynadie  
14 November 2017 
 
This article focuses on the arrest of two reporters, Caroline Christinaz and Raphael Kraft, by the Briançon police as 
they were travelling in vehicles driven by locals. They have decided to give a ride to four migrant minors in the 
border with Italy due to the weather’s harsh condition. Ms. Christinaz, who had been in the car with the migrants, 
learned that she was being investigated on suspicion of assisting the illegal entry, circulation in French territory, 
a charge punishable by a heavy fine and/or up to five years in prison. Meanwhile Mr. Kraft was only heard as a 
witness. 
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http://www.soynadie.org/2017/11/14/two-journalists-arrested-in-france-while-doing-story-on-
migrants/?lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_feed%3Bp%2FiIoRKIRruXE%2BfNH4wjLQ%3D%3D  
This was also reported by L’Express, Politis, Le Temps, ValeursActuelles, Europe 1, Courrier International, RT, Il 
Fatto Quotidiano, Ticinonews. 
 
### No. 28 ### 
 
 
France: Aid Worker Convicted for Tweet 
 
Human Rights Watch 
27 September 2018 
 
A humanitarian worker was convicted for defamation on 25 September on account of an ironic tweet, 
representing the first case of this kind of conviction in France. Human Rights Watch said it shows a dangerous 
escalation in official harassment of groups providing crucial aid to migrants. 
 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/27/france-aid-worker-convicted-
tweet?utm_source=ECRE+Newsletters&utm_campaign=2e003a7895-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_09_27_11_56&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3ec9497afd-2e003a7895-422323345 
 
### No. 29 ### 
 
Crimes of solidarity: freedom for the “7 of Briançon” 
 
La Cimade 
24 October 2018 
 
They face potential incarceration for helping migrants in distress in the French Alps. Bastien, Benoit, Eléonora, 
Juan, Lisa, Mathieu and Théo will face justice on 8 November in the city of Gap. They are accused of “helping 
undocumented foreign nationals to enter the national territory, in organised gangs”. The sentence is up to 10 
years in prison and a €750,000 fine. Even though the notion “organised gang” refers to those who commit 
organised crime, the notion is now being used against volunteers from the NGOs Tous migrants and La Cimade, 
and, more generally, as a tool to intimidate citizens who show solidarity with migrants trying to cross the French 
Alps. 
 
(English) :http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/oct/7-of-briancon.htm 
(French) : https://www.lacimade.org/agir/nos-petitions/liberte-et-relaxe-pour-les-7-de-briancon/ 
 
### No. 30 ### 
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Hautes-Alpes : procès des « 7 de Briançon », 160 CRS attendus ce jeudi 
 
C. Michard 
La Radio Plus 
7 November 2018 
 
A high-tension trial opens this Thursday at the Tribunal Correctionnel de Gap: the trial of the so-called ‘3 de 
Briançon’, who have since become seven women and men suspected of having allowed migrants to enter in late 
April, near Briançon. 
 
http://alpesdusud.laradioplus.com/news/hautes-alpes/2217/hautes-alpes-proces-des-7-de-briancon-160-crs-
attendus-ce-jeudi?fbclid=IwAR0tVzTx37A-DcBHVkTwJJkdveg2HPNJnvmoYtq6lTisLKd7gUqoR2e5d9Q 
 
   
GREECE 
Modality 1: Suspicion  
 
### No. 31 ### 
 
Refugees in Lesbos: are there too many NGOs on the island?  
  
Helen Nianias 
The Guardian  
5 January 2016 
 
Lesvos mayor Spyros Galinos is thankful for the outpouring of generosity, but points out that “many NGOs and 
individuals (are) coming to Lesbos without official registration and showing no cooperation with our 
municipality. This causes everyone upset and these NGOs arouse doubt and mistrust among the residents of 
Lesbos. I would say their presence is disruptive rather than useful.” 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/jan/05/refugees-in-lesbos-are-
there-too-many-ngos-on-the-island   
 
Modality 3: Disciplining 
 
### No. 32 ### 
 
Pleiades’ press release on militarisation of humanitarian response to refugees 
 
Hellenic Action for Human Rights 
21 February 2016 
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The Hellenic Action for Human Rights, or Pleiades, called attention to a last-minute addition to a law passed by 
the Greek Parliament on 21 February 2016, entitled “Measures on precipitating the Government’s work and other 
provisions” (Law 4368/16 (21 A'/21.02.2016)), by which the Greek army took over “exclusively everything related 
to the operation of reception centres and hotspots, in regards to the transportation, accommodation, catering 
and health care for refugees and immigrants”, “in declination of any other legal provision”. The army will also 
inspect and “coordinate” NGOs providing volunteer services to refugees. 
 
http://hellenicaction.blogspot.com/2016/02/pleiades-press-release-on.html 
 
Modality 4: Formal Prosecution 
 
### No. 33 ### 
 
NGOs decry charges against volunteers in Greece  
 
Anealla Safdar 
Aljazeera 
16 January 2016 
 
Five volunteer lifeguards were arrested by the Hellenic Coast Guard and charged with human smuggling, as part 
of a crackdown on civil society in Greek islands, activists say. Three Spanish members of PROEM-AID and one 
Danish member of Team Humanity were released on €5,000 bail, but a second Danish Team Humanity member, 
Salam Aldeen, was released on €10,000 bail and ordered to remain in the country and report to a police station 
every week.  
  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/ngos-decry-arrests-volunteer-lifeguards-greece-160116193522648.html  
This was also reported by HuffingtonPost, TheLocal, CPH Post, EuroWeeklyNews, NPR, Ekhathimerini. 
  
### No. 34 ### 
 
Dos españoles detenidos en Grecia por tratar de trasladar a Euskadi a ocho refugiados en una caravana  
(Two Spaniards arrested in Greece for trying to transport eight refugees to Euskadi in a caravan) 
 
Staff writer 
El Mundo 
28 December 2016 
 
Two Spaniards are accused of smuggling human beings, a crime punishable by very long prison sentences in 
Greece. Mikel Zuloaga and Begoña Huarte were arrested in north-western Greece when they tried to cross into 
Italy by ferry with eight refugees. They have 12 days to pay a €2,000 fine. They later stood by their action, saying 
they would do it again (see http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2017/01/07/paisvasco/1483805777_194313.html). 
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http://www.elmundo.es/sociedad/2016/12/28/5863a808e5fdea72078b4618.html  
This was also reported by EITB, Sud Ouest, El Pais, El Pais, Express, USA Today, Ekathimerini, El Mundo, El Diario. 
### No. 35 ### 
 
Volunteers Who Rescued Migrants Are Cleared of Criminal Charges in Greece 
 
The New York Times 
7 May 2018 
 
Three Spanish firefighters of PROEM-AID and two Danish members of Team Humanity, who helped migrants 
arriving in Lesbos during the height of the refugee crisis, were cleared of human smuggling charges by a Greek 
court on 7 May. Manuel Blanco, Enrique Rodriguez, Julio Latorre, Mohammed Abbassi and Salam Aldeen, who 
had been arrested in January 2016 after successfully rescuing 51 migrants, were released on bail. The case drew 
international attention. NGOs and migrant organisations considered it an attempt to criminalise humanitarian 
aid. “This is a strong signal to other NGOs and just people working for humanity,” said one of the defendants to 
the New York Times, adding that “saving lives and rescuing people is not a crime”. 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/07/world/europe/greece-migrants-volunteers.html 
This was also reported by Deutsche Welle. 
  
### No. 36 ### 
 
Διδυμότειχο: Τρεις συλλήψεις για διακίνηση λαθρομεταναστών  
(Didimoticho: three arrested on smuggling charges including a female minor) 
 
Thrakinea 
26 July 2018 
 
A 52-year-old man and two women aged 15 and 27 were arrested in Didimoticho, and police are pursuing their 
20-year-old accomplice to answer to the charge of procuring bus tickets for irregular migrants and transporting 
them to the bus terminal. 
 
http://www.thrakinea.gr/archives/129727 
 
### No. 37 ### 
 
 ‘Goodwill ambassadors’ held in Greece for illegally aiding migrants 
 
EURACTIV 
29 August 2018 
 
Police in Greece said on 28 August that they had arrested three members of a Greek NGO on suspicion of helping 
migrants to enter the country illegally. The members of Emergency Response Centre International (ERCI) were 
accused of being part of an “organised criminal network that systematically facilitated the illegal entry of 
foreigners”, according to a police statement. Overall, six Greeks and 24 foreign nationals were implicated in the 
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case, they added. Among those arrested was Sara Mardini, a 23-year-old Syrian refugee, who in 2015 together 
with her sister employed their swimming skills to pull the waterlogged boat that brought them over from Turkey 
with another 18 people on-board. 
 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/goodwill-ambassadors-held-in-greece-for-illegally-
aiding-migrants/ 
This was also reported by El País, ERCI Press release (the NGO whose volunteers are being prosecuted), Courrier 
International, Independent (UK), The Guardian, EUObserver, InfoMigrants, Aljazeera, TheJournal, Reuters, The 
New York Times, The Irish Times, The Telegraph, ECRE OPED, WeMove.EU, FreeHumanitarians. 
 
### No. 38 ### 
 
Three Greek journalists covering migrant crisis arrested for defamation 
 
Reporters Without Borders 
26 September 2018 
 
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) criticised the overnight detention of three Greek newspaper journalists on 
suspicion of defaming the defence minister. It states that the measure was “disproportionate” and calls for the 
repeal of Greece’s defamation law, under which journalists can be sentenced to imprisonment. The complaint 
was brought over a 21 September story claiming that contracts awarded to the defence minister’s business 
associates for improvements in conditions at a refugee camp at Moria, a village on the island of Lesbos, 
constituted a misuse of European Union funding. 
 
https://rsf.org/en/news/three-greek-journalists-covering-migrant-crisis-arrested-defamation 
 
HUNGARY 
 
Modality 1: Suspicion 
 
### No. 39 ### 
 
HUNGARY: Israeli intelligence firm targeted NGOs during election campaign 
 
Civic Space Watch 
23 July 2018 
 
The Israeli private intelligence firm Black Cube was involved in a campaign to discredit NGOs ahead of Hungary’s 
April election, according to a former Black Cube employee and a person with knowledge of the company’s inner 
workings. Between December 2017 and March 2018, Hungarian NGOs and individuals connected to American-
Hungarian businessman George Soros were contacted by agents using false identities who secretly recorded 
them. The recordings, which began appearing in the Jerusalem Post and Hungarian government-controlled daily 
paper Magyar Idők three weeks before Hungary’s election, were used by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to attack 
independent civil society organizations during the last days of the campaign. Orbán’s right-wing Fidesz party 
went on to win in a landslide. 
 
https://civicspacewatch.eu/hungary-israeli-intelligence-firm-targeted-ngos-during-election-campaign/ 
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Modality 2: Intimidation and Harassment 
 
### No. 40 ### 
 
Hungarian volunteers offer warm welcome for refugees 
  
Helen Womack 
UNHCR 
19 October 2016 
 
The article concerns Gabor Ivanyi, a college principal and the chair of the Hungarian Evangelical Brotherhood, 
whose volunteers attempted to deliver food to refugees at the Hungarian border fence this summer. “Some 
officers threatened to handcuff us. The situation varied from day to day. It depended on the attitudes of individual 
police and army personnel.” 
 
http://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2016/10/5805e78219/hungarian-volunteers-offer-warm-welcome-refugees.html  
 
### No. 41 ### 
 
Hungary steps up anti-immigration stance with plans for NGO tax 
 
The Guardian 
19 June 2018 
 
The Hungarian Parliament has passed a law which criminalises the work of NGOs helping migrants. The legislation 
states that anyone who falls foul of the law can face up to one year in prison and other sanctions. In addition, the 
new law will introduce a 25% tax on aid groups the government says support migration. The law is known as the 
‘Stop Soros’ law because it targets many organisations funded by the financier and philanthropist George Soros, 
whom Orban’s government considers one of the main backers of irregular migration in Europe. The law has 
worried human rights activists throughout the EU owing to its potential criminalisation of their work.  
 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/19/hungary-anti-immigration-plans-ngo-tax-orban-bill-criminalise-
aid 
This was also reported by Reuters, BBC, EU Observer. 
 
### No. 42 ### 
Soros foundation to quit Hungary by end-August 
 
Euractiv 
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17 August 2018 
 
The Open Society Foundations (OSF) announced in May that it was leaving Hungary, citing what it called the 
“repressive” policies of nationalist firebrand Prime Minister Viktor Orban. In June, Hungary passed the 
controversial so-called ‘Stop Soros’ law, which includes a punishment of up to a year in prison for anyone assisting 
someone who enters the country illegally. 
 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/soros-foundation-to-quit-hungary-by-end-august/ 
 
Modality 4: Formal Prosecution 
 
### No. 43 ### 
 
A migránsok is rákaptak a telekocsizásr 
(Car-pooling is popular among migrants) 
 
Origo 
4 September 2015 
 
This article addresses car-pooling in Austria and focuses on a car-pooling website that warns users to make sure 
they offer rides only to people who have a valid permit or visa or EU nationality.  
 
http://www.origo.hu/auto/20150904-telekocsi-migrans-mav-vonat.html  
 
### No. 44 ### 
 
On the road with volunteers offering refugees rides from Hungary 
  
Alison Langley 
DW 
7 September 2015 
 
This article is about volunteers who have rushed to the Hungarian border to help migrants on their journey to 
Austria and Germany, despite the illegality of their actions. They organised via Facebook, and while it was 
supposed to be only about free car rides, volunteers have also brought food, clothing and toiletries.  
 
http://www.dw.com/en/on-the-road-with-volunteers-offering-refugees-rides-from-hungary/a-18697098  
This was also reported by Aljazeera, Forbes. 
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### No. 45 ### 
 
Risking Arrest, Thousands of Hungarians Offer Help To Refugees  
(Audio and text) 
  
Lauren Frayer 
NPR 
29 September 2015 
 
This article is about migrants entering Hungary across the Croatian or Serbian borders. While volunteers can offer 
food and water, other forms of help are restricted: “Hungarian law prohibits offering rides – even for free – to 
people who've entered the country illegally and without a visa. Another law grants Hungarian police and military 
extraordinary powers to search private homes if they suspect someone of harboring illegal migrants”. Targeting 
traffickers, the laws can also be applied to well-intentioned volunteers and may have a chilling effect on those 
willing to offer assistance to migrants.  
 
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/09/29/444447532/risking-arrest-thousands-of-hungarians-offer-help-
to-refugees  
This was also reported by Aljazeera, Forbes. 
 
### No. 46 ### 
 
Brussels opens legal proceedings over Hungary's 'Stop Soros' law 
 
The Guardian 
19 July 2018 
 
The European Commission sent an official letter to Hungary over the so-called ‘Stop Soros’ law, which criminalises 
the work of individuals and non-governmental organisations helping asylum-seekers and migrants. The letter 
states that the Hungarian government, via the law, is breaching the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. This is 
the first step in a European legal process, and if Hungary does not address the issue, it could be taken to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Additionally, the European Commission announced that it referred Hungary to 
the ECJ for breaking other EU rules via asylum legislation related to the country’s detention camps.  
 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/19/brussels-begins-legal-action-against-hungary-over-stop-soros-
law?CMP=twt_gu 
This was also reported by BBC, Financial Times, Times of Israel, The Telegraph, UK Business Insider, Euronews. 
 
 
ITALY 
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Modality 1: Suspicion  
 
### No. 47 ### 
 
Sicily prosecutor accuses NGOs of collaboration with Libya smugglers 
 
Mark Casper 
Jurist 
23 April 2017 
 
Sicilian Prosecutor Carmelo Zuccaro stated to reporters that an investigation has revealed evidence of direct 
contacts between some NGOs and smugglers in Libya. He emphasised the importance of intervention by 
politicians as these NGOs have been receiving questionable funding for facilitating the landings in Europe in 
concert with smugglers.  
 
http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2017/04/sicily-prosecutor-ngos-cooperating-with-libya-smugglers.php  
This was also reported by DW, TheLocal, The Washington Post, RT, The New Arab, The Times, The Independent, 
BBC, Reuters, Express, The Telegraph, AnsaMed, Aljazeera, La Stampa. 
 
### No. 48 ### 
 
Migranti, sulle Ong Zuccaro insiste: “Notizie date da Frontex, non ho nuove prove”. Orlando: “Nessun 
illecito disciplinare”  
(Migrants, on Zuccaro Ong insists: “News given by Frontex, I have no new evidence.” Orlando: “No disciplinary offence”) 
 
Alessandra Ziniti 
Repubblica 
3 May 2017 
 
Carmelo Zuccaro claimed in front of the Senate’s Defence Committee that there was a link between NGOs and 
human traffickers. He added that there was no evidence yet that could be used in a courtroom, but claimed that 
with further investigative powers granted by the Ministry he would be able to prove the crimes by the NGOs and 
its volunteers. However, the Ministry of Justice decided there were not enough grounds to continue to pursue 
this request.  
 
http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/05/03/news/ong_migranti_scafisti_procura_catania_zuccaro-
164500643/?ref=RHPPLF-BH-I0-C8-P3-S2.4-T1  
This was also reported by Euractiv, Reuters, The Daily Beast, AP News, Reppublica, ABCNews. 
 
### No. 49 ### 
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Migranti e Ong, l’ammiraglio della Guardia costiera “assolve| tutti. Nuovo fronte a Trapani  
(Migrants and NGOs: coast guard admiral “performs” all; new front of Trapani) 
 
Alessandra Ziniti 
Repubblica 
4 May 2017 
 
Catanian Prosecutor Carmelo Zuccaro had to justify himself before the Defence Committee of Italian Senate. He 
was alleging links between NGOs conducting search and rescue and human traffickers. However, the commander 
of the Guardia Costiera, the Italian authority that coordinates to rescue at sea, opposed saying that “Humanitarian 
organisations help us.”  
 
http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/05/04/news/ong_l_ammiraglio_della_guardia_costiera_assolve_tutti-
164587424/?ref=RHPPLF-BH-I0-C8-P2-S1.8-T1  
 
### No. 50 ###  
 
Italy softens claim of NGOs colluding with smugglers 
 
Nikolaj Nielsen 
EUObserver 
8 June 2017 
 
Italy's interior under-secretary, Domenico Manzione, appears to have softened accusations that aid groups are 
complicit in smuggling people across the Mediterranean sea from Libya. Speaking to MEPs in the civil liberties 
committee (Libe), Manzione said NGOs are performing a welcomed duty in saving people at sea, but that they 
need to follow rules and be more transparent. 
https://euobserver.com/migration/138160 
 
 
 
 
### No. 51 ###  
 
Priest Named ‘Guardian Angel of Refugees’ Under Investigation in Italy 
 
Peter Ford 
News Deeply 
4 September 2017 
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Rev. Mussie Zerai has received hundreds of night-time distress calls from refugee boats over the years. Now the 
Eritrean Roman Catholic priest finds himself under investigation by Sicilian prosecutors for collusion with 
smugglers. 
 
https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2017/09/04/priest-named-guardian-angel-of-refugees-under-
investigation-in-italy 
This was also reported by La Croix. 
 
### No. 52 ###  
 
Save the Children suspends migrant rescues in Mediterranean 
 
Steve Scherer 
Reuters 
23 October 2017 
 
Italian police searched the Vos Hestia on Monday as part of a wider investigation into the role that non-
government organisations are playing in picking up migrants off the Libyan coast and bringing them to Italy. 
Save the Children said in a statement it was not under investigation and was cooperating with authorities. The 
documents seized by police concerned “presumed illegal actions committed by third persons”. 
 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-ngo/save-the-children-suspends-migrant-rescues-in-
mediterranean-idUSKBN1CS244 
 
 
 
### No. 53 ###  
 
Immigration en Italie: les exagérations de Matteo Salvini 
(Immigration in Italy: the exaggerations of Matteo Salvini) 
 
Le Monde 
27 September 2018 
 
Interviewed by the French weekly Valeurs actuelles, Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini justified his 
migration policy by explaining, “In Italy, we simply sought to lay down rules to stop what was, until recently, a 
real invasion”. He said, “[H]undreds of thousands of immigrants were daily brought to our shores by NGOs, in total 
indifference to the international community.” The statistics published by the Guardia Costiera are formal and 
reflect a reality different from that described by the leader of the far-right party La Ligue. 
 
https://abonnes.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2018/09/27/immigration-en-italie-les-exagerations-de-matteo-
salvini_5361175_4355770.html 
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Modality 3: Disciplining 
 
### No. 54 ###  
 
EU wil harder optreden tegen organisaties die migranten uit zee redden  
(EU wants to act tougher against organisations that rescue migrants at sea) 
 
Marc Peeperkorn 
Volkskrant 
4 July 2017 
 
EU countries believe refugee organisation lifeboats in the Mediterranean ferry illegal economic migrants to 
Europe. European Ministers of Justice will discuss a code of conduct which prohibits organisations from 
continuing to sail in Libyan waters and expanding their GPS systems.  
 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/eu-wil-harder-optreden-tegen-organisaties-die-migranten-uit-zee-
redden~a4504326/  
This was also reported by DW. 
 
Modality 4: Formal Prosecution 
 
### No. 55 ###  
 
Italia inmoviliza el barco de Proactiva Open Arms y acusa a la ONG de promover la inmigración ilegal  
(Italy detains Proactiva Open Arms boat and accuses NGO of promoting irregular migration) 
 
19 March 2018 
La Vanguardia 
 
The authorities of the Italian region of Catania have detained a boat belonging to Proactiva Open Arms. The 
organisation, which is the only Spanish NGO rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, has been accused by 
Sicilian prosecutors of encouraging irregular migration and “illegal association”. The order was issued after 
Proactiva refused to follow Libyan Coast Guard instructions to hand over migrants, owing to concern over how 
the migrants would be treated in Libya.  
 
https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20180319/441667332120/italia-retiene-barco-proactiva-open-arms-
inmigracion-ilegal.html 
This was also reported by El País, Open Migration , The Guardian, Reuters. 
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### No. 56 ###  
 
Italia libera el barco de la ONG española Open Arms  
(Italy releases boat of Spanish NGO Open Arms) 
 
Daniel Verdu and Carlos Garfella 
El Pais 
16 April 2018 
 
A judge in Ragusa (Sicily) decided to release the rescue ship belonging to the Spanish NGO Proactiva Open Arms, 
which had been immobilised for one month in Catania. Its crew was accused of human smuggling after assisting 
218 migrants and refusing to hand them over to the Libyan Coast Guard, due to concerns over how they would 
be treated in Libya. According to Proactiva’s founder, Oscar Camp, this is just “a first step” and the charges have 
not been dropped, as the Italian investigation is ongoing.  
 
https://elpais.com/politica/2018/04/16/actualidad/1523871692_947502.html 
This was also reported by The Local.  
### No. 57 ###  
 
Italy investigating German refugee rescue workers 
 
Deutsche Welle 
28 July 2018 
 
Italian prosecutors are investigating rescue workers for international NGOs, including some who work for the 
German NGO Jugend Rettet. The investigation comes as Italy’s populist government cracks down on private sea 
rescues. 
 
https://www.dw.com/en/italy-investigating-german-refugee-rescue-workers/a-44865029 
 
### No. 58 ###  
 
Italian jailed and fined after unwittingly driving migrants across border with BlaBlaCar  
 
Lillo Montalto Monella   
Euronews 
4 September 2018 
 
An Italian man was given a suspended nine-month jail sentence and a suspended hefty fine for unknowingly 
driving undocumented migrants over the border through the car-sharing service BlaBlaCar. 
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http://www.euronews.com/2018/09/04/italian-jailed-and-fined-after-unwittingly-driving-migrants-across-border-
with-blablacar 
 
### No. 59 ###  
 
Tunisian fishermen await trial after ‘saving hundreds of migrants’ 
 
Lorenzo Tondo in Palermo 
The Guardian 
5 September 2018 
 
According to their lawyers, six Tunisian men arrested at sea maintain they saw a migrant vessel in distress and a 
common decision was made to tow it to safety in Italian waters. They claim they called the Italian coastguard so 
it could intervene and take them to shore. Prosecutors have accused the men of illegally escorting the boat into 
Italian waters and say they have no evidence of an SOS sent by either the migrant boat or by the fishermen’s 
vessel. 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/05/tunisian-fishermen-await-trial-after-saving-hundreds-of-
migrants 
This was also reported by El País, BBC. 
 
### No. 60 ###  
 
Italy acquits Tunisian ‘migrant smuggling’ fishermen 
 
BBC 
22 September 2018 
 
Six Tunisian fishermen arrested earlier this month by Italian authorities for “aiding illegal migrants” have been 
cleared. Supporters of the fishermen, from the southeast coastal town of Zarzis, said the men were aiding a boat 
in distress. 
 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45613072 
 
### No. 61 ###  
 
Charities plea for help after Aquarius migrant rescue ship’s flag revoked 
 
Matthew Weaver  
The Guardian 
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24 September 2018 
 
The two charities that operate the Aquarius migrant rescue ship in the Mediterranean have urged European 
governments to step in to secure its future after its Panamanian flag was revoked following alleged pressure from 
the Italian government. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/24/italy-blamed-after-aquarius-migrant-rescue-ships-flag-revoked 
 
### No. 62 ###  
Il sindaco di Riace è stato arrestato 
(The mayor of Riace was arrested) 
 
Il Post 
2 October 2018 
 
Domenico Lucano, praised by many for his model of welcoming migrants, is under house arrest for facilitating 
illegal immigration and “marriages of convenience” for immigrants. 
 
https://www.ilpost.it/2018/10/02/sindaco-riace-domenico-lucano-arrestato/ 
This was also reported by BBC, The Guardian, DW, Independent (UK), The Telegraph (UK), NY Times. 
 
### No. 63 ###  
 
Domenico Lucano: Italy's migrant-friendly mayor banned from Riace 
 
BBC 
17 October 2018 
 
The mayor of Riace in southern Italy has been banished following accusations that he organised “marriages of 
convenience” for immigrants. The court order puts Domenico Lucano in the unusual position of being mayor of 
a town he is forbidden to step foot in. 
 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45887193 
 
 
MALTA 
Modality 2: Intimidation and Harassment 
 
### No. 64 ###  
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Rescue aircraft Moonbird is back in business - but not from Malta  
 
Times Malta 
10 October 2018 
 
The plane is now back in service, though not from Malta. The plane’s operations were formally blocked in July 
and it had not been allowed to fly since the end of May. The NGO has repeatedly insisted that there was no legal 
basis for the Maltese government to halt the plane’s operations. 
 
https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20181010/local/rescue-aircraft-moonbird-is-back-in-business-but-not-
from-malta.691250 
 
Modality 4: Formal Prosecution 
 
### No. 65 ###  
 
Migrant rescue ship Lifeline docks in Malta after days at sea 
 
BBC 
27 June 2018 
 
The vessel has been accused by Italy and France of ignoring international rules while carrying out its rescues. 
Malta has said it will detain the vessel while an investigation takes place. 
 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44636556 
This was also reported by Euractiv.  
### No. 66 ###  
 
 
German Lifeline ship captain facing Malta trial rejects guilt over migrant rescue operation 
 
Deutsche Welle 
2 July 2018 
 
Claus-Peter Reisch commanded the Lifeline when it saved hundreds of migrants off the coast of Libya. He accused 
European countries of accepting the deaths of migrants “for political reasons”. 
 
https://www.dw.com/en/german-lifeline-ship-captain-facing-malta-trial-rejects-guilt-over-migrant-rescue-
operation/a-44484938  
This was also reported by News Book. 
### No. 67 ###  
 
Malta detains second charity ship as death toll at sea rises 
 
Reuters 
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Chris Scicluna 
2 July 2018 
 
Malta detained on 2 July the German vessel Sea-Watch 3, part of a crackdown on NGO rescue vessels in the 
Mediterranean. Many NGOs stopped their activities last year due to such persecution, but Sea-Watch continued 
operating across the Mediterranean. This is the second rescue boat Malta has detained within a week; the Dutch-
flagged Lifeline was detained a few days earlier due to potential registration issues after Malta, for the first time 
in years, opened its port to 230 migrants to whom the Italian populist government refused to provide a safe port. 
 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-malta-ngo/malta-detains-second-charity-ship-as-death-toll-
at-sea-rises-idUSKBN1JS19S 
### No. 68 ###  
 
Migrants leave for Norway, others still stuck in Malta waiting for an EU lifeline 
 
Sarah Carabott 
Times Malta  
19 August 2018    
 
Some feared the ship could be impounded in Malta – a fate already suffered by three other rescue vessels, 
including the Sea-Watch 3 – because of registration issues. The Lifeline has been held in Malta since June. 
The Seefuchs and the Sea-Watch 3 are reportedly facing questions over registration. Sea-Watch insists its vessel 
was prevented from sailing for 51 days despite fulfilling all conditions of the flag state and having all the necessary 
registrations. It called on the government to put an “immediate end to the politically motivated blockade” of 
rescue vessels and stop “endangering human lives”. 
 
https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20180819/local/migrants-leave-for-norway-others-still-stuck-in-
malta.686994 
This was also reported by Independent Malta. 
 
### No. 69 ###  
 
 
Saving lives without a licence: Rescue ship trial delayed in Malta 
 
Neave Barker 
Aljazeera 
24 October 2018 
 
A court in Malta postpones the trial of Claus-Peter Reisch, a German captain of a refugee rescue ship impounded 
by the government. 
 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/saving-life-licence-rescue-ship-trial-delayed-malta-
181003063133295.html 
Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants: 2018 update 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 155 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Modality 1: Suspicion  
 
### No. 70 ###  
 
Docs not Cops  
 
29 September 2015 
 
This is a campaign against the Immigration Act 2014. The NHS has provided free health care to UK residents since 
1948, but with this Act, the government is planning to charge certain non-EU migrants before they are allowed 
treatment. Moreover, refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants will be excluded from many crucial 
services.   
 
http://www.docsnotcops.co.uk/    
This was reported by Red Pepper, NPA, Politics, OpenDemocracy, The Independent, The Independent, Doctors of 
the World, Politics, Doctors of the World, Doctors of the World, The Guardian, The Independent, RightToRemain, 
Novaramedia, Gal-Dem, Novaramedia, OpenDemocracy, OpenDemocracy, RS21, BMJ, Uneven Earth, Institute of 
Race Relations, The Guardian. 
 
### No. 71 ###  
 
 
The Hostile Environment: Turning the UK into a Nation of Border Cops 
 
Staff writer 
Corporate Watch 
9 April 2017 
 
This is a very detailed report of the Home Office’s “hostile environment” measures against “unwanted” migrants, 
including compulsory identification checks in hospitals and schools, and multiple bans on “unwanted migrants” 
from renting homes, opening bank accounts or getting a driving licence. All these measures involve information 
sharing, criminalisation of migrants, citizen collaboration, and medical aspects.  
 
https://corporatewatch.org/the-hostile-environment-turning-the-uk-into-a-nation-of-border-cops-2/ 
This was also reported by Politics, OpenDemocracy, The Guardian. 
 
### No. 72 ###  
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Big Brother state: How May's obsession with immigration turned Britain into a surveillance state 
 
Politics 
Natalie Bloomer and Samir Jeraj 
11 September 2017 
 
Today, some of society’s most vulnerable people are so afraid of being turned over to the Home Office that they 
feel unable to access healthcare, find safe accommodation or seek justice for crimes committed against them. 
And with good reason. 
http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2017/09/11/how-may-turned-britain-into-a-surveillance-society 
 
Modality 2: Intimidation and Harassment 
 
### No. 73 ###  
 
Spanish rescuers ‘told by Italy to stay away from dinghy in distress’ 
 
The Guardian 
29 June 2018 
 
The crew of a Spanish rescue ship have said that Italian officials told them to let the Libyan Coast Guard respond 
to a distress call from a smuggling boat carrying migrants – only to hear shortly afterward that 100 migrants were 
missing and feared dead in the same area. 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/29/italy-and-libya-accused-after-migrant-deaths-in-dinghy-sinking 
 
### No. 74 ###  
 
Italy’s closure to rescue ships drives up sea deaths: think tank 
 
Steve Scherer 
Reuters  
1 October 2018 
 
Since taking power in June, Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, who heads the far-right League party, has refused to 
allow charity rescue ships to dock in Italy, a policy that has broad popular support after the arrival of almost 
650,000 people from North Africa since 2014. But International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates of the 
number of dead or missing at sea suggest there are dire consequences to this policy, according to Matteo Villa, a 
researcher at Italy’s ISPI think tank. 
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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-italy/italys-closure-to-rescue-ships-drives-up-sea-deaths-think-
tank-idUSKCN1MB353 
 
Modality 4: Formal Prosecution 
 
### No. 75 ###  
 
Man who tried to smuggle child refugee into UK: ‘I'd never do it again. Well ... ’ 
 
Josh Halliday 
The Guardian 
2 January 2017 
 
This article is about Rob Lawrie, a former soldier, who was arrested at the Calais border when officers found an 
Afghan girl in his van. He explains how his life has changed and how, even if he narrowly avoided jail for trying to 
smuggle a child refugee into Britain, that he would attempt to get a minor to safety again if he thought he could 
get away with it. 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/02/man-who-tried-to-smuggle-child-refugee-into-uk-id-never-do-it-
again-well-?CMP=share_btn_tw  
This was also reported by DailyMail, The Guardian, The Independent, The Yorkshire Post, BBC (audio), Change.org 
(petition), BBC, DailyMail, Sky News, NBC News, LeMonde, JustGiving (campaign), Newsweek, Libération, 
HuffingtonPost, New Internationalist. 
### No. 76 ###  
 
EU citizens could face repeat of Windrush scandal, say landlords  
 
Jamie Grierson 
The Guardian 
8 October 2018 
  
The Residential Landlords Association has called for hard copy documents for EU citizens. The landlords have said 
that EU citizens living in the UK are at risk of facing some of the same difficulties caused for the Windrush 
generation by a lack of legal certainty around their status after Brexit. Under the right to rent rules of Theresa 
May’s hostile environment policy, landlords are required to check the immigration status of potential tenants or 
risk prosecution. 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/oct/08/eu-citizens-could-face-repeat-of-windrush-scandal-say-
landlords  
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EUROPEAN UNION 
### No. 77 ###  
 
 
Protection of human rights defenders is vital to realise OSCE human rights commitments, says 
OSCE/ODIHR Director Link 
  
Staff writer (press release) 
OSCE 
9 December 2016 
 
Michael Georg Link, director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, reaffirmed that the 
protection of human rights defenders is essential for OSCE participating states: “Human rights defenders are often 
the focus of threats, attacks and legal harassment simply for trying to protect the rights of society’s most 
vulnerable people, without discrimination. I encourage OSCE participating States to seriously consider the 
Hamburg Declaration, which outlines many important actions to safeguard human rights defenders from 
restrictions contrary to OSCE commitments.” 
 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/287861  
This was also reported by Diplomatic Intelligence. 
 
Modality 1: Suspicion  
 
### No.78 ###  
 
EU border force accuses charities of collusion with migrant smugglers 
 
Duncan Robinson  
Financial Times 
15 December 2016 
 
According to a report in the Financial Times, EU border agency Frontex has accused NGOs of colluding with people 
smugglers operating in the central Mediterranean, stating in a confidential report that it has logged the “[f]irst 
reported case where the criminal networks were smuggling migrants directly on an NGO vessel”. 
 
https://www.ft.com/content/3e6b6450-c1f7-11e6-9bca-2b93a6856354  
This was also reported by Euractiv, DailyBeast, LaTribune, DailyMail, Statewatch, The Intercept. 
 
### No. 79 ###  
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Correction: Charities in the Mediterranean 
(Retraction by Financial Times) 
22 December 2016 
 
An article on December 15 about charities and people smugglers overstated the content of confidential briefings 
from the EU’s border agency, Frontex, by reporting that the agency had accused charities of colluding with 
migrant smugglers in the Mediterranean. The agency had raised a number of concerns about charities’ interaction 
with migrant smugglers, as reported in our revised article, but had not itself made a direct accusation of collusion. 
 
https://www.ft.com/content/eae123e2-c840-11e6-9043-7e34c07b46ef 
This was also reported by TIME 
 
### No. 80 ###  
 
NGO rescues off Libya encourage traffickers, says EU borders chief 
   
Patrick Wintour 
The Guardian  
29 February 2017 
 
Speaking to Germany’s Die Welt newspaper, Mr. Fabrice Leggeri, the head of Frontex, called for rescue operations 
in the Mediterranean to be re-evaluated, and accused NGOs of ineffectively cooperating with security agencies 
against human traffickers.  
 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/27/ngo-rescues-off-libya-encourage-traffickers-eu-borders-chief  
This was also reported by Express, HurriyetDailyNews, Frontexit, The European Post, Reuters, NewsThatMoves, 
The Times UK, EuroNews, EuroPost. 
 
### No. 81 ###  
 
New Evidence Undermines EU Report Tying Refugee Rescue Group to Smugglers 
 
Zach Campbell 
The Intercept 
2 April 2017 
 
But the idea that NGOs are directly involved in smuggling people into Europe has swept through conservative 
media in recent months, fueled by a news report that the European Union’s border agency, Frontex, had “accused 
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charities operating in the Mediterranean of colluding with people smugglers.” The report, which appeared in the 
Financial Times in December, didn’t name any particular charities, and it quickly started to show holes; within a 
week, the paper issued a correction and Frontex distanced itself from the accusations. 
 
https://theintercept.com/2017/04/02/new-evidence-undermines-eu-report-tying-refugee-rescue-group-to-
smugglers/ 
This was also reported by Aljazeera, Subsequently, Frontex distanced itself from the accusation  
(https://twitter.com/PatrickKingsley/status/809424345651154944?ref_src=twsrc%5etfw) 
 
### No. 82 ###  
 
EU migration crisis: border agency accused of stirring controversy  
 
Stephanie Kirchgaessner 
The Guardian 
5 April 2017 
 
Mario Giro, Italy’s deputy foreign minister, said the recent allegation by Frontex – which suggested that aid 
groups were indirectly supporting criminal traffickers – showed a fundamental misunderstanding of so-called 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that are encouraging hundreds of thousands of people from Africa and the Middle East 
to leave their homes and make the treacherous journey across the Mediterranean to Europe. 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/05/eu-migration-crisis-frontex-people-traffickers  
 
### No. 83 ###  
 
Refugee rescue group accuses EU border agency of conspiracy  
 
Staff writer 
Euractiv 
13 April 2017 
 
Spanish NGO ProActiva, which has been rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean since 2016, accused the EU’s 
border control agency Frontex on 12 April of plotting to discredit private aid organisations in order to put off 
donors.  
 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/refugee-rescue-group-accuse-eu-border-agency-of-
conspiracy/  
This was also reported by The Intercept, Malta Today, Standard-Examiner, Jordan Times, Aljazeera, SputnikNews. 
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Modality 2: Intimidation and Harassment 
 
### No. 84 ###  
 
European Parliament wants to put an end to the solidarity offence in Europe 
 
Cécile Barbière 
Euractiv 
9 July 2018 
 
The European Parliament has approved a resolution expressing concern over the negative consequences that EU 
legislation is provoking over people who help migrants, since in some countries those assisting migrants and 
asylum-seekers are being accused of boosting smuggling. Members of the European Parliament have stressed 
that European legislation stipulates that Member States have the option of not penalising people when their 
assistance is humanitarian. For this reason, they have called on governments to adapt their legislation and ensure 
that citizens and civil society organisations assisting migrants “are not criminalised”. The document calls on the 
European Commission to adopt clear guidelines for Member States which specify which actions will not be 
penalised, in order to ensure clarity when applying European directives. 
 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/european-parliament-wants-to-put-an-end-to-the-
solidarity-offence-in-europe/ 
This was also reported by El diario.es. 
### No. 85 ###  
 
Ships ‘not willing to save Mediterranean migrants’ say aid groups as Aquarius seeks safe harbour 
 
Hannah Strange 
The Telegraph 
12 August 2018 
 
The NGOs said that those on board reported encountering five boats which did not offer assistance, a “disturbing 
development” that suggested Italy’s ban on rescue ships was deterring crews from helping migrants in distress. 
 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/12/ships-not-willing-save-mediterranean-migrants-say-aid-
groups/?utm_source=ECRE+Newsletters&utm_campaign=9047056a42-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_08_13_03_36&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3ec9497afd-9047056a42-422323345 
### No. 86 ###  
 
Humanitarian ship seeks European port for rescued migrants 
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EURACTIV 
13 August 2018 
 
“Ships might be unwilling to respond to those in distress due to the high risk of being stranded and denied a 
place of safety”, said Aloys Vimard, MSF’s project coordinator on board the Aquarius. 
 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/humanitarian-ship-seeks-european-port-for-rescued-
migrants/ 
 
### No. 87 ###  
 
One in 18 migrants die crossing the Mediterranean as death rate soars amid divisions over EU rescue policy 
 
James Crisp 
The Telegraph 
3 September 2018 
 
The UN report blamed the increase in the death rate on fewer NGO boats being active on the Libyan coast. In 
2017, there were eight but now there are just two. The Libyan Coast Guard, which has two patrol boats, is now 
the main organisation intervening off the Libyan coast. 
 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/03/migrant-death-rate-mediterranean-rises-despite-fewer-crossings/ 
 
### No. 88 ###  
 
No NGO rescue boats currently in central Mediterranean, agencies warn 
 
Lorenzo Tondo and Karen McVeigh 
The Guardian 
22 September 2018 
 
Thousands of migrants risk dying at sea because of a clampdown on NGO rescue ships, aid agencies have warned, 
in what has been their longest period of absence from the central Mediterranean since they began operating in 
late 2015. Since 26 August, no NGO rescue vessel has operated on the main migration routes between north 
Africa and southern Europe. 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/12/migrant-rescue-ships-mediterranean  
 
### No. 89 ###  
 
Spain saves some 440 migrants as Panama gets involved in controversy with NGOs 
 
Malta Independent 
Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants: 2018 update 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 163 
24 September 2018 
 
While Spain’s maritime rescue service pulled 447 people to safety on Saturday in the western Mediterranean, two 
humanitarian groups which operate the last private rescue vessel in the central Mediterranean, along what is 
considered the deadliest route for trafficked migrants, said Panama had revoked the ship's registration in 
response to Italian complaints. 
 
http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2018-09-24/world-news/Spain-saves-some-440-migrants-as-Panama-
gets-involved-in-controversy-with-NGOs-6736196760 
### No. 90 ###  
 
« Pour les migrants en mer, le plus grand danger ce sont la politique, les politiciens et la politique 
extérieure de l’UE » 
(For migrants at sea, biggest danger is EU politics, politicians and foreign policy) 
 
Par Nick Romaniuk (Research Coordinator and rescue for SOS Méditerranée  in the vessel « Aquarius ») 
Le Monde (Idées) 
02 October 2018 
 
Nick Romaniuk, a research coordinator aboard the Aquarius, deplores the growing indifference to migrants lost 
at sea, writing in the newspaper Le Monde. He is surprised to have become a criminal when he works only to save 
lives. 
 
https://abonnes.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/10/02/pour-les-migrants-en-mer-le-plus-grand-danger-c-est-la-
politique-les-politiciens-et-la-politique-exterieure-de-l-ue_5363276_3232.html? 
 
### No. 91 ###  
 
Europe’s migrant rescue boats face uncertain future 
 
Lewis Sanders IV 
Deutsche Welle 
4 October 2018 
 
The privately-operated rescue ship Aquarius arrived on Thursday in the port of Marseille in southern France after 
Panamanian authorities revoked its registration. Without a flag, the Aquarius is unable to operate in a legal 
capacity while in international waters. Before losing its flag, it was considered the last privately-operated ship 
conducting rescue missions on the Mediterranean. However, the Aquarius is not the only privately-operated 
rescue ship in legal limbo. Others, including those of Sea-Watch and Proactiva Open Arms, have been docked in 
Malta since earlier this year. 
 
https://www.dw.com/en/europes-migrant-rescue-boats-face-uncertain-future/a-45754123 
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### No. 92 ###  
 
Cómo respondió Europa a los otros ‘Aquarius’ de este verano 
(How Europe responded to this summer’s other “Aquarius”) 
 
Naiara Galarraga Gortázar   
El País 
6 November 2018 
 
The lack of a common policy for disembarking irregular migrants rescued in the Mediterranean Sea led to a great 
number of vessels being stranded this summer. In the majority of cases, EU Member States took days to agree on 
which countries would receive and process their asylum demand. This situation was considered one of the main 
causes for discouraging vessels to fulfil their obligation under international law to rescue people in distress at sea. 
 
https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/10/12/actualidad/1539373409_293746.html  
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ANNEX 2. COMPILATION OF NEW EVIDENCE: CIVIL SOCIETY REPORTS AND 
ACADEMIC RESEARCH  
 
Annex 2 lists a number of relevant reports on the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance published between 
2016 and 2018. The reports are organised in the categories European Union, France, Greece and Global. Moreover, 
they are displayed in chronological order – from the most recent to the oldest. The report’s monitoring illustrates 
the growing concern expressed by important stakeholders such as academia, research institutes, European 
agencies and civil society itself, over the escalation and the systemic nature of the phenomenon of policing civil 
society actors. 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Policing Humanitarianism: EU Policies Against Human Smuggling and their Impact on Civil Society 
 
Sergio Carrera, Valsamis Mitsilegas, Jennifer Allsopp and Lina Vosyliute 
Hart Publishing 
24 January 2019 
 
Policing Humanitarianism examines the ways in which European Union policies aimed at countering the 
phenomenon of migrant smuggling affect civil society activities in the provision of humanitarian assistance, and 
access to rights for irregular immigrants and asylum seekers. It explores the effects of EU policies, laws and 
agencies’ operations in anti-migrant smuggling actions and their implementation in the following EU Member 
States: Italy, Greece, Hungary and the UK. The book critically studies policies designed and implemented since 
2015, during the so-called ‘European refugee humanitarian crisis’. 
 
https://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/policing-humanitarianism-9781509923014/ 
 
### 
 
The shrinking space for solidarity with migrants and refugees: how the European Union and Member 
States target and criminalize defenders of the rights of people on the move 
 
Yasha Maccanico, Ben Hayes, Samuel Kenny 
Published by Transnational Institute (TNI) 
September 2018 
 
This report looks at how EU policy has played out and offers a glimpse into the ways citizens and movements are 
resisting xenophobic and securitarian policies.  
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https://www.tni.org/en/publication/the-shrinking-space-for-solidarity-with-migrants-and-refugees 
 
### 
 
Humanitarian citizens: breaking the law to protect human rights 
 
Janina Pescinski 
OpenDemocracy  
28 August 2017 
 
This article draws on research that was presented at the European International Studies Association Pan-
European Conference on International Relations in September 2017 
(http://www.paneuropeanconference.org/2017/). It is about how the EU’s crackdown on irregular immigration 
has impacted those providing humanitarian assistance to migrants. The EU Facilitation Directive (2002) 
“criminalises any act that facilitates the entry, transit or stay of unauthorized foreigners”, but there is an optional 
humanitarian clause, at the States’ discretion, that allows them not to impose sanctions on people whose aim is 
to provide humanitarian assistance. The article focuses on the French example of “délit de solidarité” and the 
story of Cédric Herrou. 
 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/mediterranean-journeys-in-hope/janina-pescinski/humanitarian-citizens-
breaking-law-to-protect-human-  
This was also reported by Amnesty International. 
### 
 
Crackdown on NGOs assisting refugees and other migrants 
Lina Vosyliute and Carmine Conte 
ReSOMA 
July 2018 
 
Since 2015, NGOs providing humanitarian assistance and search and rescue have been experiencing an 
unprecedented policing of their activities. ReSOMA’s first discussion brief on the topic analyses the trends behind 
these criminalisation cases, their causes and possible deterrent effects. NGOs and researchers can submit their 
evidence through the ReSOMA project to contribute to the Commission’s Observatory of criminalisation cases 
and to draft effective guidelines that would present them. 
 
http://www.resoma.eu/sites/resoma/resoma/files/policy_brief/pdf/Policy%20Briefs_topic4_Crackdown%20on%20N
GOs_0.pdf 
 
### 
 
Policing the mobility society: the effects of EU anti-migrant smuggling policies on humanitarianism: 
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Sergio Carrera; Jennifer Allsopp; Lina Vosyliūtė 
27 July 2018 
International Journal of Migration and Border Studies 
 
This article examines the ways in which the EU’s political priority of countering migrant smuggling affects the 
provision of humanitarian assistance and access to rights to irregular immigrants and asylum seekers. It explores 
the effects of EU policies, laws and agencies’ operations in anti-migrant smuggling actions, and their 
implementation in two EU member states, Italy and Greece, in the context of the ‘European refugee humanitarian 
crisis’ during 2015-2017. It shows that the effects of EU and national policies criminalising the facilitation of entry 
and residence of irregular immigrants extend beyond cases where civil society actors have faced actual 
prosecutions and criminal convictions when assisting irregular immigrants and asylum seekers. It uses the notion 
‘policing the mobility society’ to capture wider punitive dynamics which affect the activities of civil society actors, 
especially those critically monitoring and politically mobilising for the rights of migrants. 
 
https://www.inderscience.com/info/inarticle.php?artid=93912 
 
### 
Crimes of Solidarity in Mobility: Alternative Views on Migrant Smuggling 
 
Sheldon X. Zhang, Gabriella E. Sanchez, Luigi Achilli 
The Annals 
21 February 2018 
 
This volume of The Annals presents a collection of empirically-based research projects on migrant smuggling, 
seeking to create a more nuanced understanding of the topic that supersedes perspectives that are often found 
in mainstream narratives of unscrupulous and ruthless criminal gangs preying on vulnerable and desperate 
migrants. The contributing authors rely on field data to reveal the complex and often symbiotic relationships 
between migrants and the people behind their journeys. Often misunderstood in juxtaposition to narratives of 
security and control, the lived experiences of migrants describe smuggling facilitators as relatives or close friends, 
acquaintances or distant operators – all members of a social network of varying relational proximity. Vulnerability 
in migration grows as the travel distance and transit points increase and the density of one’s own community ties 
decreases. The procurement of smuggling services is always situated within the collective wisdom and lived 
experiences of the migrants and their communities, and the strategies to increase the odds of success and to 
reduce the hazards and uncertainty of traversing foreign terrains. 
### 
Fundamental rights considerations: NGO ships involved in search and rescue in the Mediterranean and 
criminal investigations 
 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) 
2018 
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This FRA document compiles all the NGOs and their vessels/aircrafts involved in SAR activities in the 
Mediterranean as well as legal proceedings against them in the period of 2015-2018. 
 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-ngos-sar-mediterranean_en.pdf. 
 
### 
 
 
Desperate Journeys: Refugees and migrants arriving in Europe and at Europe’s borders 
 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
January–August 2018 
 
The UN Refugee Agency shows that crossing the Mediterranean Sea has become even more deadly. The report 
shows that while the total number of people arriving in Europe has fallen, the rate of deaths has risen sharply, 
particularly for those crossing via the Mediterranean Sea, due to the lack of rescue capacity. 
 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/65373#_ga=2.60771502.200247833.1538036092-
49319563.1538036092 
 
### 
 
Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea 
 
Amnesty International 
2018 
 
This report touches upon the subject of the demonisation of NGOs and the criminalisation of solidarity in Section 
3. 
 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR3089062018ENGLISH.pdf 
 
### 
 
Blaming the Rescuers  
 
“Criminalizing Solidarity, Re-enforcing Deterrence” 
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Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani 
Forensic Oceanography, Forensic Architecture, Goldsmiths, University of London 
Realised with the support of Borderline Europe, the WatchTheMed platform and Transmediale 
2018 
 
At the core of this report, lies the analysis of the dynamics of migration across the sea between 2015 and 2016. 
The authors rely on official documents, statistics, qualitative interviews, photographs and maps to assess how the 
conditions and the danger of crossings has evolved, and how the main actors operating at sea (including the 
state-led operations of the EU and its member states at sea, Libyan officials, smugglers, SAR NGOs and migrants) 
have affected them. While the report generates substantial new data, it also relies on existing analysis by official 
bodies and other forms of expertise. This demonstrates that the analysis on offer would have been available had 
it not been occluded by attacks against SAR NGOs. 
 
English: https://blamingtherescuers.org/report/ 
French: https://blamingtherescuers.org/assets/annexes/Blamingtherescuers_summary_French_upload.pdf 
 
### 
Humanitarianism: Unacceptable Face of Solidarity 
 
Liz Fekete, Frances Webber and Anya Edmond-Pettitt 
Institute of Race 
2017 
 
The report discusses the current shrinking space and isolation of NGOs as well as their criminalisation when 
acting in solidarity towards irregular migrants, especially regarding assistance at land and sea borders. 
 
http://s3-eu-west-
2.amazonaws.com/wpmedia.outlandish.com/irr/2017/11/10092853/Humanitarianism_the_unacceptable_face_of_
solidarity.pdf 
 
### 
 
 
Crossing the Mediterranean Sea by Boat: Mapping and documenting migratory journeys and 
experiences 
 
Dr Vicki Squire, Dr Angeliki Dimitriadi, Dr Maria Pisani, Dr Dallal Stevens, Professor Nick Vaughan‑Williams, Dr 
Nina Perkowski, Dr Vasiliki Touhouliotis 
The University of Warwick  
May 2017 
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This international project is comprised of researchers at the University of Warwick, University of Malta, and the 
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. The research team has carried out 257 in-depth qualitative 
interviews with a total of 271 participants across seven sites in two phases: Kos, Malta and Sicily from September-
November 2015, and Athens, Berlin, Istanbul and Rome from May-July 2016. Additional interviews were carried 
out in Malta until March 2016. It focuses on the impact policies have directly on migrants, by “drawing together 
policy analysis and observational fieldwork with an in-depth analysis of qualitative interview data with people 
making – or contemplating making – the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean Sea.”  
 
Online interactive map accessible at: https://crossing-the-med-map.warwick.ac.uk/  
https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/crossingthemed/output/crossing_the_med_
evidence_brief_ii.pdf  
This was also reported by Researchgate, GMDAC-IOM, Research Councils UK, ALDA, Birkbeck University of 
London, Redvince, PHYS.org, Time Of Malta. 
 
### 
 
Decriminalising ‘Humanitarian Smuggling’ (RSC Research in Brief, no.6) 
 
Rachel Landry 
University of Oxford – Refugee Studies Centre  
7 March 2017  
 
This is a summary of the RSC Working Paper no. 119 “The ‘humanitarian smuggling’ of refugees: criminal offence 
or moral obligation?” It outlines the concept of “humanitarian smuggling”, and critiques smuggling prohibitions 
at the international and the EU levels. It argues that these prohibitions are overbroad and vague and fail to meet 
basic requirements of the rule of law. Moreover, they criminalise acts that fall outside the law’s stated purpose 
and that are often ethically defensible. 
 
https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/research-in-brief-decriminalising-humanitarian-smuggling  
 
### 
Research in Brief: Decriminalising ‘Humanitarian Smuggling’ 
 
Rachel Landry 
University of Oxford, Refugee studies centre 
7 March 2017 
 
This research brief summarises the legal and policy findings from the RSC Working Paper no. 119, "The 
‘humanitarian smuggling’ of refugees: criminal offence or moral obligation?" It outlines the concept of 
‘humanitarian smuggling’, and then critiques smuggling prohibitions at the international and the EU levels. It 
argues that these prohibitions are overbroad and vague, failing to meet basic requirements of the rule of law. 
Moreover, they criminalise acts that fall outside the law’s stated purpose, acts that are often ethically defensible. 
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Finally, the brief analyses existing proposals to improve the framework governing smuggling and provides 
additional recommendations to decriminalise ‘humanitarian smugglers’. 
 
https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/research-in-brief-decriminalising-humanitarian-smuggling 
 
### 
EMSC First Year Activity Report  
 
Europol 
24 February 2017 
 
Europol launched the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) in February 2016. In this report, from January 
2016 to January 2017, Europol reveal that 17,459 new suspected migrant smugglers were identified (+24% v 
2015).  
 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/emsc-first-year-activity-report  
This was also reported by The Independent. 
 
### 
 
Fit for Purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the Criminalisation of Humanitarian Assistance to 
Irregular Migrants 
 
Dr Sergio Carrera, Prof. Elspeth Guild, Dr Ana Aliverti, Ms Jennifer Allsopp, Ms Maria Giovanna Manieri, Ms 
Michele Levoy. 
The Policy Department for Citizen's Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
2016 
 
This is a study, commissioned by the European Parliament, that assesses existing EU legislation aimed at 
countering people smuggling – the 2002 Facilitators’ Package – and how it deals with those providing 
humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants. 
 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/536490/IPOL_STU(2016)536490_EN.pdf  
This was also reported by CEPS, European Area of Freedom Security and Justice, Migration4Development, 
SocialPlatform, ECRE. 
 
### 
 
Proud to Aid and Abet Refugees: The Criminalization of ‘Flight Helpers’ in Greece 
 
Mariana Gkliati 
Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
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University of Oxford, Faculty of Law 
23 May 2016 
 
Mariana Gkliati discusses alarming developments in EU policy that indicate a tendency towards placing a strain 
upon civil society that has been providing humanitarian assistance to newcomers at the EU’s external borders. 
 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-
criminologies/blog/2016/05/proud-aid-and 
### 
 
Why Cooperating with Libya on Migration Could Damage the EU’s Standing 
 
John Sunderland 
Newsweek  
11 May 2016 
 
The European mission to train Libya’s coast guard and navy to stop people smugglers raises legal and ethical 
questions.  
 
http://www.newsweek.com/why-cooperating-libya-migration-could-damage-eus-standing-516099  
 
### 
 
FRANCE 
 
Calais: police harassment of volunteers 
 
Eleonore Vigny 
L’Aubergue des Migrants, Utopia, Help Refugees, Refugee Info Bus 
July 2018 
 
During the studied time, from 1 November to 1 July 2018, 646 incidents related to intimidation of volunteers in 
Calais were registered. This report outlines this intimidation and daily harassment that volunteers in Calais 
experience at the hands of French police. 
 
EN: https://helprefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Police-Harrassment-of-Volunteers-in-Calais-1.pdf 
FR: http://www.laubergedesmigrants.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Rapport-Calais-le-harc%C3%A8lement-
policier-des-b%C3%A9n%C3%A9voles.pdf 
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### 
 
GREECE 
 
Proud to Aid and Abet Refugees: The Criminalization of ‘Flight Helpers’ in Greece 
 
Mariana Gkliati 
Oxford Faculty of Law  
21 March 2016 & 23 May 2016 
 
In these two articles, Mariana Gkliati, a PhD researcher at the Institute of Immigration Law (Leiden University), 
discusses the strain placed upon people providing humanitarian assistance to migrants in the EU.  
 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-
criminologies/blog/2016/05/proud-aid-and 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-
criminologies/blog/2016/03/registering  
 
 
GLOBAL  
 
Evidential Issues in Trafficking in Persons Cases: Case Digest  
 
Case Digest 
United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
2017 
 
Analysing 135 cases, from 31 jurisdictions, this Case Digest aims to assist criminal justice practitioners around the 
world in addressing the recurring evidential issues typical of human trafficking cases.  
 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2017/Case_Digest_Evidential_Issues_in_Trafficking.pdf  
This was also reported by International Center for Missing & Exploited children, FreeMovement, Electronic 
Immigration Network, OAS. 
### 
 
Beyond anecdotes: getting to the heart of human smuggling 
 
Institute for Security Studies – Africa (ISS) 
14 December 2016 
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This is a short infographic video explaining the smuggling phenomenon and the counterproductive anti-
smuggling industry. The research brief also highlights how migrants are losing trust in international humanitarian 
actors, as they see them as among those who want to stop migration and thus not help migrants migrate.  
 
https://issafrica.org/media-resources/videos-and-infographics/beyond-anecdotes-getting-to-the-heart-of-human-
smuggling    
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ANNEX 3. REFIT PUBLIC CONSULTATION: SELECTED QUESTIONS 
 
Figure A1. Question 7: Main issues affecting implementation for all categories of respondents 
 
Source: European Commission (2017), REFIT evaluation of the EU legal framework against facilitation of unauthorised entry, 
transit and residence: The Facilitators’ Package, Directive 2002/90/EC and Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA, Staff Working 
Document, SWD (2017) 117 final, Brussels, 22 March, Annex II – Stakeholder Consultation, p. 49. 
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Figure A2. Question 7: Main issues affecting implementation for categories other than private individuals 
 
Source: European Commission (2017), REFIT evaluation of the EU legal framework against facilitation of unauthorised entry, 
transit and residence: The Facilitators’ Package, Directive 2002/90/EC and Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA, Staff Working 
Document, SWD (2017) 117 final, Brussels, 22 March, p. 50. 
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Figure A3. Question 8: Is the definition sufficiently clear and adequate to meet the objectives? 
 
Source: European Commission (2017), REFIT evaluation of the EU legal framework against facilitation of unauthorised entry, 
transit and residence: The Facilitators’ Package, Directive 2002/90/EC and Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA, Staff Working 
Document, SWD (2017) 117 final, Brussels, 22 March, p. 52. 
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ANNEX 4. EU AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: OVERVIEW OF NGO 
SHIPS INVOLVED IN SEARCH AND RESCUE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND 
UNDER CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
 
Table 1: NGOs involved in SAR activities in the Mediterranean and vessels/aircrafts deployed by them 
(2015-2018) 
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Note: * = ‘country’ means the state where the NGO has been established or registered  
Table 8 Source: FRA (2018), “Fundamental rights considerations: NGO ships involved in search and rescue in the 
Mediterranean and criminal investigations”, (http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/asylum-migration-borders/ngos-sar-
activities) (based on publicly available information) 
 
Table 2: Legal proceedings against private entities involved in SAR operations in the EU 
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Table 9 Source: FRA (2018), “Fundamental rights considerations: NGO ships involved in search and rescue in the 
Mediterranean and criminal investigations”, (http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/asylum-migration-borders/ngos-sar-
activities) (based on publicly available information) 
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This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for 
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the PETI Committee, 
aims to update the 2016 study ‘‘Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and 
the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants’’. It takes 
stock of and examines the latest developments that have taken place since 
2016, specifically the legislative and policy changes, along with various forms 
and cases of criminalisation of humanitarian actors, migrants’ family members 
and basic service providers. The study uses the notion of ‘policing 
humanitarianism’ to describe not only cases of formal prosecution and 
sentencing in criminal justice procedures, but also wider dynamics of suspicion, 
intimidation, harassment and disciplining in five selected Member States -- 
Belgium, France, Greece, Hungary and Italy. Policing humanitarianism 
negatively affects EU citizens’ rights -- such as the freedom of assembly, 
freedom of speech and freedom of conscience. When civil society is effectively 
(self-)silenced and its accountability role undermined, policies to combat 
migrant smuggling may be overused and give rise to serious breaches of the 
EU’s founding values, notably the rule of law, democracy and fundamental 
rights. Moreover, policing humanitarianism negatively affects wider societal 
trust and diverts the limited resources of law enforcement from investigating 
more serious crimes. 
